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Mapping Media Bias In China
Abstract

This exploratory study investigates the landscape of media bias in China. First, I propose a new conceptual
framework for identifying media bias that is more comprehensive and less context-sensitive than existing
models. The framework includes two independent dimensions: an ideological dimension, which is organized
as clusters rather than a continuum, and a structural dimension which reveals the relationship of media outlets
to the center of political and/or economic power in a given nation state. I then present a novel mixed-methods
approach to document media bias across different contexts. This approach draws from previous literature on
political communication, journalism studies, and network analysis. More specifically, to gauge the ideological
bias of Chinese media, I analyze the journalistic sourcing patterns of expert interviewees in 31 major media
outlets. My research reveals a dominant four-cluster pattern of media outlets: the “orthodox party outlets”
which consists of central level party media, the “balanced outlets” which includes both provincial party dailies
and provincial commercial dailies, the “critical outlets” which is a mixture of party and commercial media that
hold relatively critical views toward the government and promote more liberal ideals, and the “nationalistic
outlets” which includes two commercial media featuring nationalistic voices. I further identify the positions of
these media outlets on twenty major political, economic, social and cultural issues. To measure the structural
bias of Chinese media, I examine the frequency with which top political leaders are mentioned, and find that it
closely aligns with the party media/commercial media divide, with party media significantly paying a larger
amount of positive attention to top leaders. I also test how the media landscape has changed after President Xi
Jinping took power in late 2012. I find that under Xi’s strict media control, on the one hand, Chinese media
have become more ideologically homogenous, especially that the critical outlets have reduced their critical
edge and become more nationalistic; and on the other hand, they have become more structurally biased in
favor of the party-state. Finally, I discuss the implications of my research on Chinese media and on the study of
media bias in general.
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ABSTRACT

MAPPING MEDIA BIAS IN CHINA
Kecheng Fang
Michael X. Delli Carpini
This exploratory study investigates the landscape of media bias in China. First, I propose a
new conceptual framework for identifying media bias that is more comprehensive and less
context-sensitive than existing models. The framework includes two independent
dimensions: an ideological dimension, which is organized as clusters rather than a
continuum, and a structural dimension which reveals the relationship of media outlets to
the center of political and/or economic power in a given nation state. I then present a novel
mixed-methods approach to document media bias across different contexts. This approach
draws from previous literature on political communication, journalism studies, and
network analysis. More specifically, to gauge the ideological bias of Chinese media, I
analyze the journalistic sourcing patterns of expert interviewees in 31 major media outlets.
My research reveals a dominant four-cluster pattern of media outlets: the “orthodox party
outlets” which consists of central level party media, the “balanced outlets” which includes
both provincial party dailies and provincial commercial dailies, the “critical outlets” which
is a mixture of party and commercial media that hold relatively critical views toward the
government and promote more liberal ideals, and the “nationalistic outlets” which includes
two commercial media featuring nationalistic voices. I further identify the positions of
these media outlets on twenty major political, economic, social and cultural issues. To
measure the structural bias of Chinese media, I examine the frequency with which top
v

political leaders are mentioned, and find that it closely aligns with the party
media/commercial media divide, with party media significantly paying a larger amount of
positive attention to top leaders. I also test how the media landscape has changed after
President Xi Jinping took power in late 2012. I find that under Xi’s strict media control, on
the one hand, Chinese media have become more ideologically homogenous, especially that
the critical outlets have reduced their critical edge and become more nationalistic; and on
the other hand, they have become more structurally biased in favor of the party-state.
Finally, I discuss the implications of my research on Chinese media and on the study of
media bias in general.
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CHAPTER 1. Introduction

Are Chinese media biased? If so, in what way? A likely answer from non-experts on China
would be: yes, they are biased in favor of the Communist Party due to the authoritarian
political system, which imposes censorship and information control. Those who are more
familiar with the Chinese media landscape might point out the party media versus
commercial media divide and assume two kinds of bias, driven by political control and
market imperative respectively. In this project, I demonstrate that the media landscape in
China is more complicated and nuanced than either of these answers suggest, with the
amount and type of bias varying across media outlets and substantive issues.
In doing so, this study attempts to fill an important gap between the rich and
burgeoning literature on political communication in American and Western European
contexts, and the scholarly investigation into media and politics in China, and by
extension, other non-Western nation states. While there has been a great deal of research
and debate on Western media’s liberal/conservative bias and their role in political
polarization, these theoretical frameworks and methodological approaches have yet to find
their way into political communication studies in non-Western contexts such as China.
This is largely because several fundamental issues remain unsolved: What does “bias”
mean when applied to Chinese media? Does a liberal/conservative spectrum exist in
China? How are Chinese media positioned in the ideological landscape of the nation?
Some might argue that the absence of national elections, the tight restrictions on
political rights, and the limited pluralism in China render these questions irrelevant. But
China has an emerging commercialized media system (Stockmann, 2013; Zhao, 1998,
1

2000), a significant group of committed investigative and critical journalists (Repnikova,
2017a; Svensson, Sæther, & Zhang, 2013; Tong & Sparks, 2009; Wang, 2016), and
diversified opinions expressed in both print and digital media (Pan, 2009; Shi-Kupfer,
Ohlberg, Lang, & Lang, 2017; Sullivan, 2013; Wang, Sparks, Lü, & Huang, 2017; Yang,
2009). What remains understudied is how the combination of these characteristics, in the
context of China’s authoritarian regime, are shaping the range and orientation of Chinese
media coverage of local, national and international issues. I hope to both shed light on this
question, and in doing so expand academic discussions regarding the relationship between
media and politics to a more global and comparative scale.
In this study, I propose a new conceptual framework for identifying media bias that
is more comprehensive and less context-sensitive than existing models. I also present a
novel mixed-methods approach to document media bias across different contexts. This
approach draws from previous literature on political communication, journalism studies,
and network analysis. More specifically, to gauge the ideological bias of Chinese media, I
analyze the journalistic sourcing patterns of expert interviewees in 31 major media outlets.
My research reveals a dominant four-cluster pattern of media outlets, each with a different
perspective on a variety of major issues. I also examine the frequency with which top
political leaders are mentioned to measure the structural bias of Chinese media, and find
that it closely aligns with the party media/commercial media divide, with party media
significantly paying more attention to top leaders. Finally, I test how the media landscape
has changed after President Xi Jinping took power in late 2012. I find evidence that under
Xi’s strict media control, Chinese media have become more ideologically homogenous,
and more biased in favor of the party-state. The major theoretical contributions of this
2

project are two-fold. On the one hand, it provides a new perspective to understand and
study the ideological landscape in regimes where a clear ideological alignment has not
formed. On the other hand, it synthesizes and extends previous research on Chinese media
from different approaches including political economy (Zhao, 1998), market competition
(Stockmann, 2013), fragmented authoritarianism (Repnikova, 2017a), and journalistic
professionalism (Pan, 2009; Svensson et al., 2013), and provides a more systematic
approach to the media landscape in China.
In this introductory chapter, I first discuss my conceptual framework of media bias
based on critiques of previous scholarship. I then review the literature on the ideological
and structural bias in China. Finally, I introduce the research questions, and provide an
outline for the remaining chapters.

Media Bias: A Framework
Media bias is a popular term in both public discourse and academic literature. However, as
scholars imply, it is a “curiously undertheorized” term (Entman, 2007, p. 163), and “[i]n
essence, there does not appear to be a major theorist of media bias” (D’Alessio & Allen,
2000, p. 135). In this section, I begin with reviewing two types of commonly used
conceptualizations of media bias. I then explain their shortcomings, and propose an
alternative approach. I conclude by providing a new methodological approach for
understanding the ideological landscape in non-democratic regimes.

Two Types of Flawed Conceptualization

3

A survey of previous studies on “media bias” reveals that the term has been frequently used
as a synonym of media’s partisan bias and/or ideological slant (e.g., Alterman, 2003;
Eisinger, Veenstra, & Koehn, 2007; Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2010; Groseclose & Milyo,
2005; Niven, 2002; Patterson & Donsbach, 1996; Puglisi, 2011). More specifically, a large
body of studies focus on the “liberal bias,” “conservative bias,” “pro-Democrat bias,” and
“pro-Republican bias” of media in the context of American two-party politics. In an even
narrower sense, a number of research articles examine which presidential candidate media
prefer in the election campaigns, which conveniently provides “a fertile ground for the
analysis of media bias” (D’Alessio & Allen, 2000, p. 137).
However, this context-specific definition cannot be easily applied to other
democratic regimes such as some multi-party European countries, let alone authoritarian
regimes. More importantly, the exclusive focus on partisan and ideological bias leads to the
possibility of missing other types of bias. For example, Page and Shapiro (1992) propose
several types of media bias that exist in American media across the ideological spectrum:
nationalistic and ethnocentric bias, anti-Communist bias, pro-capitalist bias, minimal
government bias, and pro-incumbent bias. These biases could be summarized as structural
bias, which, according to van Dalen (2012), “is not the result of ideological decisions, but
rather the result of the routines by which journalists work, such as judging news stories
according to their news values or the use of framing which provide stories that are easily
recognizable for audiences” (p. 34). In other words, structural bias is unintentional and
irrelevant to media’s position on the liberal-conservative continuum. The consequence of
structural bias in media is often the tendency to favor the institutional sources, the
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established actors, and the status quo. Therefore, it could also be framed as pro-status quo
bias.
In contrast to the narrow approach of defining media bias as partisan and
ideological, other scholars have proposed more general frameworks of media bias. Baron
(2006) defines bias “relative to the truth” (p. 4). McQuail (2010) maintains that “any
tendency in a news report to deviate from an accurate, neutral, balanced and impartial
representation of ‘reality’ of events and social world” could be seen as bias (p. 549).
Similarly, Groeling (2013) suggests that media bias refers to “a portrayal of reality that is
significantly and systematically (not randomly) distorted” (p. 133).
By defining bias as deviations from reality, this conceptualization avoids the
danger of narrowing media bias to simply liberal or conservative bias in the Western
context. However, such a framework is highly descriptive and lacks theoretical rigor. It
assumes that there is an objective and measurable “reality,” a view which has been
challenged by social constructionist scholars (Cohen & Young, 1973; Schudson, 2003;
Tuchman, 1978). Even if we accept the positivist view that social reality does exist on its
own and is measurable, it is often unreasonable to expect media to “mirror” (Vos, 2011;
Zelizer, 2005) the reality without filtering. For example, as Schudson (2003) suggests, if a
weather report perfectly mirrors reality, it should pay much more attention to sunny, mild
days than to “hurricanes, floods, heat waves, and cold spells” (p. 37). But we would never
consider hurricane news to be “biased.” Focusing on the abnormal and exceptions is, in a
sense, a deviation from reality, but it is the nature of news. In a similar vein, Schiller (1981)
also considers the mirror metaphor as a “paradoxical notion” (p. 2).

5

A related strategy to give a general framework of media bias is to equate imbalance
with bias, namely, bias as a deviation from balance rather than from reality. For example,
Baron (2006) proposes that “the absence of balance, emphasis on one side of a story, or
support for a particular world view” are indications of media bias (p. 7). In D’Alessio and
Allen's (2000) meta-analysis of media bias in presidential elections, they maintain that
“any departure from a ‘50-50’ split” of coverage on the two sides should be considered as
biased (p. 137). However, this simplified criterion is highly contestable. As Niven (2002)
argues, a candidate from one party may work harder for coverage than the other one, one
may have stronger ability to communicate a message, and one may have much better
qualifications than the other one (p. 314). Under these circumstances, why should we
expect a balanced “50-50” split? D’Alessio and Allen's (2000) also admit that this simple
split is “impossible to measure” outside of electoral politics (p. 136). Moreover, the
emphasis on balance could potentially lead to the trap of false equivalence (Boykoff &
Boykoff, 2004; Cunningham, 2003). In a word, hindered by what Entman (2007) calls
“irresolvable questions about truth and reality” (p. 166), attempts to define media bias in
contrast to truth, reality, balance, and objectivity are deemed to be problematic.

Bias and the Relative Distribution of Power
To better conceptualize media bias, we need a more rigorous general framework to replace
the narrow definition of partisan bias as media bias and the questionable definition of
deviations from reality and balance as bias. In this study, I propose that media bias should
not be understood as something deviating from certain absolute truth or reality, but rather
as media’s potential to influence the relative distribution of power. Here, power could
6

be understood as the ability to get others to do what one wants (Nagel, 1975), and influence
includes change, reinforcement, and weakening. This theoretical approach posits that all
media representations are biased in some way, and what matters is how they are biased
relative to each other. The approach is largely borrowed from Entman (2007), who defines
the bias of media content as “consistent patterns in the framing of mediated communication
that promote the influence of one side in conflicts over the use of government power” (p.
166). His definition is limited to the political and institutional aspects of power, but we
could extend it to other forms of power. Different from Entman, I define media bias as the
potential to influence power distribution rather than the actual influence. The reason lies in
the fact that, according to literature on media effects, the actual influence of media is
shaped by various factors including individual traits and contextual elements. A biased
media outlet per se does not guarantee influence. Therefore, it is less appropriate to define
media bias in terms of influence, but rather in terms of content. It should be noted that due
to differences in the size of readership, the perceived importance, and other factors, the
biases of different media outlets are expected to have varying levels of influence, but the
calculation of actual influence is beyond the scope of this project.
To give a few examples of media bias under this definition, conservative talk radio
in the American political context could be biased in terms of potentially boosting public
support for Republicans’ anti-abortion policies and influencing public policy by framing
the issue as “the right to life” and likening abortion to murder. Commercial media in
capitalist systems could be biased in terms of potentially helping transnational corporations
sell their products to global consumers by setting the consumerist agenda. And so forth. In
the concluding chapter, I will discuss how the Chinese case fits into the definition.
7

This definition has several advantages. First, it is broad enough to accommodate
different kinds of bias in various contexts, and is not limited to a purely partisan and
ideological dimension. Second, it is also open to use in polities that have more than a single
ideological “left-right” dimension and that have multiple parties and/or competing centers
of power. Third, it avoids the need to measure “objective reality” or assume that media
must mirror this reality in order to be unbiased.

Two Dimensions of Media Bias
Drawing from both my definition and previous literature, we can identify two major
dimensions where media could potentially influence the relative distribution of
power—the ideological and the structural.
The ideological dimension of media bias refers to the potential influence of media
on people’s beliefs and attitudes on ideologically divided issues, which in turn shapes the
power dynamic in a society. It could also be understood as how media outlets align with
ideological cleavages in a society. The factors behind media’s ideological bias are
two-fold. First, on the demand side, scholars argue that media are motivated to provide
biased content that sides with consumers’ preferences, value, and ideology, because news
consumers are attracted to and thus willing to pay for and/or attend to content that is
ideologically consonant. Consumers support biased content in part because they avoid
being in a state of cognitive dissonance (Mullainathan & Shleifer, 2005), and because they
consider ideologically consonant content to be more credible (Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2006).
Second, on the supply side, journalists’ own biases, including partisan
predispositions, are often cited as an important source of media bias. Survey results
8

repeatedly reveal that journalists tend to be more liberal and progressive than the general
public in the U.S. (Pew Research Center’s Journalism Project, 2006; Weaver, Beam,
Brownlee, Voakes, & Wilhoit, 2006; Weaver & Wilhoit, 1986, 1996), and such
phenomenon holds true elsewhere around the globe (Deuze, 2007; Patterson, 1997). This
ideological position could potentially influence how they interpret the world and write
their stories. As Patterson and Donsbach (1996) argue, “as journalists go about the daily
business of making their news selections, their partisan predispositions affect the choices
they make, from the stories they select to the headlines they write… It flows from the way
they are predisposed to see the political world” (p. 466). In addition, since contemporary
news work is characterized by its highly organized nature, with news organizations setting
editorial policies and closely monitoring the production processes, journalists do not enjoy
total autonomy in their work because of the teamwork nature and newsroom bureaucracy
(Hanitzsch & Mellado, 2011; Sigelman, 1973). Baron (2006) points out that journalists
want their stories to be published and positioned in important sections, and that biasing
stories in accordance with media organizations’ preferences can increase the probability of
publication. Thus, the combination of organizational slant and personal career incentive
produces ideologically biased content. All in all, the ideological orientations of news
stories are influenced by both journalists’ individual ideological slants and organizational
policy and norms.
The structural dimension of media bias refers to the fact that established media
often favor the interests of power elites and the status quo. This is not to say that media
cannot be adversarial to the powerful interests—Freedman (2014) shows that mainstream
commercial media can sometimes give voice to anti-establishment forces. But most media
9

outlets do frequently show a pro-status quo tendency. This kind of bias is deeply rooted in
several structural factors of media.
First, structural bias could originate from state intervention and other forms of
political control. Obviously, media in authoritarian regimes suffer from the restrictions on
free speech. For example, in South America, strong control, censorship, and manipulation
of the mass media have benefited government officials more than the public (Waisbord,
1995). Media in liberal democracies are not immune from the influence of political power,
either, though not in an explicit manner. As Schudson (2005) argues, “journalists at
mainstream publications everywhere accommodate to the political culture of the regime in
which they operate” (p. 184).
Second, private ownership, commercial imperative, and the advertisement-based
business model could bias media content in favor of the interests of their owners, investors,
and advertisers. McChesney (2008) argues that private ownership of media leads to “the
degradation of journalism and suppression of genuine debate.” To provide empirical
evidence on a specific case, Gilens and Hertzman (2000) examine newspaper coverage of
the 1996 Telecommunications Act and find that newspapers that stood to gain from the
proposed deregulation offered more favorable coverage than those did not benefit from the
policy change. Baker (1994) shows that newspapers’ financial dependence on advertising
could influence their non-advertising content in favor of the interests of advertisers over
those of readers. Bagdikian (2000) demonstrates that news on tobacco-related diseases
have been suppressed by advertising from the tobacco industry. Hamilton (2004) identifies
a shift in network evening news programs from a focus on hard news about politics to an
emphasis on happy, positive and uncontroversial content as a result of ownership changes
10

and incentives to attract advertisers. These cases all fit into the general framework of
structural media bias as conceptualized in this study.
Third, journalistic routines could also influence media content. Studies on news
production (e.g., Gans, 1979; Tuchman, 1978) have documented the influence of work
routines on news content. As one important component of the routine, journalists’
interactions with sources from beats could produce bias favorable to the status quo.
Entman (2007) gives an example of how the skill of White House news managers and that
of opposition party news managers can affect the slant of news items about the U.S.
government. Bennett's (1990) indexing theory demonstrates that, as a result of journalistic
routines and structural factors, political elites are disproportionately powerful in shaping
the range and focus of debates.
To further illustrate the two major dimensions of media bias, I use the
much-studied case of contemporary American media as an example. On the ideological
dimension, since the U.S. electoral system provides a relatively clear, one-dimensional
liberal-conservative cue, and the electorate is overwhelmingly sorted along this continuum
according the Democratic and Republican party lines (Levendusky, 2009), it is quite clear
that American media’s potential to influence people’s ideological beliefs and attitudes falls
largely on the liberal-conservative spectrum. Under most circumstances, when we talk
about American media’s ideological bias, we are judging them as either
pro-liberal/Democratic or pro-conservative/Republican.
On the structural dimension, as revealed in previous studies, the hegemonic power
in the American society is the capitalist system maintained by political, economic, and
cultural elites. Elites on both ends of the ideological spectrum buy into the system. Due to
11

aforementioned structural factors, American media—regardless of their liberal or
conservative tendencies—are largely biased in favor of the interests of the power elites and
the status quo from which they benefit.

A “Cluster View” of the Ideological Bias
For the study of media’s ideological bias, a conventional perspective is to adopt a left-right
continuum, or two orthogonal continuums that constitute a two-dimensional ideological
space.1 Here I argue that an alternative and more realistic approach is to adopt a “cluster
view” of media outlets, which assumes that media are clustered in a few communities,
rather than smoothly distributed along the continuum. Take the American case as an
example. Based on previous literature, the actual distribution of media outlets is more
likely to be in several clusters – two large clusters of slightly liberal and slightly
conservative media outlets (some argue that the liberal cluster is slightly larger, while some
argue they are of the same size), as well as two small clusters of outlets on the far-left and
far-right.
The cluster approach to ideological landscapes has unique advantage when
applying to authoritarian regimes like China, where there is a lack of partisan sorting and
ideological alignment. As Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argue, ideological cleavages can
emerge without democratic institutions. Linz (2000) also suggests that there is pluralism
(albeit limited) in authoritarian regimes (p. 54). Indeed, as Chairman Mao famously
argued, “wherever there are people, there are leftists, rightists, and centrists.” Ideological

1

For example, a political continuum and an economic continuum.
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cleavages exist in most societies, no matter democratic or authoritarian, East or West.
However, cleavages in authoritarian regimes are less coherent and attitudinal elements are
bound together by weaker constraint than in liberal democracies. The reasons are two-fold.
On the one hand, as Chen (2016) argues, their regimes “have yet to produce a viable and
recognizable regime ideology that can provide a basis for a distinctive political and
economic model,” which means that the ideological landscape is still largely undefined.
On the other hand, authoritarian regimes often intentionally suppress public discussions on
ideological issues and conceal the disagreements among the elites for fear of losing
ideological legitimacy (e.g., China’s “no dispute” policy, see Gilley, 2004). As a result, the
public does not have sufficient opportunities to think and deliberate on this issue. It is
difficult to identify a clear left-right ideological continuum as in democratic regimes,
where citizens are exposed to different sets of party policies and are expected to engage
with the ideological lines defined by political elites.
Therefore, although there are cleavages and diversified ideological options
available in an authoritarian regime, those options are not likely sorted along a few clearly
defined dimensions. Rather, there might be multiple groups or clusters of beliefs and
attitudes bound together by some form of constraint (Converse, 1964). Within each cluster,
there are multiple specific attitudinal elements. The distribution of ideological bias is thus
better reflected in clusters, rather than distribution along one or a few dimensions.
To sum up, “media bias” is an undertheorized term that has often been narrowly
defined as partisan bias in previous literature, or loosely defined in contrast to the contested
notions of truth, reality, and balance. In this study, I define media bias as media’s potential
to influence the relative distribution of power. There are different sources of media bias,
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from the demand side and the supply side, as well as from individual and structural factors.
Drawing on these approaches, I develop a theoretical framework of media bias that
includes two major dimensions: the ideological and the structural. And I propose a cluster
view of ideological bias that could be applied to authoritarian regimes where ideological
sorting is limited.

Previous Studies on Media Bias in China
I now turn to the review of existing literature on media bias in China. I discuss the two
dimensions of media bias respectively, as laid out in the aforementioned framework.
The Ideological Dimension
Previous scholarship suggests two general levels of ideology: that among the elites and that
among the public. Media is considered part of the elites, which also include the
government, party, and academia (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). Before reviewing
studies on media ideology, I present a historical perspective of ideology in China and
discuss ideological orientations identified among the public and among intellectuals.
Historical perspective. Yang & Stening (2013) propose that the belief systems in
China could be categorized according to different eras in Chinese history, namely
Confucianism (2500 years ago), socialism (People’s Republic of China under Mao), and
capitalism (after market reform). According to Nathan and Shi (1996), the ideological
dimension in Mao’s Red China was decreed from above: “Mao accepted Stalin’s scheme
that history moved from primitive communism to feudalism to capitalism to communism
and that whatever pushed things in that direction was ‘progressive’ and hence leftist,”
whereas “those who failed to push historical progress at the appropriate speed were right
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deviationists guilty of class compromise” (pp. 526-527). Walder (2015) suggests that Mao
styled himself as a genuine revolutionary and punished party members as rightists for
“voicing ideas that allegedly expressed the ideology of the former exploiting classes” (p.
152). In essence, the Communist ideology was the dominant and the only available option
for the public and the elites. During those three decades (1949-1977), Chinese media
adhered closely to the party’s position. Communist Party mouthpieces filled with
propaganda stories were the only form of media outlets in the red China (Sukosd & Wang,
2013; Winfield & Peng, 2005).
After Mao’s death, the Chinese regime was no longer able to monopolize public
debate, and the Maoist ideologues in high-ranking positions were replaced by pragmatic
officials like Deng Xiaoping, resulting in the collapse of the former ideological system.
However, this collapse did not lead to a significant level of political pluralism. Indeed,
many scholars argue that there has been an ideological vacuum in China since the inception
of the economic reform in the late 1970s. There are multiple reasons behind the vacuum.
First, the party has been suppressing ideological debates and promoting “ideological
homogeneity” (Lieber, 2013) by emphasizing Deng’s dictum of “don’t argue,” which was
further revived by subsequent leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao (Gilley, 2004). Second,
the state fails to provide a coherent ideological repertoire. As Chen (2016) argues, “China
is still struggling to come up with a clear and viable regime ideology that goes beyond the
existing eclectic amalgam of many seemingly incompatible elements” (p. 13). Third, the
so-called “state-capitalism” in contemporary China (Tsai, 2007) tends to atomize social
relationships and encourage citizens to retreat to the private domain (Nisbet, 1953),
making it difficult to form ideological camps. Fourth, the autonomous civil society is weak
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due to state suppression (e.g., Hildebrandt, 2013), thus further discouraging the emergence
of different ideological positions.
Nonetheless, there is at least some evidence suggesting that identifiable ideological
cleavages and contentious ideological landscape do exist in contemporary China despite
the unfavorable conditions. For example, although the state attempts to suppress
ideological debates, there have been several significant debates since late 1970s, including
the one prior to the Tiananmen student democratic movement in 1989 (Lau & Lo, 1991). A
more recent example is the debate on “universal values,” which “focused on whether
democracy, liberty, human rights and humanities are universal values shared by all human
beings” and was widely participated in by two opposing camps (Qi, 2011).
President Xi Jinping has intensified the control over Chinese society since he took
power in late 2012. There are speculations that the room for plural ideas has vanished
under Xi’s rule. However, empirical studies on the media as well as the online sphere
suggest that a certain spectrum of diversified and even dissenting opinions are still allowed
(Repnikova, 2018; Repnikova & Fang, 2016; Shi-Kupfer & Ohlberg, 2018; Shi-Kupfer et
al., 2017)
Ideology among the public. With the emergence of polls in China since the 1980s,
scholars have investigated different aspects of public opinion in China such as political
trust and support for the government, but only a few of them have examined the overall
structure of ideology (Manion, 2010; Wu & Meng, 2016). Based on data from a 1990
national sample survey, Nathan and Shi (1996) claim that a multidimensional ideological
landscape has emerged. They term the dimensions as the Tiananmen agenda, the reform
agenda, the economic welfare agenda, and the foreign policy agenda. However, their
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argument is not widely accepted by other scholars. According to Lee (2003), the
ideological landscape has become more complicated with the rise of neoliberalism, the
New Leftism, neo-Confucianism, and the revival of Maoism since late 1990s and 2000s.
Other scholars have suggested that nationalism has become one of the most pervasive
ideologies in China and an important source of legitimacy of the party-state (Wang, 2014;
Zheng, 1999). Based on another original set of nationally representative survey data
collected in 2015, Wu and Meng (2016) identify a two-dimensional space of the overall
ideology structure—the state-market divide (the economic dimension) and the
authoritarian-democratic divide (the political dimension). Analyzing data from a large
scale opt-in online survey, Pan and Xu (2018) find a one-dimensional ideological space,
where the one end represents authoritarian rule, support for traditional norms, and support
for political distribution of resources, while the other end represents political liberalization,
opposition to traditional values, and support for markets allocation of resources. While
survey research has made a significant contribution to the study of ideology in China, they
all suffer from the nature of the study designs—all survey questions were determined
beforehand. Thus, if any significant issues were missed in the survey, which is highly
likely due to the limited knowledge of China’s ideological space, the results would be far
from a complete or accurate picture. In addition, the sample used in Pan and Xu’s (2018)
study was non-representative.
Another approach to studying ideology among the public is to analyze social media
posts. Two research reports published by German think tank Mercator Institute for China
Studies used data from Weibo and five influential online forums to analyze the opinions
expressed in the posts (Shi-Kupfer & Ohlberg, 2018; Shi-Kupfer et al., 2017). They
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observed “a remarkable plurality of opinions” (Shi-Kupfer et al., 2017, p. 9) in these online
communities. Relying on pilot conversations with 100 online-savvy individuals and a
subsequent survey of 1,552 urban Internet users, they identified eight clusters of Internet
users: party warriors, flag wavers, China advocates, Mao lovers, traditionalists, equality
advocates, industrialists, market lovers, democratizers, U.S. lovers, and humanists. These
clusters shed light on our understanding of online public opinion in China, but the data are
drawn from a specific group of active social media and online forum users, who are not
necessarily representative of the overall online population.
Ideology among the intellectuals. In general, intellectuals are more likely than the
general public to form coherent ideology based on attitudinal elements bound together
(Jost et al., 2009). An early attempt to map out the “ideological camps” of Chinese
intellectuals was done by Lee (2003), who qualitatively identified the camps of the old left,
reform Marxists, liberals, and the New Left. Similarly, Cheek et al. (2018) examined
intellectual discourse in China identify three groupings of Chinese intellectuals: liberals,
New Left, and New Confucian. In a more recent study, Mulvad (2018) interviewed 28
“leading Chinese intellectuals” and proposed a two-dimensional spectrum of elite
intellectuals’ ideological structure: one axis between capitalism and socialism, and the
other axis between paternalism and fraternalism. He places his interviewees in the four
areas of this space, each representing an ideological vision in the Chinese context:
de-privatizing statism (socialism + paternalism); Confucianizing liberalism (capitalism +
paternalism); proletarianizing constitutionalism (socialism + fraternalism); and liberalism
(capitalism + fraternalism). While these works provide useful insights into the elite
ideological structure, they all draw from qualitative analysis of selected scholarly
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discourse. There remains no systematic quantitative analysis of the ideological structure
among Chinese intellectuals.
Ideological bias of the media. Partly due to the limitations and disagreements in
the understanding of the overall ideological structure in China, there are only a few studies
that have discussed media’s position and bias in this complicated and only partially
understood ideological space. In his mapping of four intellectual ideological camps, Lee
(2003) gives examples of websites that belong to each camp (p. 20). In a more recent study,
Lu, Chu, and Shen (2016) put forward three clusters of ideological items—liberalism,
culture conservatism, and the new left—and test the relation between media use and these
orientations. However, the clusters are inferred from previous literature (mainly political
philosophy pieces) rather than based on empirical data.
A recent project conducted by a group of economists provides by far the most
systematic study on this topic (Qin, Strömberg, & Wu, 2018). Using computer-assisted text
analysis to examine data from 117 newspapers during the years 1999-2010, they position
the papers on a party-commercial continuum, which treats “party bias” and “commercial
bias” as two opposite ends. However, this is not necessarily the case—as indicated by
Stockmann (2013), the party line and the commercial interests converge on some issues
such as nationalism. More critiques about their methodological approach are provided in
the next chapter.
In a few case studies, ideological biases are analyzed through the lens of specific
issues. For example, Duckett & Langer (2013) focus on the policy issue of health reform,
on which the government did not have a unified stance during the 2000s. They find that
media coverage took diverse positions, “with narratives centering on market and state roles
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in health, but a vocal minority of pro-market articles challenged the dominant pro-state
reporting.” They also find that pro-state positions were populist and paternalist, while the
neoliberals were elitist. Zhao (2003) analyzes the discourses in coverage of China’s
decision to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) and argues that there is a neo-liberal
hegemony in Chinese press.
In a word, while studies acknowledge that media no longer hold a rigid ideological
commitment to communism, only a few have empirically investigated media’s ideological
biases. In addition, none of these studies examine a comprehensive set of dividing issues in
a systematic manner.

Media Bias in China: Structural Dimension
Previous studies on the structural dimension of media bias in China concentrate on two
factors: authoritarian control of information and media commercialization since the 1980s.
A vivid metaphor is that Chinese news media have to “serve two masters”—the party and
the market. Although there is still no ownership diversity in Chinese news industry—all
print media, broadcast media, and online media that could produce original news content
have to be state-owned, the introduction of market-oriented media does bring arguably
major changes.
There are generally two views about the influence of the state and the market on
media bias. The first argues for Chinese media’s partial separation from political power as
a result of commercialization. In this view, the emergence of a group of market-oriented
outlets has decreased the general pro-state bias of media and brought a more open and
diverse space. The rise of commercial media in circulation and advertising revenue was
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accompanied by the proliferation of content that was “open, lively, and even assertive at
times vis-à-vis the state” (Pan, 2009). Based on empirical findings, Huang (2001) argues
that press commercialization is “a significant and positive development towards a free
press” (p. 447). Such optimism is shared by other scholars, who believe that the party-state
is losing control of the mass media (Pei, 1994).
On the other hand, however, there are scholars portraying a gloomier picture. They
question “the supposed contradiction between market and state control” and the
assumption that “the needs of the media to build and retain a mass audience would
inevitably conflict with the demands of the party for detailed control of media output”
(Sparks, 2010). According to them, the party’s information control has not gone away. The
party-state has made various adaptations and diversified its control in many alternative
ways along with the commercialization and technological advances of Chinese media
(Winfield & Peng, 2005). Content analysis conducted by Stockmann (2013) reveals that
there is no substantial difference in official media and commercial media’s coverage on the
issues of labor law and of the United States. Worse still, the market impetus has driven
media to focus on serving the rich, urban residents (Zhao, 2000) and commodify their
products, which were increasingly light-hearted, mundane, and entertaining (Wu, 2016).
Some fear that the combination of political censorship and market censorship could ‘turn
China into a nation of tabloid-dazed couch potatoes’ (Schell, 1995). In other words, media
content is still biased toward the party, and is also biased toward the rich – political control
and market imperative often converge and reinforce the bias in favor of the power elites.
The latter view receives, by and large, more empirical support in previous studies,
and also makes more logical sense in China’s “state corporatist system” (Pan, 2009). This
21

study assumes that the structural dimension of media bias in China remains characterized
by a single power center – the Communist Party. To be more specific, all the media outlets
in China, to varying degrees, are required to cover the party and the leaders in a positive
light. This kind of coverage is mainly to show a gesture of compliance and to “signal”
(Huang, 2015) the party’s power, rather than taking ideological stances. Therefore, it is
unrelated to the ideological bias of the outlets.

Research Questions
The above review shows that there is no consensus regarding the political cleavages and
ideological orientations that exist within the Chinese public, intellectuals, or media. As a
result, my own study on media bias in China is admittedly exploratory in nature, following
the approach of grounded theory to develop theories from data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
While the majority of media bias studies in the U.S. follow the top-down, deductive
hypothesis-testing approach, studies in the Chinese context at the current stage will be a
combination of inductive and deductive approaches.
This study aims to provide answers to the following research questions.
Research Question 1: What does the media landscape of contemporary
China look like, and how do the biases found in this landscape comport with the
distribution of ideological perspectives and structural control found in China?
Research Question 2: What are the major clusters of media bias in China
and which media outlets are there in each cluster?
Research Question 3: What are the major dividing issues among these
clusters of media outlets?
22

I also attempt to answer two additional questions on the specific changes in media
landscape after the leadership transition in late 2012. President Xi Jinping has been widely
criticized by domestic and international observers for his conservative mindset and
hardline policies. The prevailing opinion among China watchers is that Xi is consolidating
power and aspiring to be the new Chairman Mao (Lam, 2015; Miller, 2014). Critics say
that China’s human rights record has worsened (Phillips, 2015), and news media have
become more heavily censored since Xi took power (Freedom House, 2016; Reporters
Without Borders, 2016). However, although there are widely covered cases of journalists
being arrested and news stories deleted, there is still a lack of systematic, objective
evaluation of the changes in press freedom under Xi’s rule. This study provides an
empirical assessment of Xi’s impact on media content by measuring the changes in the
media landscape under his rule. Following the general framework of media bias proposed
above, this study attempts to answers these two questions:
Research Question 4: How has Chinese media’s ideological landscape
changed after 2012?
Research Question 5: How has Chinese media’s structural bias changed
after 2012?

Chapter Outlines
The structure of the remaining chapters in this manuscript is as follows. Chapter 2 provides
a review of previous methods in measuring media bias, and proposes a novel
methodological approach that is valid and universally applicable. It also explains the
qualitative data collection and analysis, and discusses how these methodological
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approaches inform each other. This chapter also provides detailed information on the
nature and processing steps of data used in this project.
Chapters 3 and 4 present research findings in detail. In Chapter 3, the focus is on the
general landscape of media bias in China. This chapter begins with validating the
methodological approach by interviewing journalists and examining their sourcing
practices in China. I then present and discuss the ideological clusters of Chinese media as
identified in the data analysis, as well as the extent to which these clusters changed after
President Xi Jinping took power in late 2012 and early 2013. In the last section of this
chapter, I turn to structural bias and show to what extents different types of media are
biased in favor of the top political leaders. Chapter 4 furthers the investigation into
ideological bias, focusing on the patterns of coverage of 20 major political, economic,
social and cultural issues.
Finally, in the concluding Chapter 5, I synthesize the findings presented in the
previous two chapters, followed by discussions on the implications for research on Chinese
media and for research on media bias in general. I also discuss the limitations of this
project, and propose some possible directions for future studies.
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CHAPTER 2. Follow the Sources: Methods and Data

“Follow the money!” Generations of investigative journalists take this approach to uncover
corruption, as money is so central to numerous scandals that its transfer between parties
could bring wrongdoings to light. I argue that, in a similar vein, sources are so central to
journalism that the examination of sourcing patterns could reveal much about the nature
and structure of journalism in a cross-national manner. They could also indicate
shortcomings of this profession, such as the problem of “indexing” elite sources (Bennett,
1990). In this dissertation project, the principal method of tackling the difficult question of
measuring media bias in China is to investigate how news media in China cite intellectual
sources. In short, follow the sources.
This chapter begins by reviewing methods used in previous studies to measure
media bias and discussing their validity and applicability in comparative contexts. I then
propose and explain the methodological approach of the current project. Next, I introduce
the technical details of data collection and analysis strategies. Finally, the analysis is
supplemented by 32 in-depth interviews with media professionals in China, which I
introduce in the last part of this chapter.

Previous Methods of Measuring Media Bias
Efforts to measure ideological or partisan bias/orientation exist in a number of arenas. For
example, political scientists have developed reliable methods of measuring the
bias/orientation of legislators by using congressional voting records (e.g., Groseclose,
Levitt, & Snyder, 1999; Poole & Rosenthal, 2000), and public opinion researchers in a
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number of fields often use partisan voting or self-reports in surveys (e.g., Abramowitz &
Saunders, 2006; Ansolabehere, Rodden, & Snyder, 2008). In the case of measuring media
bias, communication scholars have developed several approaches, with varying degrees of
applicability to non-U.S. contexts. In this section, I summarize previous methods in three
categories (consumer-based, journalist-based, and content-based) and discuss their
applicability in two types of non-U.S. contexts: multi-party systems and non-democratic
regimes.

Consumer-based measures
Public perceptions. The first category of measures focuses on consumers of media. One
method is to simply ask the general public to provide their perceptions of the bias of
specific media outlets. For example, Watts et al. (1999) has measured public evaluations
and found that Americans considered the media to have become increasingly liberal over
past three general elections. Having asked survey respondents to provide their opinions on
media bias for decades, Pew Research Center (2012) suggests that there has been a
significant rise in seeing bias in news coverage among the public, especially among
Republicans. In 1989, only a quarter of Republicans agreed that there is “a great deal of
bias” in the news, whereas in 2012, the number increased to 49%. In the specific context of
the 2016 U.S. presidential election, a Gallup (2016) poll shows that over half (52%) of
registered voters think the media have a pro-Clinton bias.
Thanks to its simplicity, this approach is universally applicable. Surveys have been
conducted in Europe (YouGov, 2016), Japan (Flanagan, 1991), South Korea (Lee, 2012)
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and other parts of the world to gauge public opinion on the bias of specific news outlets or
media as an institution overall.
However, due to the widely recognized problem in audience’ judgement of media
orientation ("the hostile media effect", see Gunther & Schmitt, 2004), this measurement is
far from an ideal method to examine media slants. Ultimately, what it measures is the
public perception of media bias, which is different from media bias per se.
The ideological composition of media audiences. An alternative method is to
infer a media outlet’s orientation from the ideological composition of its audiences, either
through conducting surveys, or through using data from audience research companies like
Nielsen and comScore. Since we assume audiences choose media outlets according to their
own ideological preferences and positions in the society, this measurement is a reasonable
proxy to the bias of media outlets. For example, Pew Research Center’s study on political
polarization and media habits identifies the distinct favorites of media sources on the left
and right (Mitchell, Gottfried, Kiley, & Matsa, 2014). Another example is that Gentzkow
and Shapiro (2015) uses comScore’s audience data to measure the ideological orientations
of media websites. This method could also be used in non-U.S., multi-party contexts, as
long as audience data is available.
However, this approach has limited applicability in non-democratic contexts due to
the lack of measures on audience ideology. While it is possible to gauge the demographics
of the audience, it is very difficult to measure the ideological composition of them. As Lu
et al. (2016) suggest, “despite the plethora of political belief measures in the West, very
few empirical measures of political ideology were tailored to the Chinese context” (p. 79).
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Journalist-based measures
Journalists’ perceptions. To avoid the hostile media effect among audiences, we can also
ask journalists about their evaluation of the ideological position of media outlets. In
surveys of American journalists (Weaver et al., 2006; Weaver & Wilhoit, 1986, 1996;
Willnat, Weaver, & Wilhoit, 2017), researchers asked them to place the media they worked
for on the liberal-conservative scale. This straightforward method is applicable in
multi-party and non-democratic contexts. However, although media professionals might
be better in judging bias in news coverage than audiences, this measurement is still about
perception rather than media bias per se. In addition, journalists may be hesitant to provide
an honest assessment of their perceptions, especially those working in less democratic
regimes.
The ideological composition of journalists. Media organizations are run by
individuals, and so could be influenced by media workers’ own ideological bias
(Shoemaker & Reese, 2013). Therefore, another approach to measure media bias is to
assess the ideological orientations of the people working in different media outlets. We can
conduct surveys with journalists and media executives to collect their ideological
orientations. The aforementioned surveys on American journalists contain data on the
ideological positions of individual journalists at various publications. There is also a global
scale survey that measured the ideological orientations of journalists in democratic
countries other than the U.S. (Weaver & Willnat, 2012). Researchers find that journalists
are generally more liberal than the public around the globe.
However, surveys in non-democratic regimes rarely examine the ideological
orientations of journalists due to the lack of measures as mentioned above. For example,
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the global journalists survey (Weaver & Willnat, 2012) does not include ideological
measures about Chinese journalists. Furthermore, media practitioners’ own bias is only
one of the many factors influencing the bias of media content. The objectivity norm of
journalism (Schudson, 2001) constrains the direct expression of journalists’ bias in media
content. As a result, the ideological composition of journalists is not a proper proxy for
media bias.

Content-based measures
The Filtering of Certain Issues. Other than inferring media bias from people producing
or consuming media content, several other methods directly measure the ideological bias
of media content. One such approach is to calculate the frequency of selected media outlets
in covering certain issues that are clearly reflecting certain bias. In other words, bias is
determined by the types of stories that are filtered or amplified by media outlets. For
example, Puglisi and Snyder (2011) focus on coverage of political scandals and find that
Democratic-leaning newspapers provide relatively more coverage of scandals involving
Republican politicians than those involving Democratic politicians, while
Republican-leaning newspapers tend to do the opposite. Similarly, Larcinese et al. (2011)
count media coverage on unemployment. They find that liberal newspapers
“systematically give more coverage to high unemployment when the incumbent president
is a Republican than when the president is Democratic,” and vice versa. Baum and
Groeling (2008) examine how political websites chose stories from wire services and find
evidence for partisan filtering. Stovall (1985, 1988) investigates media bias by looking at
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the filtering of media coverage during presidential campaigns: which events to cover,
which not?
This approach is related to the agenda-setting theory—media set biased agenda
through the selection and filtering of certain issues. The downside of this approach is that it
requires sufficient knowledge about the “pool” of issues for media to cover and to avoid.
As a result, while it can be applied in multi-party democracies, it is rarely applicable in
non-democratic contexts because the full range of such issues is not known. One important
exception is economists Qin, Strömberg, & Wu’s (2018) work on Chinese media, as
mentioned in the first chapter. They calculate the amount of media coverage on three types
of events: the “party line” events (e.g., political leaders’ activities; the annual top 10 news
events listed by the official Xinhua News Agency), the “mass line” events (e.g., corruption,
disasters, and accidents), and the “bottom line” events (e.g., sports and entertainment). The
underlying logic is that these events indicate the distance from the official discourse. While
this paper makes a seminal contribution to the study of media bias in China, it
oversimplifies “media bias” as bias in favor of the Communist Party. In addition, the
amount of coverage on certain selected events is not necessarily indicative of bias. For
example, the authors find that party newspapers actually cover corruption more than
commercial papers. That might result from the intensive coverage of the achievements in
anti-corruption campaigns by party outlets, in contrast to the less frequent yet more critical
coverage by commercial papers. Here we could see the exact problem we discussed at the
beginning of this paragraph—the insufficient knowledge about the “pool” of issues and
subsequent uninformed selections.

30

Editorial Endorsements. Endorsements in presidential elections provide a
straightforward measure of media bias, but only in democratic contexts. Ansolabehere et
al. (2006) find that newspapers in the U.S. have shifted from strongly favoring Republicans
in the 1940s and 1950s, to dividing their editorial endorsements roughly equally between
the parties. From DiMaggio et al.'s (1996) perspective, this change could be seen as
evidence of polarization. Stroud (2008) has also measured media’s ideological slants by
endorsements.
During recent election cycles, an increasing number of outlets do not explicitly
endorse a presidential candidate (Casas, Fawaz, & Trindade, 2016; Stanley & Niemi,
1994), and radio and television stations do not endorse political candidates in the first
place. To deal with this problem, Ho and Quinn (2008) examines newspaper editorials in
the U.S.—not on political candidates, but on government and supreme court decisions: do
they support or oppose certain ideological decisions? This approach provides a much
larger amount of data than candidate endorsements. They reach the conclusion that most
newspapers took “political positions that are relatively centrist.”
One important limitation of this set of approaches is that editorials are only a small
part of media content. It should also be noted that newspapers’ editorial endorsements are
not necessarily related to the orientation of their news coverage and other opinion pieces
(Dalton, Beck, & Huckfeldt, 1998), due to the strong separation between the editorial
divisions and the news divisions in professional news organizations. A prominent example
is Wall Street Journal’s strong conservative tone in editorials and relatively balanced news
reporting. Therefore, the information we can get from those separate endorsements is very
limited (Ho & Quinn, 2008). In terms of applicability, it cannot be used in democratic
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countries where editorial endorsements are not practiced (e.g., Argentina, France, and
Portugal, see Fawaz, Trindade, & Casas, 2016). They are not directly applicable in
non-democratic regimes where no national election is being held, either.
The Tone of Content. To gauge the ideological bias in news content rather than
editorials, one approach is to manually code the tones of stories. Lowry and Shidler (1995)
have analyzed radio content and coded sound bites about candidates in the 1992 election.
They find that the sound bites were substantially more negative toward Republican
candidates George Bush and Dan Quayle. Similar methods are used in Dalton et al. (1998)
and Watts et al. (1999). However, this approach, as Ho and Quinn (2008) suggest, requires
“substantive knowledge on the part of the coders, is often expensive, and can be prone to a
variety of coding errors” (p. 355).
Computer-assisted content analysis including sentiment analysis offers promise in
dealing with the problems of manual coding (e.g., Soroka, Young, & Balmas, 2015; Young
& Soroka, 2012). It is also open to studies in different contexts, because such analysis
could be run on various types of texts regardless of context. However, this approach cannot
eliminate subjective decisions on issues such as building the “dictionary” and setting the
training set for supervised learning. Getting a reasonably high accuracy rate and efficiency
also requires the familiarity of the technique development, as well as careful thought and
reasoning (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013).
Politically charged phrases. Another approach to measure the ideological bias in
news content is to count the frequency of “politically charged” phrases. For example,
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) calculate how often a media outlet uses certain phrases (e.g.,
“death tax”), and then compare the results with Congressional Record “to identify whether
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the newspaper’s language is more similar to that of a congressional Republican or a
congressional Democrat” (p. 42). Similarly, Wihbey and colleagues (2018) measure bias in
news content by examining how often phrases representative of a strong ideology (e.g.,
“undocumented workers” suggests a liberal ideology, while “illegal immigrants” indicates
the opposite) are used. This process simply deals with counting and thus reduces
subjectivity, but it requires the knowledge of a group of these words/phrases and the
consensus that these words/phrases do signal bias. Unfortunately, these requirements are
often difficult to meet in non-democratic regimes, where such politically charged phrases
do not exist due to the lack of open competition among political groups.
Table 1 summarizes the methods discussed above and whether they could be
applied effectively in the study of media bias in multi-party and non-democratic systems.

Table 1 Summary of previous methods of measuring media bias
Category

Method

Consumer-based Public perceptions
Ideological composition of
audiences
Journalist-based Journalists’ perceptions
Ideological composition of
journalists
Content-based
Filtering of certain issues
Editorial Endorsements
Tone of content
Politically charged phrases

Applicability in
multi-party systems
Y
Y

Applicability in
non-democratic
systems
Y
N

Y
Y

Y
N

Y
Limited
Y
Y

N
N
Y
N
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Journalistic Sourcing Pattern of Intellectuals as Indicator of Media Bias
The methods reviewed above all provide insights into how to measure media bias, but
suffer from different problems in validity and applicability in non-democratic contexts.
Here I argue that using journalistic sourcing patterns to study media bias in various
contexts is the best approach that is currently available.
This approach is rooted in several important branches of research from different
areas. The first is journalism studies, especially the sociological study of media work
(Gans, 1979; Schudson, 2003; Tuchman, 1978), in which scholars have paid intensive
attention to how journalists gather factual information and opinions from others. Sources
are so important to news media that O’Neill and O’Connor (2008) argue that sources are
actually “making” news. The bedrock position of sourcing in journalism practice lies in the
fact that journalists across the globe are constrained by the objectivity norm (Schudson,
2001)—the reliance on sources to provide information thus protects “the professional from
mistakes and from … critics” (Tuchman, 1972, p. 678). However, sourcing is only a kind
of “strategic ritual” of objectivity (Tuchman, 1972) rather than a magical method to ensure
objectivity—“journalists make subjective choices all of the time as to whom they interview
or what documents they quote” (Hamilton & Lawrence, 2010, p. 683). To put it differently,
sourcing could be a way for journalists to implicitly express opinions through others’
voices, especially when they resort to intellectuals, researchers, commentators, and think
tanks for comments (rather than when they interview persons involved in the stories or
witnesses).
The second branch of study that relates to this approach is political communication
studies that often critically assess how the sourcing patterns are in favor of power holders
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and produce media bias. There is a rich set of literature that have examined the
disproportional reliance on institutional and official sources such as government officials
and leaders of major political parties and business organizations (e.g., Aday, 2010; Brown,
Bybee, Wearden, & Straughan, 1987; Reese, Grant, & Danielian, 1994; Sigal, 1973). As a
consequence, the power elites’ interpretation of political and social issues “commands the
field in all subsequent treatment and sets the terms of reference within which all further
coverage and debate takes place” (Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, & Roberts, 1978, p.
58). Based on this prevalent sourcing pattern, Bennett (1990) proposes the widely-cited
“indexing theory” to predict that news coverage on political and public policy issues will
generally follow the parameters of elite debate.
The third branch that sheds light on media bias research is research on citation
networks that is often used to study scientific and scholarly networks (White, 2011). I
argue that it could be adapted to the study of media bias. In academia, citation is the
process of building knowledge upon previous work, and citation networks can reveal the
influence of authors and the relationship among them. This methodology provides
illuminating insights on how the citation network of news media could be established. Due
to different substantial meanings of citation in academic research and in media coverage,
the networks reveal very different things. For the citation network of media, it is not about
how theory is built upon each other or how studies influence each other, but about how
media share similarities in choosing individuals to express opinions.
One important study that relies on journalistic sourcing patterns to measure media
bias is conducted by Groseclose and Milyo (2005). They examine how 20 selected media
outlets in the U.S. (including newspapers, magazines, TV news programs, radio programs,
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and websites) cite 50 influential think tanks on different ends of the ideological spectrum.
In order to measure the ideological position of think tanks, they calculate how members of
Congress cite them. If a think tank is frequently cited by a liberal legislator (whose position
was revealed by adjusted ADA scores, compiled by the Americans for Democratic Action
and developed by Groseclose, Levitt, & Snyder, 1999), then it is considered to be liberal. A
media outlet that overwhelmingly cites liberal think tanks is then positioned on the liberal
side of the spectrum.
This approach is groundbreaking, but again, it could not be directly copied to the
Chinese context for two reasons. First, it predefines a liberal-conservative continuum,
which is not theorized in China, as explained in the first chapter. Second, the ideological
positions of sources (i.e., think tanks) are calculated with the help of congressional data,
which is also unavailable in China.
To address these two problems, I develop a novel methodological approach which
borrows insights from Groseclose and Milyo (2005) but extends it in important aspects. It
does not require a predefined ideological continuum or congressional (or similar elite)
data. Adopting the “cluster view” proposed in the first chapter, I combine Groseclose and
Milyo’s method with a data-driven network approach to capture the sourcing similarities
among media outlets, and construct a network without predefining the position of sources.
In addition, I use individual intellectuals and commentators rather than think tanks because
the think tank industry is still weak and heavily controlled in China. As Wang (2017)
suggests, Chinese think tanks are unlikely to “express thoughts that are in conflict with the
government.” Instead, they “think what they’re told to think.” Therefore, think tanks are
not useful in differentiating ideological positions. In contrast, individual intellectuals in
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China hold different opinions, including opinions that are in conflict with the official
policies (Mulvad, 2018).
Next, I turn to a detailed introduction to the methods and data used in this study.

Data Collection and Analysis Strategies
The selection of media outlets
To measure media bias and map the landscape in China, I selected 31 major news outlets to
be included in this study, drawn from newspapers, magazines, broadcasting, and websites.
Specific outlets were selected using two criteria: reach and representativeness. Reach is
defined in terms of circulation, viewership, or traffic. I chose the most widely
circulated/viewed/visited media outlets. Representativeness refers to: a) the inclusion of
both party media and commercial media, and b) covering two types of signature
publications in China, i.e., outlets that aimed at promoting the ruling party’s “authoritative
voice” (such as Qiushi, the official magazine published by the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China) and those known for investigative journalism (such as
Southern Weekly and Caixin magazine). This purposive sampling approach is in line with
media bias research in the Western context—focusing on influential ones such as The New
York Times and Drudge Report rather than randomly selecting titles. I also surveyed
previous studies on Chinese media to make sure that no major outlet that has been studied
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before is missing here.2 Appendix I provides a more detailed explanation on the process
and why each of the outlets in this project was selected.
The final dataset of media outlets is constrained to those whose full-text data are
available. Unfortunately, there is no Chinese equivalent to LexisNexis, which provides
full-text data of nearly all major news outlets in one place. The most similar database is
WiseNews, where I collected data of 19 newspapers. I used web scraping to collect data
from another 11 outlets (including online newspapers, magazines, TV programs, and
websites), and relied on my personal connection to get data from the remaining one
newspaper (Table 2).

Table 2 Media outlets included in the sample
Title (Chinese)

Title (English)

Circulation
(thousand)

Data source

Newspapers (22)
人民日报
广州日报
南方都市报
钱江晚报
环球时报
楚天都市报
南方日报
华西都市报
南方周末
经济日报
光明日报
新民晚报
今晚报
湖北日报
羊城晚报

The People’s Daily
Guangzhou Daily
Southern Metropolis Daily
Qianjiang Evening News
Global Times
Chutian Metropolis Daily
Nanfang Daily
Western China Metropolis Daily
Southern Weekly
Economic Daily
Guangming Daily
Xinmin Evening News
Today Evening Post
Hubei Daily
Yangcheng Evening News

3,334
1,850
1,826
1,580
1,165
1,012
968
824
760
756
730
601
505
440
417

Web scraping
WiseNews
WiseNews
WiseNews
WiseNews
WiseNews
WiseNews
WiseNews
Provided by editor
WiseNews
WiseNews
WiseNews
WiseNews
WiseNews
WiseNews

2

I reviewed 51 academic papers on Chinese media that use content analysis and are published
in 16 major journalism and mass communications journals during recent two decades, see Fang,
2015.
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浙江日报
江南都市报
北京晚报
中国青年报
新京报
北京青年报
京华时报
Magazines (4)
求是
财新周刊
三联生活周刊
南风窗
Broadcasting (2)
新闻联播
焦点访谈
Websites (3)
澎湃新闻

Zhejiang Daily
Jiangnan Metropolis Daily
Beijing Evening News
China Youth Daily
The Beijing News
Beijing Youth Daily
Beijing Times

408
400
330
300
281
250
247

WiseNews
WiseNews
WiseNews
Web scraping
WiseNews
WiseNews
WiseNews

Qiushi
Caixin Weekly
Sanlian Life Weekly
Nanfeng Chuang

1,729
220
750
660

Web scraping
Web scraping
Web scraping
Web scraping

Xinwen Lianbo / News Simulcast
Focus
The Paper

界面新闻

Jiemian

观察者网

Guancha.cn

Web scraping
Web scraping
402 (Alexa
rank in
China)
469 (Alexa
rank in
China)
1,738 (Alexa
rank in
China)

Web scraping

Web scraping

Web scraping

Total:
31 news outlets
Note: Circulation data based on China Journalism Yearbook 2016.

For these media outlets, I collected and analyzed 4 years of data: 2010, 2012, 2014,
and 2016.3 The major goal of this longitudinal design is to capture the changes in media
landscape after President Xi Jinping took power in the end of 2012 (The 18th National
Congress of the Communist Party of China) and early 2013 (The 1st Session of the 12th
National People's Congress), as discussed in the first chapter.

Extracting intellectuals’ names and quotes
3

It should be noted that Pengpai and Jiemian were both launched in mid-2014. Therefore, these
two outlets only have data for the years 2014 and 2016.
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As illustrated in Figure 1, after obtaining the full-text data of the 31 media outlets, I
extracted articles that met the following two criteria: a) they were relevant to this study and
the methodological approach—those on political, economic, and social issues, which was
judged by the pages/sections they appear, and b) they cited intellectual or opinion sources.
To be more specific, articles with keywords “professor” (教授), “researcher” (研究员),
“economist” (经济学家), “political scientist” (政治学家), “sociologist” (社会学家), or
“commentator” (评论员) in their full texts and appeared in sections of politics, economy, or
social issues were extracted.
After the articles were selected, I implemented an algorithm to recognize names in
Chinese characters4 with the requirement that the names appeared within 10 characters of
any of the aforementioned keywords. It should be noted that these names include
non-Chinese experts whose names were transliterated into Chinese characters.5 A large
spreadsheet was then produced. Each row of the spreadsheet contained the following
information: name cited, media title, article headline, article date, and the full sentence in
which the name appeared. By keeping the article headlines and full quotations in the
spreadsheet, I was able to identify the specific issues discussed and analyze the media
outlets’ issue positions, which is to be discussed in detail later.

Data cleaning

4

The Chinese model in Stanford Named Entity Recognizer (NER), see
https://nlp.stanford.edu/software/CRF-NER.shtml.
5 For example, Niall Ferguson was transliterated into 尼尔·弗格森 in Chinese media. The
algorithm was able to identify these transliterated names.
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After creating the large spreadsheet of “raw” data, I, with the help from three research
assistants, cleaned the data by removing duplicates6 and irrelevant quotes (see Appendix II
for a detailed explanation on the data cleaning process), identified and marked different
individuals with the same names, supplemented data on the individuals’ basic
demographics (gender and nation of origin) and areas of specialization, and identified
quotes that are used to criticize the intellectual’s view rather than endorsing it.7
The cleaned spreadsheet contained 47,476 entries and 8,710 individuals. In other
words, 8,710 individual intellectual sources appeared one or more times in at least one of
the 31 media outlets to provide their opinions, and the total amount of “appearances” was
47,476. Among the 31 media outlets, Southern Metropolis Daily quoted expert sources the
most frequently, with a total amount of 3,731 times, while Qiushi quoted the least, with a
total amount of 101 times. This is unsurprising, given the fact that Southern Metropolis
Daily is one of the most successful commercial daily newspapers and literally the thickest
paper with the most pages for a long time, while Qiushi is a biweekly magazine.

Counting the frequency

6

One quotation might be picked up twice by two different keywords.
For example, in an article on the South China Sea disputes published by Southern Metropolis
Daily (http://gcontent.oeeee.com/8/4c/84c578f202616448/Blog/eef/38fe8e.html), Peter
Brookes, Senior Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, was cited as an “anti-China” expert whose
claim that China’s actions in the South China Sea negatively influenced global economy was
“totally false and absurd;” in another article published by Guancha.cn
7

(https://www.guancha.cn/wen-yang/2012_08_21_92325.shtml), economists Mao Yushi (茅于轼)
and Zhang Weiying (张维迎) were quoted as examples of “economists who lack history lessons
but love to talk about history” and who should not be trusted.
41

With the cleaned spreadsheet, I then created a 31×8,710 table for the total frequency of
each name appearing in each outlet (as shown in Figure 1). It should be noted that I used
negative counts to denote the situations in which a media outlet cited a person in order to
criticize him/her. These circumstances were rare yet existent. They included important
information on the sourcing patterns of certain outlets.
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Full-text data of selected 31 media
outlets

Articles with keywords
(“professor”, “researcher”,
“scholar”, “economist”, “political
scientist”, “sociologist”, or
“commentator”) and in
pages/sections of politics,
economics, and social issues

Name recognition
algorithm
Within 10
characters of the
keywords

Spreadsheet of
names and
quotations
appeared in
media outlets

Manual cleaning

Cleaned
spreadsheet, with
demographics and
specialization

Media 1
Media 2
Media 3
…

Name 1
2
1
0

Name 2
0
3
-1

…

Compute the cosine similarity scores
between each pair of media outlets and
build a network of these 31 media
outlets, where the edges are weighted
according to the similarity scores.

Figure 1 Quantitative data collection and analysis process
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Comparing similarity between each pair of outlets
Next, using the 31×8,710 table, I computed the cosine similarity scores between each pair
of media outlets. Cosine similarity is “a measure of similarity between two vectors of an
inner product space that measures the cosine of the angle between them” (Gomaa &
Fahmy, 2013, p. 14) and is frequently used in comparing the content of two webpages. In
the case of the current study, each media outlet could be seen as a vector of 8,710 values,
each of which represented the frequency of a name appearing in that outlet. If two outlets
had the exact same pattern of intellectual sourcing8, the cosine similarity score would be 1.
If two outlets shared no source in common, the score would be 0. If every source cited by
one outlet was criticized by the other, the score would be -1. In the current study, the
similarity scores ranged from 0.006 (between Guangzhou Daily and Qiushi) to 0.798
(between Nanfang Daily and Yangcheng Evening News), with a mean of 0.227 and
standard deviation of 0.185.
Another possible approach to quantifying the similarity between each pair of media
outlets was to compute the total number of experts that co-appear in any pair of outlets. I
did not take this approach for two reasons. First, as indicated above, the amount of stories
in each outlet varies a lot. As a result, the thick newspaper Southern Metropolis Daily and
other outlets that published more frequently would naturally have a bigger chance to have
more co-appeared individual sources, even if their sourcing patterns were quite different.
The cosine similarity approach avoided this problem, for the score was only based on the
8

The same pattern could be: a) the two outlets had exact same sourcing frequency for each
individuals, or b) the frequency for each individual in one outlet was proportional to that in the
other outlet (e.g., the first outlet quoted individual A once, individual B twice, and others zero
times, while the second outlet quoted individual A twice, individual B four times, and others
zero times).
44

“angle” rather than the size of citations. Second, the negative counts denoting criticisms
would play little role in this alternative approach, while cosine similarity score would fully
make use of the information of negative counts.
Table 3 provides the summary statistics of the data.

Table 3 Summary statistics of the data
Amount of media outlets
Amount of individual intellectuals
Amount of quotes
Media outlet with the most quotes
Media outlet with the fewest quotes
Average amount of quotes
Most similar pair of outlets
Most dissimilar pair of outlets
Average of similarity scores
Standard deviation of similarity scores

31
8,710
47,476
Southern Metropolis Daily (3,731 quotes)
Qiushi (101 quotes)
1,531
Nanfang Daily and Yangcheng Evening News
(similarity score: 0.798)
Qiushi and Guangzhou Daily (similarity score:
0.006)
0.227
0.185

Building the network
I then built a network of these 31 media outlets, where the edges between each pair were
weighted according to the similarity scores. I detected the community structure in this
network in R, using the “fast and greedy” algorithm by Clause, Newman, & Moore (2004).
This algorithm is developed from a previous technique proposed by Newman (2004). It is
based on the greedy optimization of modularity, which measures the strength of division of
a network into clusters. If a network has a high modularity score, the nodes within the same
cluster have dense connections, and those in different clusters have sparse connections
(Newman, 2006). Therefore, a clearer community structure is identified as the algorithm
optimizes modularity.
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There are multiple community detection algorithms developed by previous studies,
and I have run the four major ones available in the igraph package in R and compared their
results, which are summarized in Table 4. It could be seen that the modularity scores are
relatively low compared to the conventional standard (0.3-0.7, see Newman & Girvan,
2004). This is because the current network is a complete graph, where each pair of nodes is
connected, and the only thing that differentiates the clusters of nodes is the weight of the
edges. The modularity score is calculated in a way that it tends to be higher with
communities detected in a sparse graph. Nonetheless, we could tell from the table that the
fast and greedy algorithm and the Louvain algorithm (Blondel, Guillaume, Lambiotte, &
Lefebvre, 2008) are performing better than the other two. The only difference in the
community structures detected by the two better algorithms is that the central-level party
newspaper Economic Daily is recognized in the cluster of other central-level party outlets
by the fast and greedy algorithm, and in the cluster of provincial dailies by the Louvain
algorithm. I chose fast and greedy because a) the modularity score it produced is slightly
higher than the Louvain algorithm, and b) it makes more sense to see central-level party
outlets in the same cluster rather than having a cluster of all provincial dailies plus a
central-level newspaper. But it also suggests that the Economic Daily, which has more
coverage on economy and business issues, might be somewhat different from other patty
outlets. I will discuss this more in the next chapter.

Table 4 Comparing community detection algorithms
Community detection algorithm
Fast and greedy
Edge betweenness

Modularity score
0.083
0.050
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Number of communities
3
6

Walktrap
Louvain

0.055
0.080

3
3

Qualitative interpretations
So far the analysis was purely quantitative. After the communities were detected, however,
additional qualitative interpretations were needed to decode the meanings of the
communities identified by the algorithm. I examined and compared the background
information (location, ownership, and hosting institution) of media outlets in each cluster,
and investigated the “unique” sources in each cluster. Here “unique” means that such
sources appear very frequently in one cluster, and rarely in other clusters. I closely read all
the quotations by these sources, and summarized the major opinions expressed in these
quotations following a thematic coding process (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

Comparing Pre-Xi and Xi eras
To answer the fourth and fifth research questions, I compared the community structure
before Xi took power and that under his rule. More specifically, I divided the dataset (the
large, cleaned spreadsheet) into two parts: the first part contained data in 2010 and 2012,
and the second part for 2014 and 2016. I followed the same approach as introduced above
to identify clusters in each of the two sub-datasets, and compare the amount of
communities and the affiliation of the media outlets.

Examining issue attitudes
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Ideological bias is largely studied through the lens of issues. The common practice is to
measure the subject’s stances on a set of key issues and then synthesize them into a one or
more dimensional space. As Baldassarri and Gelman (2008) argue, however, people’s
views are usually incoherent across issues, and their preferences on specific issues might
not neatly fit into a coherent ideological space. This is likely to be especially true in nations
such as China, which as noted in the previous chapter does not have a clear and easily
captured ideological structure. To account for this, in this study I also examined the media
outlets’ standpoints on 20 major issues, revealing a more comprehensive picture of the
ideological landscape of Chinese media. The issues were selected by the following steps.
First, I collected the issues examined in previous important studies on ideology in China
(Lee, 2003; Pan & Xu, 2018; Wu, 2014; Wu & Meng, 2016). Second, during the in-depth
interviews with experienced media professionals in China, to be introduced in the next
section, I asked them to tell if these issues were truly heavily covered in Chinese media.
Those that were not significantly present were dropped. I also asked them to provide their
selections of additional important issues. Third, I also identified additional issues through
the above-mentioned qualitative reading of the quotations. The final selection of the issues
is shown in Table 5.

Table 5 List of issues and corresponding keywords
Category
Political

Issues
Adherence to
party ideology

Keywords
马克思主义 (Marxism), 马列主义 (Marxism–Leninism), 毛泽东思
想 (Mao Zedong Thought), 邓小平理论 (Deng Xiaoping Theory), 三
个代表 (Three Represents), 和谐社会 (Harmonious Society), 中国特
色社会主义 (Socialism with Chinese characteristics), 习近平思想
(Xi Jinping Thought), 新时代 (Socialism with Chinese Characteristics
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for a New Era), 中国梦 (The Chinese Dream)

The “China
Model” (as
compared with
Western liberal
democracy)

中国模式 (the China Model), 中国崛起 (the rise of China), 中国道路
(the Chinese road), 道路自信 (confidence in the path), 理论自信
(confidence in theories), 制度自信 (confidence in system of socialism
with Chinese characteristics), 三个自信 (three matters of confidence),
中国经济模式 (China’s economic model), 北京共识 (Beijing
Consensus), 西方民主 (Western democracy), 美式民主
(American-style democracy)

Sovereignty and 南海 (South China Sea), 仲裁 (South China Sea Arbitration), 钓鱼岛
territorial
(Diaoyu Island), 台独 (Taiwan independence), 台湾问题 (Taiwan
integrity
issue), 藏独 (Tibet independence), 西藏问题 (Tibet issue), 疆独

(Xinjiang independence), 新疆问题 (Xinjiang issue), 互联网主权
(Internet sovereignty), 占中 (Occupy Movement), 港独 (Hong Kong
independence)

China’s
international
presence

中国威胁论 (China threat theory), 和平崛起 (peaceful rise), 上合组
织 (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), 一带一路 (One Belt One
Road Initiative), 中日关系 (China-Japan relations), 中美关系
(China-U.S. relations), 中欧关系 (China-Europe relations), 中非关系
(China-Africa relations)

Corruption

反腐 (anti-corruption), 廉政 (clean government), 公务接待 (official
receptions), 八项规定 (an eight-point code to cut bureaucracy and
maintain close ties with the people), 老虎苍蝇 (tigers and flies,
referring to high-level corruptions and low-level corruptions)

Government
accountability
Rule of law

治理 (governance), 公众监督 (public oversight), 舆论监督
(supervision by public opinion), 监督政府 (holding government
accountable)
法治 (rule of law), 法制 (rule by law), 依法治国 (law-based
governance of the country), 司法 (judiciary), 审判 (trial), 案件
(cases), 诉讼 (lawsuits), 宪法 (constitution), 刑讯逼供 (extorting a
confession), 程序正义 (procedural justice)

Social conflicts

社会矛盾 (social conflicts), 社会稳定 (social stability), 社会管理
(social management), 维稳 (maintaining social stability), 上访
(petition), 信访 (complaint), 群体性事件 (mass incidents)

Civil society

公民社会 (civil society), 公益 (public service), 慈善 (charity), NGO,
社会组织 (social organizations)

Economic

The role of the
government in

市场经济 (market economy), 市场作用 (the functions of the market),
政府干预 (government intervention), 大政府 (big government), 小政
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economy, the
extent of state
intervention
State-owned
and private
enterprises
Tax and income
distribution
(state vs.
citizens)
Inequality (rich
vs. poor)

府 (small government), 政府退后 (government stepping back), 民间
金融 (private finance)
国有企业 (state-owned enterprises), 垄断国企 (state-owned
monopoly), 民营企业 (private enterprises), 民企 (short for private
enterprises)
收入分配 (income distribution), 财政收入 (government revenue), 居
民收入 (resident income), 民富 (fortune of citizens), 税负 (tax
burden), 减税 (tax cut), 偷税漏税 (tax evasion)
贫富差距 (the gap between rich and poor), 城乡差距 (urban-rural
gap), 基尼系数 (Gini coefficient), 农村 (rural), 寒门 (poor family
background), 分配不均 (uneven distribution)

Housing price
regulation

房地产 (real estate), 房价 (housing price), 限价 (price limit), 楼市
(property market), 买房 (buying a property)

Interpretation of 经济数据 (economic statistics), GDP (Gross Domestic Product), CPI
key economic
(Consumer Price Index), PMI (Purchasing Managers Index), 上证指
statistics
数 (SSE Composite Index), 深圳成指 (SZSE Component Index)

Social and
Cultural

Currency

人民币 (Renminbi), 汇率 (currency)

Gender equality

性别 (gender), 性教育 (sex education), 男孩危机 (crisis of boys), 家
暴 (domestic violence), 性侵 (sexual abuse), 性骚扰 (sexual
harassment), 男女平等 (equality between men and women), 性别平
等 (gender equality), 女权 (feminism), 同性恋 (homosexual)

One-child
policy
Environmental
protection

计划生育 (one-child policy), 二胎/二孩 (second child)
环保 (environmental protection), 资源 (resources), 能源 (energy), 污
染 (pollution), 雾霾 (smog), 全球变暖 (global warming), 气候变化
(climate change), 碳排放 (carbon emissions)

Traditional
culture

传统文化 (traditional culture), 文化自信 (confidence in culture), 儒
家 (Confucian School), 儒学 (Confucianism), 国学 (Sinology)

Table 5 also lists the corresponding keywords for each issue. To examine the
ideological positions of the 31 news outlets on these 20 issues, I extracted 20 issue-specific
sub-datasets from the large, cleaned spreadsheet by keyword searching in the quotations
and the headlines of the articles. I then followed a similar approach explained above to map
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the network of the outlets on each issue and detect the community structure of each
issue-specific network. The detailed results are presented in Chapter 4.

Measuring structural bias
The process discussed above is used to measure the ideological dimension of media bias,
with the assumption that intellectuals are providing ideological opinions on political and
social issues. For measuring the structural bias, I rely on the data of mentions of top
political leaders from both the national and provincial levels. Previous studies suggest that
the relative amount of space devoted by media outlets to political actors is a strong
indicator of structural power (e.g., Ban, Fouirnaies, Hall, & Snyder, 2018; Jaros & Pan,
2018). More specifically, on the national level, I include all 25 members the Central
Politburo of the Communist Party of China, who are the most powerful persons in the
ruling party. On the provincial level, I include the provincial party standing committee
members (11-13 members in each province) of the provinces where the selected outlets are
based. Leaders before and after the leadership transition are all included9. I calculate the
frequencies (in proportion to the total amount of articles of each outlet) of these media
outlets mentioning the top leaders to analyze their structural bias. It should be noted that
due to censorship, it is very unlikely for news media in China to mention top leaders for the
purpose of criticizing them. To distance themselves from the party-state, the most probable
strategy for media outlets is to avoid mentioning the top leaders.
9

For example, after the leadership transition at the first plenary session of the 18th Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China, 10 members of the previous Central Politburo
remained, while the other 15 retired. Therefore, a total of 40 Central Politburo members were
included in the study. The total amount of top national and provincial political leaders in the
study was 192.
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Overall, the methodological approach adopted in this study has several advantages.
First, it covers a fairly large number of media outlets in China, thus giving a relatively
comprehensive picture of Chinese media. Previous studies usually choose less than 10, or
even less than 5 outlets (e.g., Wang, Sparks, Lü, et al., 2017) and face challenges in
claiming any generalizing statements based on the limited sample size. Second, by
synthesizing quantitative and qualitative methods, this study is inherently bottom-up and
data-driven, rather than presuming any structure of the ideological landscape. It avoids the
problem of predefining the landscape which is not escapable in survey research. Third, the
major part of the analysis is done by automatic rather than manual coding. It largely avoids
subjective decisions and provides more reliable findings.

In-depth Interviews as Supplementary Data
In addition to the analysis based on media content, I also conducted in-depth interviews
with experienced media professionals in China to supplement the investigation. The
interviews mainly serve two goals. First, it provides evidence on whether this “follow the
sources” approach works in the Chinese context. If journalists do consider the ideological
alignment in selecting intellectual interviewees, the above-mentioned methodological
approach would be valid. Second, it provided expert assistance regarding the major issues
and the standpoints of news outlets in the Chinese context, which facilitates my qualitative
interpretation of content and the analysis of key issues.
I conducted the interviews in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou from August to
December 2017, with some follow-ups in late 2018. There were 32 interviewees in total, 18
of whom were reporters or editors (with more than 3 years’ journalistic experience) at the
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31 news outlets in the sample. The remaining 14 interviewees held management positions
(chief editors, deputy chief editors, executive editors, managers, etc.) at those outlets. I
managed to include interviewees from newspapers, magazines, broadcasting, and digital
outlets, and also covered both national and provincial media in the interviews. To protect
the identity of the interviewees, I use numerical coding to replace their names.
The interviews were conducted face-to-face in cafes chosen by the interviewees.
The length of the interviews ranged from 1 to 2 hours. During these semi-structured
interviews, I mainly asked questions on the following topics: their working routine,
especially their sourcing practices; the factors determining the choice of certain sources;
their relationships with expert sources; their perceptions of media bias in China; their
perceptions of the bias of the media they worked for; the key issues heavily covered and
discussed in Chinese media; and the standpoints of representative media outlets on those
issues.
I used Mandarin in the interviews, and the recordings were transcribed by myself in
Chinese, except for 3 cases in which the interviewees preferred not to be recorded. In those
cases, I made written notes during the interviews. In analyzing the interview data, I used
the NVivo software and followed a thematic coding approach (Braun & Clarke, 2006) to
identify the common themes in the interviews. In order for additional themes to emerge
from the transcripts, I also followed the open coding method during the analysis (Strauss &
Corbin, 1990).
Overall, the mixed methods introduced in this chapter are suitable for the
exploratory nature of this project, allowing for a bottom-up, inductive process in
identifying patterns and interpreting findings, while also maintaining the rigor and validity
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of the analysis. It is built on a combination of large volume quantitative data and in-depth
qualitative data. In the following chapters, I will present the findings produced by this
methodological approach.
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CHAPTER 3. The Landscape

In this chapter, I present the findings on the overall landscape of media bias in China.
Before going into the details of the network and clusters of news outlets, I discuss Chinese
journalists’ practices in expert sourcing based on the in-depth interviews. The findings
generally validate the approach of measuring media bias by patterns of expert sourcing. I
then introduce the network structure and the clusters of the ideological landscape of
Chinese media, followed by the comparison between the pre-Xi Jinping era and the Xi era.
In the last section of this chapter, I turn to the findings on the structural bias of Chinese
media as measured by mentions of top political leaders.

How Chinese Journalists Cite Intellectuals for Opinions
As discussed in the previous chapter, I argue that sources make the news (O’Neill &
O’Connor, 2008). One central practice in this profession, then, is to choose from the
seemingly endless options of potential sources. To use Carlson’s (2009) words, “the
external world is a world of potential sources harboring individual interpretations of reality.
Yet… not all individuals stand the same chance of being called upon as a source” (p. 527).
There are generally two types of sources, who serve distinct purposes in journalism.
The first type is sources providing factual information and evidence for news stories. They
are directly or indirectly involved in the stories, or at least could provide some relevant or
background information as a witness or observer. The choice of this type of sources is
usually quite straightforward and based on relevance and access, though there are still
problems such as the tendency of favoring elite and official sources over other interested
55

parties in the stories (Bennett, 1990). The second type of sources is those who provide
opinionated information including interpretation, explanation, and viewpoints. As scholars
have argued, news reporting during recent decades has put increasing emphasis on
interpretative journalism, which has “increased journalists’ need to consult experts for
assistance in interpreting and explaining the news” (Albæk, 2011, p. 338). While factual
information sources are relatively objective, interpretations and explanations unavoidably
bring more subjective appraisals into news stories. And the decision of choosing which
experts to interview is not only based on relevance and access, but also about ideological
alignment. As an interviewee working for a provincial newspaper said,
“There are usually dozens or even hundreds of experts on a specific topic we
cover. Any one of them will do the job of interpreting the factual information,
so the choice is really based on two factors: whether we can get in touch with
them, and whether they want to talk with us. And these two factors could
further be summarized into one sentence: whether we have good collaboration.
And one crucial part of good collaboration is that we should share similar
values (价值观).”10
The prerequisite for a source to “share similar values” with the news outlet is
practiced at both the individual journalist level and the organizational level, echoing
previous studies on the different levels of influence on news making (Shoemaker & Reese,
1996; Sigelman, 1973; Voakes, 1997). For the former, several journalists mentioned in my
interviews that they personally would never call certain experts to solicit their opinions.

10

Interview 6.
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One journalist working at a national commercial media said that he would “never give the
platform of our media outlet to those nationalistic voices.” 11 For the latter, two
interviewees recalled instances during their early years of their journalistic careers when
their initial choices of expert sources were rejected by the editors, who cited “ideological
incongruence” as the main reason.12
This is not to say that ideological congruence is always a major factor in
“screening” potential expert sources. Many interviewees, especially those working for
daily newspapers, acknowledged that the fast news cycle often left them with no time to
carefully and strategically choose expert sources. The decisions are largely pragmatic, i.e.,
calling those who have been in their contact lists for a long time and have already
frequently appeared in their outlets. The majority of my interviewees mentioned that there
were internally shared contact lists of experts who were long-time “collaborators.” But
again, one essential factor in establishing such collaborations is the alignment in terms of
ideological positions.
To implement “sharing similar values” as an important criteria in selecting expert
sources, one has to know the values held by both the media outlet and the sources. In my
interviews, journalists were generally aware of the standpoints of their media outlets—at
least on the issues they covered, and were also familiar with the opinions of major experts
in their areas. For example, a journalist at a commercial magazine covering legal affairs
shared that “we are always promoting the idea of judicial independence and I know almost
all of the major legal scholars who are willing to openly advance this idea in the
11
12

Interview 2.
Interviews 3 and 17.
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interviews.”13 The sourcing practice essentially becomes a confirmation process rather
than the discovery of new opinions. This is in line with arguments in previous literature
that journalists seek for “compensatory legitimacy” from experts—to confirm the opinions,
interpretations, and conclusions that they themselves have already formed (Albæk, 2011;
Weiler, 1983). Albæk (2011) also finds that in about half of the cases, the framing of a
news article has already been settled before journalists actually begin contacting experts.
This phenomenon is also confirmed in my interviews. The aforementioned legal affairs
journalist suggested that in most of the cases, he had estimations on the opinions that
scholars would provide. “I prefer reaching out to the ones that are likely to provide
comments that I am looking for, and in most of the cases, I do get what I want.”14 Another
example is that a business journalist at a provincial daily shared in my interview that
among the multiple interviewees for one story, she almost always chose to contact the
expert interviewees the last, after she decided on the general structure and orientation of the
story. She claimed that “experts are often like the icing on the cake (锦上添花), and I know
which ones to choose for each story.”15
One possible challenge to this sourcing practice is the norms on objectivity, balance,
and opinion diversity in journalism, which are also honored in China as in Western
countries. However, as previous studies suggest, journalists often find ways to ostensibly
comply with the norms without changing their ideological preferences. For example,
scholars find that “adherence to balance and diversity norms was limited to half a sentence
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Interview 16.
Ibid.
15 Interview 32.
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noting that someone disagreed,” and that “most uses of second viewpoint did little to
achieve a balanced presentation” (Tenenboim-Weinblatt & Baden, 2018, p. 491). In my
interviews, one journalist working for an online publication called it “a trick that every
journalist knows about”: “Yes, you need to appear to be objective and balanced, but you
can always implicitly show your preference by adjusting the ratio of agree/disagree. For
instance, you can cite three experts that you agree with, and only one you don’t agree with.
And of course, you can begin with quoting the one you disagree with, and then go on with
‘but…’.”16 This “trick” echoes Baden & Tenenboim-Weinblatt’s (2018) finding that
journalists could add positioning on quoted viewpoints to “endorse, distance, question, or
even discredit the source’s frame” (p. 155). My interviews also suggest that at daily
newspapers, there is little pressure on citing more than one expert source. As a journalist
said, “our article is very short, and one expert to provide his or her opinion is usually
enough.”17
I also considered two other questions regarding the expert sourcing practice. The
first is that: do experts have consistent points of view? In the interviews, journalists
generally agree that it is highly unlikely for experts to express very different opinions to
different media outlets or at different times. “They might adjust the wording a little bit,
depending on the context and the nature of the publication,” shared one journalist who keep
close connections with dozens of scholars, “but the major ideas are very difficult to
change.”18 The second is that: what if the experts themselves are in charge? Although in
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Interview 22.
Interview 1.
18 Interview 19.
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some rare cases, scholars take the lead to contact journalists and pitch stories, the
overwhelming consensus among my interviewees is that it’s usually the journalists who
take the initiatives. This also confirms Albæk’s (2011) study on the relationship between
journalists and expert sources, which finds that only in 1-2% of the cases, the contact
comes as the result of initiatives taken by the experts.
So far, we have discussed the expert sourcing practices of Chinese journalists that
are also true for Western journalists. My interviews also reveal some elements unique to
the Chinese context, and perhaps also to other authoritarian contexts. The first is the
government-enforced “blacklists” that prevent certain outspoken intellectuals from
appearing in news outlets. The interviewees suggest that such blacklists are usually
communicated orally from the propaganda department to the editors, for fear that any
written orders might be leaked and make the government look bad. The lists, according to
my interviewees, has grown significantly longer under Xi Jinping’ rule. The media outlets
overwhelmingly choose to comply with the blacklists, because otherwise the editors will
be punished or even lose their jobs. Because of the secret nature of such lists, it is not
feasible to get the full list of banned names. However, as I will discuss in the following
sections, the data could reveal some names that disappeared after 2012. Some banned
names mentioned during the interviews include He Weifang (贺卫方), a Peking University
law professor who is also an activist promoting judicial system reform and a prominent
advocator for human rights and constitutionalism, Leung Man-tao (梁文道), a Hong Kong
writer, host, and critic who writes extensively on social and cultural issues, and Xu
Zhiyuan (许知远), a Beijing-based writer and former journalist. It should be noted that
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censorship in China is a fragmented system (Roberts, 2018; Shambaugh, 2007), so these
blacklists are not necessarily in effect in every province. In addition, journalists could
occasionally circumvent censorship by creative means such as using a pseudonym. For
example, in October 2016, Southern Weekly published a piece on “Why corrupted officials
like to get a law degree”19, in which a Peking University law professor named “Zhu
Shouzheng (祝守正)” was quoted intensively. My interview with a Southern Weekly editor
reveals that this is in fact a pseudonym for the blacklisted professor He Weifang20. The
battle on which intellectuals to quote shows that expert sourcing is indeed an important
way of showing ideological orientations. By preventing certain experts from being
interviewed, the blacklisting practice influences the ideological bias as reflected in media
content, and such influences could be detected by the methodological approach adopted in
this study.
The second unique phenomenon is the so-called “imperially-appointed scholars”
(御用学者), which refers to experts who are recognized, approved, and arranged by the
party-state to express pro-government opinions in news media. Such opinions could push
the ideological and structural bias of media content in a more pro-government direction.
These scholars usually hold titles that are the same as others, such as university professors
or think tank researchers. In fact, there is no clear line between “imperially-appointed
scholars” and “non-imperially-appointed scholars.” It is more a matter of distance to the
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http://www.infzm.com/content/120505.
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Sensitive readers might be able to decode the pseudonym. The Chinese characters “贺卫方”

and “祝守正” can be considered as a “couplet.” 贺 and 祝 both mean congratulating. 卫 and 守
both mean guarding. 方 and 正 Both mean square.
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party-state. A scholar would be perceived as “imperially-appointed” if he or she becomes
too close to the authorities, and promotes the pro-government opinions too blatantly. This
group also appears in party media more often than in commercial media. My interviews
suggest that there is a more or less vague consensus among journalists on who are the
“imperially-appointed” ones. As will be discussed in the following sections, data from the
current study do suggest the growing influence of a group of experts that could arguably be
labelled as “imperially-appointed.” It also demonstrates that expert voices play a vital role
in shaping the ideology embedded in news stories.
In sum, the interview findings discussed above support the idea of measuring the
patterns of intellectual sourcing as a valid method to study media bias in China. Next, I will
present the major findings on the overall ideological landscape of Chinese media.

The Ideological Landscape based on Intellectual Sourcing
In this section, I examine the network structure and ideological clusters of media outlets
based on the full dataset of 31 publications in 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016. The network is
visualized by the igraph package in R as in Figure 2, where the size of the nodes are
proportional to the log-transformed amount of expert citations in each outlet21, the shape of
the nodes represents the type of the outlets (circle denotes party media, and square denotes
market-oriented media), and the edges are weighted according to the cosine similarity
scores between each pair of outlets. Three clusters have been identified by the community
detection algorithm introduced in Chapter 2 and are visualized in different colors. I named
21

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the largest node is Southern Metropolis Daily, which quoted
expert sources for a total amount of 3,731 times, while the smallest node is Qiushi, with a total
amount of 101 quotations.
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the clusters based on my qualitative interpretation of the nature and content of publications
in each cluster. One immediately noticeable finding is that the network is not structured
along the party media/commercial media divide, thus defying the convenient presumption
made in most of previous studies that the ideological bias of Chinese media is rooted in the
party/commercial divide. Next, I go into the details of each cluster in this network graph.

Figure 2 The ideological landscape of Chinese media (2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016)
Note: the size of the nodes are proportional to the log-transformed amount of expert citations in each
outlet.

The Orthodox Party Outlets
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Let us begin with the cluster with the fewest publications, which are uniformly party media,
as shown in red in Figure 2. I call them “orthodox party outlets” for two reasons. First, this
cluster covers all of the four print publications affiliated with the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China and two primetime television news programs on the primary
channel of China Central Television (CCTV) that are largely dedicated to state propaganda.
The People’s Daily is the official newspaper of the party’s Central Committee and is
known as the major channel for the party’s voice. Its president and editor-in-chief are
appointed by the party directly through the nomenklatura system (Hassid, 2008; Truex,
2016) and are on the provincial-ministerial level in the political ranking system. The
current president, Li Baoshan, is also a member of the 19th Central Commission for
Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party of China, a position that could only be filled
by party members at very high rankings, usually among the top few hundred. Both
Guangming Daily and Economic Daily are also directly under the party’s Central
Committee and respectively have their target audiences among intellectuals and people in
the economic sector. They have slightly lower status inside the party, with their presidents
and editors-in-chief at the vice provincial-ministerial level. Qiushi is the only magazine of
the party’s Central Committee. Its major mission, according to its official website, is to
“publicize the governing philosophy” of the party through the coverage of “political,
economic, cultural and social issues” as well as “analysis of world politics and China’s
foreign relations.”22 Its president also ranks at the vice provincial-ministerial level. In
terms of broadcasting, CCTV is the state television broadcaster, whose president is at the
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See http://english.qstheory.cn/about/201109/t20110919_110860.htm.
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vice provincial-ministerial level in the party cadre system. News Simulcast (Xinwen
Lianbo) is the daily news program aired at 7 pm and boasts to be one of the most-watched
programs around the globe, mainly thanks to the state requirement that all local television
stations in China have to air this program simultaneously every day. News Simulcast
enjoys unparalleled political significance among television news programs and is widely
regarded as a “mirror” or “barometer” of politics in China (Chang & Ren, 2016). Another
primetime news program, aired immediately after News Simulcast, is Focus (Jiaodian
Fangtan). Combining news and commentary, this program originally focused on
investigative journalism in the 1990s but changed to propaganda content during recent
years. Previous studies suggest that, even in its peak years, Focus remained “conservative
in its subtle and cautious control of the frequency, timing, level, and content of the
criticism” (Chan, 2002, p. 35) and did not give voice to different political perspectives
(Zhang, 2006). It’s not surprising to see that it falls in the same cluster as News Simulcast.
Notably, there are two important official media organizations that are not included
in my sample. The first is Xinhua News Agency, which is affiliated with the State Council
of China and enjoys a provincial-ministerial level ranking. However, due to its nature as a
news agency, it is difficult to collect the full-text data for its enormous daily wire news.
The other important official media is the People's Liberation Army Daily, the official
newspaper of the army, which is under the total control of the party. Unfortunately, there
was no available full-text data of this newspaper. My hypothesis is that these two media
organizations would also fall in this “orthodox party outlets” category. Future studies could
test this speculation if data become available.
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The second reason why I named this cluster “orthodox party outlets” is based on the
analysis of content, i.e., the “unique” experts quoted intensively by these publications but
not by those in the other clusters, as well as their major viewpoints. I compared the
frequency for each expert source to appear in this cluster with the frequency to appear in
the other two clusters, and divided the former by the latter23. The larger the quotient is, the
more “unique” a source is for this “orthodox party outlets” cluster. The five most unique
sources include: a researcher in the Research Center on the Theoretical System of
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, who
argues for the “superiority” of the guiding thoughts of the Communist Party of China, and
explains why the party can rule the country for a long time24; a professor at the Central
Party School and researcher affiliated with the School’s Research Center on the
Theoretical System of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, who introduces the theories
built by the Communist Party, how they have been developed over time, and why it’s
important to study and follow those theories; a professor in the Research Center on
Marxism at the National Defense University of People's Liberation Army, who interprets
the top leaders’ thoughts and policies, with a focus on the party’s guidelines on military
development; a researcher in the Department of Philosophy at the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences, who discusses the theoretical foundations of state policies; and a professor
at Fudan University’s School of International Relations and Public Affairs and researcher
affiliated with the University’s China Institute, who explains why the Chinese political
23

I excluded the non-frequent sources that only appeared on or two times in this cluster and
never appeared in the other two clusters.
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In this dissertation, the names of some Chinese experts are anonymized to protect their
confidentiality.
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system is actually democratic and why it is more suitable for China than American-style
democracy. As we could see from this list, the intellectual sources that connect these six
outlets and separate them from the other two clusters are mostly scholars working at the
institutions whose primary goal is to promote party ideology and state policies. These
institutions usually include “Marxism” or “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” in their
names, and are often considered the most heavily politically-controlled and most
“sensitive” institutions in universities. As one journalist working at a central party
newspaper shared in the interview, “researchers at those institutions are largely considered
official mouthpieces, or the so-called ‘imperially-appointed scholars.’ Their appearance in
media are usually arranged by the party to interpret the policies, argue for the smartness
and timeliness of the policies, and promote a positive image of the party.”25 A journalist at
a commercial publication told me that he seldom interviews this group of intellectuals
unless being required by the propaganda government, because their opinions are usually
“purely propaganda”.26
One interesting thing to note for this “orthodox party outlets” cluster is that, as can
be seen in Figure 2, Economic Daily has almost “drifted away” from the other five outlets
and is quite close to the cluster of “Balanced Outlets.” A close look at the data suggests that
this is largely due to the fact that the official party newspapers’ sourcing patterns on
economic issues is close to that of commercial papers. Since Economic Daily has a larger
portion of content on economic issues, it tends to be somewhat dissimilar from other
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“orthodox party outlets.” Chapter 4 will present detailed findings on sourcing patterns in
different issue areas.

The Balanced Outlets
We now turn to the largest cluster in the network graph—“the balanced outlets” which
consists of 16 publications. This cluster is uniform in the sense that the publications are all
provincial or municipal-level daily newspapers, but also quite mixed in terms of the
official/commercial nature: 4 party newspapers and 12 market-oriented ones. The fact that
provincial/municipal party and commercial newspapers are very similar in terms of
intellectual sourcing is the most important finding in this cluster. This is surprising because
scholars and observers have long taken the official/commercial divide as the key factor in
shaping the landscape of Chinese media, with the assumption that party newspapers align
closely with the party ideology, while commercial newspapers enjoy more freedom and are
more critical towards the party-state. However, this finding is not entirely unprecedented,
for a few previous studies have suggested similar results.
The most important previous study is in Daniela Stockmann’s (2013) seminal book
Media Commercialization and Authoritarian Rule in China. She conducted content
analysis of provincial newspapers on two cases: news coverage on the National Labor Law
and on the United States. For the former case, she finds that although commercial
newspapers (Chongqing Times in this case) tends to offer “a more critical evaluation of
state policies, a more realistic portrayal of the law, and a positive relationship with
companies” than party newspapers (The People’s Daily and Chongqing Daily in this case),
both types of newspapers are actually quite similar in terms of the “core political message,”
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which is to portray the law in a positive light without challenging the legal system or
exposing its weaknesses (pp. 109-111). For the latter case, the same pattern is also
identified—although party newspapers (The People’s Daily in this case) describe the
United States consistently more positively than commercial newspapers (Beijing Evening
News in the case) even on cases such as the war in Iraq, the difference is “small and subtle”
and the overall tones are “fairly uniform” (pp. 126-128). It should be noted that here
Stockmann compares the provincial commercial newspaper with the national The People’s
Daily rather than the provincial Beijing Daily. It is possible that, based on the findings of
the current study, such “small and subtle” differences would become insignificant if we
compare party and commercial newspapers on the provincial/municipal level.
Similarly, in economist Han Yuan’s (2016) study on media bias in China based on
the patterns of most frequently used words, he also finds that provincial/municipal level
party and commercial newspapers are very close on the spectrum. For example, Shanghai’s
Liberation Daily (party newspaper) and Oriental Morning Post (commercial newspaper)
are similar to each other according to Yuan’s measurement. The same is true for the pair of
Jilin province’s Jilin Daily (party newspaper) and New Wenhua Post (commercial
newspaper), and Guangdong province’s Yangcheng Evening News (party newspaper) and
Southern Metropolis Daily (commercial newspaper).
Why are the ideological orientations as reflected in news content in party and
commercial newspapers quite uniform? Stockmann’s (2013) insightful argument is that
even on issues that are considered to be open for different perspectives, commercial
newspapers still choose to stay close to state policies due to audience demands, which
usually converge with state policies. In other words, commercial newspapers do not
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provide dissident opinions because readers do not really expect “political messages that
differ strongly from those of official papers” (p. 153). While her analysis is rigorous and
convincing, here I provide some complementary arguments based on the systematic
analysis of expert sourcing practices rather than individual case studies.
As suggested by the in-depth interviews with journalists and media executives,
provincial daily newspapers, no matter party or commercial, follow similar work routines.
They tend to cover similar issues, with the exception that party newspapers are required to
devote a few pages to the activities of national and provincial political leaders. Their news
articles are about the same length, following the similar format, and tend to feature the
voices of experts who are “middle of the road.” One journalist working at a provincial
commercial newspaper shared in the interview that, “As compared to the weekly
newspapers and magazines, we don’t do in-depth investigations and rarely present
controversial or radical opinions. We focus on providing daily updates on events that could
be easily and quickly digested by readers, so I prefer to interview experts who could offer
some quick interpretations that would be accepted by most of our readers.”27 This confirms
the “audience demand” argument by Stockmann, and also adds another layer regarding the
nature and work routines of daily newspapers to the explanations.
Although opinions featured in provincial/municipal daily newspapers tend to be
less extreme, they cover a diverse range of issues, and their stances on the issues cannot be
easily summarized in one word. That’s why I call this cluster of media outlets “the
balanced outlets.” As will be elaborated in the next chapter, this cluster of publications is
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present on every major issue, and could be described as: pro-market on most economic
issues; nationalistic in terms of foreign affairs; culturally both cosmopolitan (in terms of
focusing on middle class tastes) and conservative (in terms of highlighting Chinese
traditional culture); etc. Regarding the amount of coverage, however, the overwhelming
focus is in economic and financial areas. The most “unique” sources of this cluster,
calculated in the same way as explained in the previous section, are: chief economist at
Industrial Bank Lu Zhengwei (鲁政委) and chief economist at Bank of Communications
Lian Ping (连平), both of whom frequently interprets economic figures such as GDP and
CPI, and predicts the future of China’s economy in a way that is positive but not
exaggerating way; Wang Tao (汪涛), chief economist of the Swiss UBS Securities’ China
branch, who mainly interprets currency rate changes and other issues of Chinese economy
from a global perspective; Wang Yukai (汪玉凯), a professor at the China National School
of Administration, who comments on government issues and policies from an
administrative and de-politicized perspective; Ba Shusong (巴曙松), Deputy
Director-General of the Financial Research Institute at the Development Research Center
of the State Council, who mainly provides opinions on the financial and real-estate
markets.
Taking a closer look at this cluster, we notice the factor of locality at play.
Newspapers in the same province tend to have high cosine similarity scores. For example,
the scores between each pair among Nanfang Daily (party newspaper), Southern
Metropolis Daily (commercial newspaper), and Yangcheng Evening News (party
newspaper), all of which are Guangdong’s provincial level papers, are above 0.7. Similarly,
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Beijing’s Beijing Youth Daily, The Beijing News, Beijing Evening News, and Beijing Times
are close to each other. The same holds true for Zhejiang’s Zhejiang Daily and Qianjiang
Evening News. One possible explanation is that these daily newspapers tend to interview
experts in their own provinces. However, an analysis on the affiliation of the cited expert
sources in these dailies reveals that newspapers in Guangdong are not significantly more
likely to cite Guangdong experts than newspapers in other provinces (p > 0.05). The same
pattern is also seen in the sourcing patterns for experts in Beijing and Zhejiang. The
influence of locality on media orientations in China has been discussed in case studies in
the works by Lee et al. (2007) and Lei (2016). The current project supports their conclusion
in a more systematic way.
Following the discussion on media locality, one question that remains to be
answered: what about newspapers in less developed and more politically sensitive
provinces such as Tibet and Xinjiang? In this study, I did not include provincial dailies
from those areas because they had smaller circulations. It is highly likely that party dailies
and commercial dailies in those areas share similar ideological orientations, but they might
be quite different from provincial dailies in more developed areas such as the coastal
Zhejiang province. Future studies could further explore this issue by including media
outlets from less developed and more politically sensitive areas, and potentially identify
more diversity among provincial and municipal level daily newspapers based in different
areas in China.
One thing to note is that the “blending” of party and commercial outlets only
applies to provincial and municipal dailies. It would be wrong to suggest that the divide
between party and commercial media does not exist at all. Outside the group of provincial
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dailies, there is still divide between party and commercial publications. As could be seen in
Figure 2, “orthodox party outlets,” which mainly consists of central-level party media
outlets, are very different from commercial outlets. Provincial dailies are also different
from other types of commercial media and certain type of central-level party media, which
are to be discussed in the next section.

The Unorthodox Outlets
The last cluster, which I call “the unorthodox outlets,” is characterized by an emphasis on
interpretive, analytical, and argumentative elements in media content. As will be explained
in detail shortly, the expert sources cited in this cluster tend to have stronger and clear-cut
opinions on various issues. And different from the “orthodox party outlets,” their opinions
often deviate from the party ideology.
As shown in Figure 2, there seem to be two “sub-clusters” in this cluster, since two
of the media outlets are located relatively “far away” from others. Results to be presented
in the next section will further demonstrate that these two outlets did constitute a separate
cluster in the years 2010 and 2012. The reason why they “merged” with other seven outlets
is related to the changes in the media landscape after Xi Jinping took power, which will be
discussed in the next section.
The two seemingly separate media outlets are Global Times and Guancha.cn. The
former is a daily commercial newspaper affiliated with The People’s Daily and is
well-known for its nationalistic positions (e.g. Wang, 2015; Yahuda, 2013). It has even
been called “China’s Fox News,” which “makes Bill O’Reilly seem fair and balanced”
(Larson, 2011). The latter is a commercial news website registered in Shanghai. It also
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carries a nationalistic tone and features columns for a number of pro-regime commentators,
including the editorial department of the Global Times.28 The high similarity score between
this pair (0.78) suggests that they largely feature the opinions from the same group of
experts. The similarity scores between Global Times or Guancha.cn and any of the other
seven outlets in this cluster are all below 0.20. If we consider these two outlets as a cluster,
their most unique expert sources are: a researcher at the PLA Naval Research Academy,
who frequently comments on foreign affairs and military issues, with a firm stance of
applauding the Chinese government’s actions in “protecting national interests and
sovereignty” and criticizing American, Japanese, and other countries’ “aggressive policies
and moves”; a professor at Fudan University and Director of the University’s China
Institute, who is a prominent promoter of the “China Model” and has published several
books in the English world, explaining why China will succeed under the Communist Party;
a Shanghai venture capitalist and a trustee of the China Institute at Fudan University, who
is known for his defense of China’s political system in prominent international media; a
professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, who often criticizes Western liberal
democracy and speaks highly of the Mao Zedong era and the so-called “Chongqing
Model,” which was a set of policies closely resembled the Maoist socialist policies and
were promoted by Bo Xilai, who was the former party leader of Chongqing and was found
guilty of corruption and sentenced to life imprisonment in 2013; and a researcher at the
Academy of Social Sciences in Guangxi in southwest China, who mainly provides
opinions on China-Southeast Asia relations. As can be seen from this list, the sources that
28

See https://www.guancha.cn/authorcolumn,
https://www.guancha.cn/DanRenPing/list_1.shtml.
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have been heavily cited by Global Times and Guancha.cn but not by other outlets are
mostly defenders of China’s national interests, sovereignty, and the political system.
Interestingly, these experts are do not have a significant presence in the “orthodox party
outlets.” Interviews with journalists at party newspapers suggest that the major reason is
that their opinions are considered too aggressive and “hawkish,” and might be
controversial for the general audience in China. As a journalist at national party newspaper
shared, “Although Global Times and Guancha.cn are popular, they are different from our
party newspaper because our readers are presumed to be the general public, whereas they
have their specific target audiences, who are the highly nationalistic citizens. Many of them
could be described as the so-called ‘voluntary fifty-cent army.’”29 Here “voluntary
fifty-cent army” refers to those who defend the authoritarian regime and combat criticism
that targets the regime on an unpaid basis, as compared to the state-hired online
commentators (Han, 2015). This might suggest that strong nationalistic rhetoric and
arguments on the superiority of the Chinese political system are not commonly shared by
the public, echoing previous studies on the declining nationalism in China (e.g., Woods &
Dickson, 2017).
The remaining seven media outlets in this cluster mainly take a more critical view
towards state policies30 and promotes ideas such as free market and rule of law. The most
unique expert sources shared by them are: He Weifang (贺卫方), the aforementioned
Peking University law professor who got “blacklisted” under the Xi Jinping leadership for
29

Interview 11.
It should be noted that these outlets are not critical towards all kinds of state policies. As will
be demonstrated in the next chapter, they generally show support of foreign policies and
economic policies.
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his outspoken opinions on rule of law and constitutionalism; Jiang Hong (蒋洪), a professor
at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics and a delegate of the Chinese People’s
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) from 2009 to 2018, who studies government
revenue and expenditures and promotes the transparency of budget and government
accountability; Chen Ruihua (陈瑞华), a law professor at Peking University and a colleague
of He Weifang, who often comments on legal reform and criminal justice; Jia Xijin (贾西
津), a professor at Tsinghua University’s School of Public Policy and Management, who

promotes the legitimization of non-governmental organizations; and Qian Liqun (钱理群),
a retired professor at Peking University, who is vocal about the problems in the education
system and the “shrewd egoists” (jingzhi liji zhuyizhe) among Chinese young elites (Qian,
2014). The seven outlets include four commercial weekly newspaper or magazines
(Southern Weekly, Caixin Weekly, Sanlian Life Weekly, and Nanfeng Chuang) which
publish in-depth stories and commentaries; two websites (Pengpai and Jiemian), which are
newly launched online publications that aim at attracting audiences on their smartphones
by quality content and at the same time disseminating new, slick propaganda content
(Repnikova & Fang, 2019; Speelman, 2015); and one central-level party newspaper China
Youth Daily, which is sponsored by the Communist Youth League. This is a very
interesting case of party media that falls closer to more critical voices rather than
propaganda mouthpieces and regime defenders. This finding echoes Wang, Sparks, and
Huang’s (2018) study, in which they argue that China Youth Daily challenges the bipolar
understanding of Chinese media as party-oriented official press and market-oriented
commercial press. They argue that China Youth Daily offers a relatively large amount of
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watchdog journalism and infotainment content. While not disputing their findings, the
current study adds another layer to our understanding of China Youth Daily, which is that
in terms of intellectual sourcing patterns, it is close to the media outlets that people
conventionally describe as “regime critics” and “liberal voices.” Wang, Sparks, and Huang
(2018) suggested that the uniqueness of China Youth Daily could be explained by the role
of the Communist Youth League, which is to influence young people. In order to target at a
younger audience, a more “popular” approach rather than orthodox propaganda is needed.
My interviewees familiar with this newspaper suggest that the historical tradition of the
Communist Youth League also plays an important part in shaping China Youth Daily’s
content. An executive at a party newspaper shared that, “During the 1980s, party leaders of
tuanpai (the Communist Youth League faction) were generally reformers. Important
figures including Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦) and Hu Qili (胡启立) promoted a more open and
democratic vision, which was unfortunately ended due to the Tiananmen Student
Movement in 1989. However, the critical tradition of China Youth Daily, which started to
publish influential investigative journalism and commentary pieces in the 1980s, remained
because of key journalists of that era such as Li Datong (李大同) and Lu Yuegang (卢跃刚)
stayed and passed on the heritage to younger generations of journalists.”31 While further
studies are needed to uncover the uniqueness of China Youth Daily, the current finding
further challenges the conventional party/commercial divide of Chinese media landscape.
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Changes in the Ideological Landscape after Xi Jinping Took Power
Did the expert sourcing patterns of Chinese media change after President Xi Jinping took
power in late 2012 and early 2013? I divided my dataset into two parts and ran analysis on
the two separate networks. The results are shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3 Comparison between the ideological landscape before Xi (2010&2012) and
under Xi (2014&2016)
Note: the size of the nodes are proportional to the log-transformed amount of expert citations in each
outlet.

As can be seen in the network graphs, two of the aforementioned clusters (the
“orthodox party outlets” and the “balanced outlets”) remained unchanged. The only
difference is that the “unorthodox outlets” was divided into two separate clusters in the
years 2010 and 2012—one is the nationalistic cluster of Global Times and Guancha.cn, and
the other one includes the other five outlets that are more critical towards state policies.
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Because online publications Pengpai and Jiemian were launched in 2014, they did not
appear in the network graph of 2010 and 2012.
What drives the changes in the ideological landscape, i.e., the merger of the two
clusters of unorthodox outlets? There are three possibilities. First, the five more critical
outlets changed to cite more nationalistic sources, thus increasing the similarities with
Global Times and Guancha.cn. Second, the two nationalistic outlets moved to cite more
critical experts. Or third, both of the two unorthodox clusters changed their expert sourcing
patterns and moved to cite a third type of intellectuals. In order to identify the most
probable answer, I calculated the cosine similarity scores between each of the seven
outlets’ pre-Xi (2010&2012) citations and Xi-era (2014&2016) citations. In other words, I
did the “within-publication” comparison to see if these outlets changed in their expert
sourcing patterns after Xi took power. Results show that Global Times and Guancha.cn’s
expert interviewees basically remained unchanged, as indicated by similarity scores above
0.85 (0.91 for Global Times and 0.88 for Guancha.cn). However, the other five more
critical publications all changed to a certain extent. The similarity score between Southern
Weekly’s 2010&2012 sources and its 2014&2016 sources is only 0.37, suggesting a
noticeable shift in selecting expert interviewees. The “within-publication” similarity scores
for China Youth Daily, Caixin Weekly, Sanlian Life Weekly and Nanfeng Chuang and are
respectively 0.61, 0.57, 0.49, and 0.43, all of which are lower than the nationalistic duo.
Following the same approach to identify the most “unique” sources, I identified the
expert sources that contributed the most to the changes of the five critical publications. To
be more specific, I calculated the ratio of the frequency of each source appearing in the
2014&2016 sub-dataset of those five outlets to the frequency of him/her appearing in the
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2010&2012 sub-dataset. The largest numbers produced by this method suggest the most
prominent new sources. They include: a professor at Renmin University of China, who
frequently comments on China’s contributions to global governance and promotes the Belt
& Road Initiative; the aforementioned researcher at the PLA Naval Research Academy,
who frequently comments on foreign affairs and military issues; a military theorist and a
retired Major General in the People's Liberation Army Air Force, who is known for
criticizing the U.S. foreign policies and arguing for non-traditional military strategies to
defeat the U.S.; a professor at Tsinghua University’s Institute of International Relations,
who comments on foreign policy and national security; and a professor at Peking
University, who mainly provides opinions on China-Japan relations. This list clearly
suggests that the turn of the five publications which were generally more critical towards
state policies was primarily driven by the increased reliance on foreign policy experts, who
largely use the national interests rhetoric in their quotations.
Reversely, we could also examine the expert sources who used to appear frequently
in those five publications before Xi and then largely disappeared in 2014 and 2016. Based
on the ratio calculated above, the disappeared sources as indicated by the smallest numbers
include: Wang Changjiang (王长江), a professor at the Central Party School, who calls for
reforms of the Communist Party, especially the “intra-Party democracy” (dangnei minzhu);
He Weifang (贺卫方), the aforementioned “blacklisted” Peking University law professor;
He Bing (何兵), a professor at China University of Political Science and Law, who shares
similar views with He Weifang on legal reforms; Jiang Ping (江平), a retired professor and
former President of China University of Political Science and Law, who has been
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consistently advocating for rule of law; and Mao Yushi (茅于轼), an economist described
by the Cato Institute as “one of China’s most outspoken and influential activists for
individual rights and free markets”.32 These names indicate that the room for the
discussions on legal and political reforms shrank after Xi took power. In-depth interviews
with journalists at these five publications confirm that they have experienced heavier
censorship on these topics during recent years. They suggested that although scholars such
as Jiang Ping and Mao Yushi are not officially on the “blacklist,” journalists tend to
interview them much less than before, mainly for two reasons. First, there are less stories
for them to comment on due to increased censorship in these areas. Second, their
viewpoints become more likely to trigger self-censorship—not because they become more
radical, but because the overall environment become tenser and less tolerant.33
All in all, these findings suggest that the ideological landscape under the Xi Jinping
leadership has experienced significant changes, which are most evident on several
high-profile publications that are known for their critical stances on many issues
(Repnikova & Fang, 2015). In 2014 and 2016, these publications feature less voices that
advocate legal and political reforms as compared with the years 2010 and 2012. Instead,
they cite more experts who emphasize national interests and security, starting to resemble
the nationalistic outlets.
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See https://www.cato.org/friedman-prize/mao-yushi.
Interviews 4, 27, and 29.
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The Landscape of Structural Bias
The findings presented above illustrate the landscape of ideological bias of Chinese media.
We now turn to the other dimension of media bias—structural bias, which in this study is
operationalized by the distance to the Communist Party. As elaborated in the previous
chapter, I measured the frequency of mentions of top political leaders in each media outlet
as a proxy of the relative political distance. The results, combined with the ideological bias,
is presented in Figure 4.

Figure 4 The ideological and structural bias of Chinese media

82

In this figure, I kept the community structure of ideological bias as in Figure 3.1
(the edges were eliminated for the sake of clarity and simplicity of the graph), and added
the structure bias as the dimension of “height.” The higher a media outlet is in the graph,
the more it is structurally biased towards the party. As can be seen from the figure, there are
clear differences between party media and commercial media. On average, 15.9% of
articles published in party media mention top leaders, while commercial media only
mention them in 3.1% of their articles. The publication that most frequently mentions top
leaders is Qiushi, with a percentage of 26.0%. The lowest percentage is seen in both Caixin
Weekly and Sanlian Life Weekly—only 1.3% of their articles mention top leaders. This
result is largely in line with Qin, Wu, and Stromberg’s (2018) finding about mentions of
political leaders.34 It shows that the party/commercial division is clearly present in terms of
structural bias. Even China Youth Daily, the unconventional party newspaper, mentioned
top leaders in 8.1% of its articles, which confirms previous findings that it dose cover much
propaganda-related materials (Wang et al., 2018, p. 1203). The nationalistic commercial
outlets Global Times and Guancha.cn only mention top leaders in 3.9% and 5.2% of their
articles respectively. Interviews with journalists and media executives suggest that party
media outlets are required to cover top national and provincial leaders and disseminate
propaganda messages, while commercial media outlets are not subject to this obligation.
“Party newspapers are the face of the party,” shared a journalist at a party media, “people

34

In their study, 21% of party media articles were found to mention leaders, while 4% of
commercial media articles mention them. The reason why their numbers are slightly larger is
because they included a larger pool of political leaders in their calculations.
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will suspect that something have gone wrong if we don’t devote the first two pages of our
newspaper to the leaders.”35
However, the fact that top leaders appear more frequently in party media than in
commercial media is independent from the ideological bias of these two types of media.
Provincial party newspapers and China Youth Daily are not ideologically orthodox as
Qiushi and The People’s Daily. Commercial outlets Global Times and Guancha.cn are
more enthusiastic defenders of the political system than many party newspapers.
Finally, has the landscape of structural bias changed after Xi Jinping took power? I
calculated the frequencies of mentions before and under Xi. According to the results, the
pattern that party media mention top leaders more than commercial media is unchanged,
but all the publications have increased the mentioning frequency. The average percentage
has increased from 7.7% in 2010 and 2012 to 8.3% in 2014 and 2016. While these
differences are small, they are consistent with the observations about the increased control
on both party and commercial media and Xi’s cultivation for his personality cult (Luqiu,
2016), and are also in line with Jaros and Pan’s (2018) finding that top political leaders are
mentioned with greater frequency after Xi’s ascent (pp. 14-15). Interviews with journalists
suggest that on the one hand, there are more orders from the propaganda department that
require more coverage on top leaders, especially Xi; on the other hand, media outlets
voluntarily devote more column inches and air time to top leaders in order to display
loyalty and seek political safety.36
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Interview 11.
Interviews 2, 5, 7, 11, 14, 18, 27, and 30.
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To sum up, findings presented in this chapter illustrate the ideological and
structural bias of media outlets in China. Four ideological clusters have been identified,
and they challenge the conventional party/commercial division. However, the structural
bias of Chinese media closely aligns with this division. Under Xi Jinping’s rule, the
ideological diversity of Chinese media has shrunk, especially for the more critical
publications which have changed to cite more experts on national interests and security
rather than those on legal and political reforms. Media outlets, both party and commercial,
have also cited top political leaders more frequently in the Xi era. In the next chapter, I will
take an issue-centered view of the ideological landscape and discuss Chinese media’
positions on major political, economic, social and cultural issues.
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CHAPTER 4. Issues

Conceptually, ideology is defined as a “set of beliefs about the proper order of society and
how it can be achieved” (Erikson & Tedin, 2003, p. 64). These beliefs both influence and
are reflected in the issue positions held by individuals, groups, and institutions.
Operationally, the empirical study of ideology is overwhelmingly conducted through the
examination of issue-based opinions or issue attitudes (Jost et al., 2009). To get a deeper
understanding of the ideological landscape of Chinese media, this chapter takes a similar
issue-centered approach, mapping where the various outlets included in Chapter 3 stand on
twenty political, economic, social and cultural issues, as identified by methods explained in
Chapter 2. I use network graphs similar to those in the previous chapter to illustrate the
ideological landscape on each issue, combined with qualitative interpretations of the
clusters and representative opinions. Where relevant, I also note differences in patterns that
exist between the pre-Xi and Xi eras.

Political Issues
Adherence to party ideology
Ever since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the Communist Party has put
significant resources and efforts into ideological work (Brady, 2008; Brown, 2012).
However, since the late 1970s the party-state has adopted a pragmatic approach of reform
and development, resulting in what some have called a “post-ideological” society (Brown,
2012). Rather than being post-ideological, however, the party-state has abandoned the
aggressive, doctrinaire methods of the Maoist regime for a more subtle, flexible approach.
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As Holbig (2013) insightfully points out, party ideology in contemporary China is not a
matter of the direct indoctrination of a rigid set of beliefs, but a language game that aims at
legitimizing the authoritarian rule and “a set of practices and incentives for the proper
performance of the political elite” (p. 61). Therefore, the adherence to party ideology is
superficial. Politicians painstakingly mention “Socialism with Chinese characteristics,”
“Marxism–Leninism,” “Mao Zedong Thought,” “Deng Xiaoping Theory,” “Three
Represents (proposed by Jiang Zemin),” “Harmonious Society (proposed by Hu Jintao),”
“Xi Jinping Thought,” “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” and “The
Chinese Dream” in their speeches to show their loyalty to the top leaders, and use them as
umbrella justification for whatever policies they promote.
These phrases occupy an essential role in China’s political discourse. How do news
media cover and interpret them? Figure 5 maps the landscape of the media outlets’
positions on the adherence to party ideology. As in previous figures, I use circles to denote
party media and squares for commercial media. There are two major features of this figure:
first, there is only one single community in this network—all the outlets quote similar
groups of experts, leading to a densely connected graph without clear divides among the
outlets. A closer look at the cited experts suggests that they are mainly scholars affiliated
with research centers on party ideology at various universities and institutes, such as the
Institute of Marxism Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Interviews with
journalists suggest that those scholars act as the official “interpreters” of party ideology,
and all the news outlets turn to them for comments on the official ideology.37
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Interviews 2, 18, and 20.
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Figure 5 The ideological landscape of the issue: adherence to party ideology
Note: Circle = party media; square = commercial media. The size of the nodes are proportional to the
log-transformed amount of expert citations in each outlet.

Second, although there are no discernable communities in this graph, we can
identify a pattern: party media (circles) are generally larger than commercial media
(squares), suggesting that they cover the party ideology more. Three commercial outlets
(Caixin Weekly, Sanlian Life Weekly, and Jiemian) do not cover this issue at all, and thus
are absent in this graph. On average, a party media outlet has 46.1 quotations on this issue,
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significantly more than commercial media outlets (13.0 quotations). This pattern is
explained by an interviewee as the “distancing” strategy of commercial media outlets:
“they do not have the freedom to choose dissenting opinions, if there is any, but they are
allowed to largely skip this issue area and stay away from those official scholars.”38 In
other words, on this highly controlled issue, there is no option of diverse viewpoints, and
the only freedom is to cover it less. My interviews suggest that during recent years, under
Xi’s leadership, this freedom has been increasingly limited. Many commercial publications
are now required by the propaganda department to join the language game and propagate
Xi’s thoughts. Data show that in the years 2010 and 2012, commercial media outlets on
average only have 5.4 quotations on this issue, significantly less than in the years 2014 and
2016 (8.3 quotations). An example is that both of the only two quotations in Southern
Weekly appeared in 2016, confirming the taming of this once outspoken newspaper
(Repnikova & Fang, 2015). In other words, although the overall structure of the landscape
on this issue remains the same, the size of the commercial outlets in the graph grows larger
in the Xi-era as compared with the pre-Xi era.

The “China Model”
Next, we examine the issue of the so-called “China Model,” which proposes that China has
offered a “distinctive model of economic and political development” that is largely
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characterized by the co-existence of free market and authoritarian state39 (Zhao, 2010).
Proponents of the China Model often claim that the Chinese political system is as good as,
if not superior to, Western liberal democracy. Relatedly, the Chinese party-state has been
promoting the idea of “three confidences,” which refer to confidence in the theory of
“socialism with Chinese characteristics,” confidence in China’s current path, and
confidence in its current political system (Zhao, 2017; Zheng, 2014). If the vision of a
unique and successful China Model is desired by the party-state, one might expect that
news media in China would be homogenous in viewpoints towards the model, just as they
are regarding the issue of official ideology discussed above. However, the data reveal a
different landscape, as shown in Figure 6.
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The Chinese state propaganda never uses the word “authoritarian” to describe its political
system. It usually talks about the centralized power of the government, the absolute leadership
of the Communist Party, and the meritocratic process of selecting officials.
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Figure 6 The ideological landscape of the issue: the “China Model”
Note: Circle = party media; square = commercial media. The size of the nodes are proportional to the
log-transformed amount of expert citations in each outlet.

The majority of the news outlets—including the “orthodox party outlets,” the
provincial party dailies, and the commercial dailies—are densely connected and form the
central cluster in this figure, suggesting that they tend to interview a similar group of
experts when covering the issue of the China Model. It is notable that provincial
commercial dailies, including the ones that are conventionally known as “liberal”
newspapers such as Southern Metropolis Daily and The Beijing News, also feature the
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voices of some prominent China Model proponents. The most frequently cited experts in
this major cluster include: a professor at Fudan University’s China Center for Economic
Studies, who argues that China’s economic development is based on a powerful
government and strong state capacity; a professor at Peking University’s National School
of Development, who attributes the “miracle” of China’s economic development to
China’s unique strategies characterized by government interventions; Francis Fukuyama, a
professor at Stanford University and the author of The End of History and the Last Man,
who has visited China for several times during 2010-2016 and has been frequently cited in
Chinese media for his updated idea that history did not end and that China proposes another
possibility with its great achievements ensured by strong state capacity; and a professor at
National University of Singapore’s East Asian Institute, who takes a more nuanced stand
that the China Model requires constant reforms.
The two nationalistic outlets—Global Times and Guancha.cn—also frequently
discuss the issue of the China Model, but their viewpoints are different from publications in
the major cluster. A closer look at the quotations suggest that the difference is not about
how they evaluate the China Model, but about how they treat the Western models. News
outlets in the major cluster tend to avoid talking about Western democracies, or to put the
China Model and the Western models on the same level. However, for the nationalistic duo,
they are more likely to cite experts who not only promote the China Model, but also
criticize the political systems in the U.S. and Europe. These experts include: Stein Ringen,
a professor at University of Oxford, who appears in these outlets to question the future of
American democracy for its low efficiency, its failure in serving the public interest, and its
decreasing appeal to the rest of the world; Martin Jacques, a British political commentator
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and the author of When China Rules the World, who claims that the 21st century will
witness the decline of the Western world; and Zhang Weiwei and Eric X. Li, the two
prominent proponents of China’s political system introduced in the previous chapter. It is
interesting to note that foreign experts play a central role in shaping the discussions on the
China Model and its claimed superiority. Ever since Edgar Snow, the American journalist
who covered the Chinese Communist revolution in the 1930s, the Communist Party has
partly relied on non-Chinese voices to claim its legitimacy.
The third cluster in the graph comprises four commercial outlets that are generally
more critical of the party-state (note that Caixin Weekly and Jiemian.cn are again absent in
this graph). The Party newspaper China Youth Daily, which was part of this
commercial-media dominated cluster in the general landscape, is instead in the major
cluster on this issue, suggesting a tighter control on Party media when it comes to coverage
of the China Model. Close readings of the quotations in this cluster reveal that these
publications strategically insert their vision of the political system under the disguise of
championing for the China Model. For example, Nanfeng Chuang magazine cites legal
expert and professor Xu Chongde (许崇德) to argue for the importance of constitutionalism
for ensuring future progress, and cites Yale University economist Chen Zhiwu (陈志武) to
argue for the importance of free market and deregulation in China’s economic
development. Southern Weekly quotes several critical scholars to warn against the potential
pitfalls of the China Model and argues that the model needs to be deeply updated and fixed
in order to achieve long-term success. This kind of strategy is well-documented in previous
studies of Chinese journalism (e.g., Repnikova, 2017a; Svensson et al., 2013) and
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illustrates how dissenting opinions can still be expressed in a controlled media
environment.
Overall, my quantitative and qualitative analyses suggest that coverage of the
China Model is permitted a somewhat wider range of views than that of party ideology. In
addition, this greater latitude not only includes voices critical of the China Model, but also
those that are critical of Western democratic systems. Further longitudinal analysis shows
that there is no significant distinctions between the pre-Xi and Xi eras on this issue.

Sovereignty and territorial integrity
Sovereignty and territorial integrity is considered a sensitive issue in China and is closely
related to nationalism (Gries, 2004; Wang, 2014). The independence movements in Tibet,
Xinjiang, and Taiwan, as well as the territorial disputes over Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and
the South China Sea have always been heavily censored topics (e.g., MacKinnon, 2009).
During recent years, as tensions have risen between Mainland China and Hong Kong,
especially after the 2014 Umbrella Movement (also known as the “Occupy Central
Movement”), pro-independence movements in Hong Kong also became a highly
controlled topic (Kou, Kow, Gui, & Cheng, 2017; Tsui, 2015). The Chinese party-state has
also extended the concept of “sovereignty” to cyberspace and proposed the idea of
“Internet sovereignty,” which argues for the central role of the nation state in Internet
governance, and the necessity of blocking “harmful” foreign websites and services (Jiang,
2010; Zeng, Stevens, & Chen, 2017).
How do news media in China cover and discuss this issue? As shown in Figure 7,
the general structure of the news landscape is almost identical to that for the issue of party
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ideology, suggesting a heavily controlled (or at least centralized and homogeneous)
environment. All the media outlets quote from the same group of experts who actively
defend China’s sovereignty and national interests. The most cited experts include: a
professor at Xiamen University’s South China Sea Institute, who cites historical
documents to support China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea; a researcher at the
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, who appears in Chinese media to
question the validity of the South China Sea Arbitration brought by Philippines against
China; a researcher at the People’s Liberation Army’s Naval Research Academy, who
frequently criticizes American, Japanese, and other countries’ “aggressive policies and
moves”; a researcher of Taiwan history at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, who
argues that Taiwan independence movement is against the historical trends and the
founding father of the Republic of China Sun Yat-sen’s will; and an economist at China
International Capital Corporation, who cites economic statistics to “prove” that the
Umbrella Movement has caused severe damage to Hong Kong’s economy and social
welfare.
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Figure 7 The ideological landscape of the issue: Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity
Note: Circle = party media; square = commercial media. The size of the nodes are proportional to the
log-transformed amount of expert citations in each outlet.

However, there is a key difference between this landscape and that for coverage of
party ideology—commercial outlets do not shy away from this issue. They are actually
more likely to cover the sovereignty issue (53.1 quotations on average) than party media
(31.2 quotations on average). It is not surprising that the nationalistic Global Times and
Guancha.cn publish a large number of articles on this topic, given that sovereignty and
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national interests are the central issues of nationalism. Notably, the other commercial
outlets, including those that are generally more critical, also cover this issue heavily and
feature the same voices as the orthodox party outlets. My interviews suggest two factors
behind this phenomenon: political considerations and commercial interests. Publishing
these opinions is not only a favorable gesture to signal compliance to the party-state, but
also a strategy to attract more readers. After all, nationalism sells. It echoes with previous
studies on the commodification of nationalism in Chinese media (Schneider, 2018), and
provides another example of the convergence between state regulation and audience
demand (Stockmann, 2013).
It is also notable that 84.5% of the citations on sovereignty and territorial integrity
in the critical publications appear in the years 2014 and 2016, indicating that although the
network structure remains the same after Xi took power, the size of the critical news outlets
in this issue network grows significantly larger after 2012 (12.1 quotations in the Xi era as
compared with 3.1 quotations in the pre-Xi era). It confirms the findings on the
longitudinal changes of the general landscape presented in the previous chapter—critical
outlets cite more nationalistic sources and move closer to nationalistic publications.

China’s International Presence
The rise of China as a military and economic power has changed the global balance of
power among nations, and given birth to both the “China threat theory” and the pessimistic
prediction that military conflict between China and the U.S. is inevitable (Broomfield,
2003; Mirilovic & Kim, 2017). The Chinese party-state firmly rejects this perception and
proposes a more peaceful vision of its increased global influence. However, this debate is
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far from settled, especially as China expands its global influence by investing in and
providing significant financial aid to African countries (Brautigam, 2009), strengthens the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization which covers three-fifth of the Eurasian continent
(Chung, 2006), and implements the ambitious “Belt and Road Initiative” (Huang, 2016).
Interviews with media executives suggest that the “China threat theory,” the controversies
over China’s “neo-colonialism” in Africa, and the Belt and Road Initiative are considered
highly sensitive topics for the Chinese media to cover critically. As one interviewee noted,
the reason for this is fear that “hostile foreign forces would pick up any opinions featured in
Chinese media that are not consistent with the government’s standpoints and use them to
attack the official policies of the Chinese government.”40 My analyses largely support this
notion, with the ideological landscape on the issue of China’s international presence being
quite homogenous. Nonetheless, there is still a small, separate cluster, suggesting the
existence of some different views (see Figure 8).
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Figure 8 The ideological landscape of the issue: China’s International Presence
Note: Circle = party media; square = commercial media. The size of the nodes are proportional to the
log-transformed amount of expert citations in each outlet.

For the large cluster in this graph, the majority of Chinese media turn to similar
experts on international relations for comments on China’s international presence. The
views of these experts largely restate the Chinese government’s talking points: China’s rise
is and will be peaceful; the economic interdependence of China and the U.S. is so
important that no substantial conflict is possible; China mainly wants to contribute to
global economic development and the development of specific regions such as Africa;
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China will contribute to globalization in a way that is win-win for all. It is notable that the
economic factor is prominently emphasized, while the political element is downplayed.
For example, a researcher of Southeast Asian affairs at the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences who appears in nearly all the publications in the sample, claims that the Belt and
Road Initiative solves a key problem in the growth of global economy by investing in
infrastructures. Another example is a headline in Guangzhou Daily: “The key to smash the
theory of China threat is economic diplomacy.”41
However, the nationalistic duo—Global Times and Guancha.cn promote a more
hawkish vision and often talk about the possibility of war. For example, a professor at
Guangdong Ocean University and the Director of the University’s Ocean Politics and
Strategy Research Center, frequently appears in these two media outlets and claims that
“we shouldn’t have our hands tied by the idea of peaceful development, and it’s totally
legitimate to use military force when necessary.” He also argues that “the China-Japan
friendship is only wishful thinking, because we have never been friendly to each other for
the past two thousand years.” Global Times even interviewed University of Chicago
professor John Mearsheimer to highlight his opinion that “China won’t rise peacefully.”42
It is important to note that the statements that China could and even should use military
force is based on the argument that the U.S. and its allies will not allow China’s rise.
Therefore, the two outlets are promoting the idea that the international environment is so
hostile to China that the Chinese government will have no choice but to use military force.
This viewpoint is clearly different from the mainstream dovish, economy-based opinion
41
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See http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/detail_2010_12/18/3574402_0.shtml.
See http://opinion.huanqiu.com/1152/2012-05/2759003.html?agt=61.
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that aligns with the government’s stance. An interview with a journalist familiar with
Global Times and Guancha.cn suggests that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sometimes
complains about the hawkish voices expressed in these two nationalistic outlets because
they cause trouble in foreign relations.43 On the other hand, users in the comment section
on these two outlets’ websites often criticize the diplomats as having “calcium deficiency,”
i.e., they are not strong and tough enough to fight against the “hostile” countries. This case
demonstrates that opinions expressed in Chinese news media that are deviant from the
official Party stance are not always or only progressive ones.
For the changes in the landscape after Xi took power, data indicate that media
outlets in both clusters have increased the amount of quotations on this issue. In the years
2010 and 2012, each outlet contain 7.1 quotations on average, less than half of the amount
in the years 2014 and 2016 (15.3 quotations). A closer look at the quotations in 2014 and
2016 suggests that the change largely results from intensive coverage on the Belt and Road
Initiative, which was proposed in 2013 by Xi.

Corruption
We now turn to domestic politics. Corruption is a widespread problem in China that draws
both public concern and government responses. Since President Xi Jinping took power, he
has launched a far-reaching anti-corruption campaign that took down more than 100
high-ranking officials (known as the “tigers”) and more than 100,000 other officials
(known as the “flies”) (Yuen, 2014). The campaign has been hugely popular among the
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general public and became a key feature of Xi’s political brand, but it also draws criticisms
that Xi uses this campaign to selectively crack down on his political rivals and solidify his
own faction (Li, 2016). Then, are there any conflicting opinions expressed in media outlets?
The answer is no.

Figure 9 The ideological landscape of the issue: Corruption
Note: Circle = party media; square = commercial media. The size of the nodes are proportional to the
log-transformed amount of expert citations in each outlet.
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As shown in Figure 9, this is again a densely-connected network with no separate
clusters, suggesting a similar group of interviewees for all the media outlets. The most
frequently cited experts are all scholars of anti-corruption based in Chinese public
universities and research institutes: Ren Jianming (任建明) of Beihang University, Ni Xing
(倪星) of Sun Yat-sen University, Li Chengyan (李成言) of Peking University, Lin Zhe (林
喆) and Xin Ming (辛鸣) of Central Party School, and Huang Weiting (黄苇町) of Qiushi

Magazine’s research center. Their opinions are featured across all the publications, with no
clearly discernible differences. The general tone is that corruption is a severe problem, that
the top leaders have been working very hard in fighting against it, and that they have made
great progress in terms of both specific cases and institutional reforms. One journalist at a
commercial newspaper who covers anti-corruption shares that “we all know that
corruption is the result of unchecked power, so anti-corruption is ultimately about holding
power accountable. However, there is a clear red line: you cannot talk about constraining
Xi’s power, though you can certainly talk about constraining other officials’ power. In fact,
constraining other officials’ power is what Xi wants for his paramount leadership.”44 This
quote could largely explain Chinese media’s homogenous opinions on corruption: no one
is allowed to propose checking Xi’s power, and everyone is interested in checking other
officials’ power—it is politically desirable, commercially attractive, and also aligns with
some outlets’ more critical stance towards the party-state. The party and commercial media
pay equal attention to this issue (18.3 quotations on average for party media and 18.7
quotations on average for commercial media).
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A longitudinal analysis on this issue suggests that all of the media outlets in the
sample have significantly increased their coverage of corruption after 2012, suggesting the
central role of this issue in Xi’s governance. In the years 2010 and 2012, one publication on
average contains only 6.5 quotations on this issue, whereas in the years 2014 and 2016, the
amount has significantly increased to 12.1. The general structure of the landscape remains
unchanged.

Government accountability
A related issue is government accountability, especially the extent to which media and the
public can hold the government accountable. While all the publications acknowledge the
necessity and importance of government accountability, the opinions featured in them are
somewhat different, as shown in the two clusters in Figure 10.
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Figure 10 The ideological landscape of the issue: Government Accountability
Note: Circle = party media; square = commercial media. The size of the nodes are proportional to the
log-transformed amount of expert citations in each outlet.

The larger cluster on the left includes provincial party dailies, commercial dailies,
and the publications that are more critical towards those in political power. They
overwhelmingly cite political scientists and legal scholars to argue for an accountable
government and protection of “yulun jiandu,” which refers to media supervision in a
partially open environment (Repnikova, 2017b). Some also talk about the impact of “social
media supervision” and argue that Weibo and WeChat could be useful in holding the
government (mostly local government) accountable. In contrast, the smaller cluster on the
right of the graph proposes different opinions. This cluster consists of the orthodox party
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outlets and the two nationalistic commercial outlets. They cite expert opinions that on the
one hand support the idea of government accountability, but on the other hand make it clear
that this does not mean learning from the Western political system. For example, Wu
Minsu (吴敏苏), a professor at the Communication University of China, argues that media
supervision and positive propaganda can actually be integrated, and the integration is the
major feature of “Marxist news values” instead of “Western news values.”45 Another
example is Ou Shujun (欧树军), a professor at Renmin University of China, who cites
American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington to argue that the pursuit of government
accountability and good governance does not mean the change of the political system.46 In
sum, this cluster is characterized by the affirmation of China’s one-party rule—holding the
government accountable without challenging the ruling party. There is no significant
changes in the landscape after 2012.

Rule of Law
China has been promoting the idea of “law-based governance” (yi fa zhi guo) in recent
decades and has given “rule of law” (fazhi) a more important place in official rhetoric
under Xi Jinping’s rule than his predecessors (Delisle, 2015). However, there are debates
about whether the actual approach taken by the Communist Party is truly the liberal notions
of legality or simply “rule by law” under the guise of “rule of law” (Keith, 1994; Turner,
Feinerman, & Guy, 2015). The analysis of expert opinions featured in different media
outlets reveals different understandings of this issue.
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Figure 11 The ideological landscape of the issue: Rule of Law
Note: Circle = party media; square = commercial media. The size of the nodes are proportional to the
log-transformed amount of expert citations in each outlet.

As shown in Figure 11, the four-cluster network of this issue resembles the overall
ideological landscape of Chinese media before Xi became the president (Figure 3). A
closer look at the quotations suggests that the central-level party outlets (red circles in the
figure) closely follow the party line and mainly interview scholars very close to the party
who introduce recent developments in building the legal system with Chinese
characteristics. Frequently cited prominent figures include: Han Dayuan (韩大元), a
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professor of constitutional law and the Dean of Renmin University of China Law School,
and also the President of the official organization Chinese Constitutional Law Society, who
comments on the development of China’s legal system; Ma Huaide (马怀德), a professor
and Vice President of China University of Political Science and Law, who has been invited
to a top-level meeting on social science research chaired by Xi in May 2016 and provided
his opinions on China’s legal scholarship and legal reforms; and Li Buyun (李步云), former
editor-in-chief of Chinese Journal of Law and former head of Department of Jurisprudence
at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, who was the first scholar to propose the idea of
“law-based governance” and offers his congratulatory opinions on the achievements of
China’s legal developments on party media.
Expert sources cited in the more critical outlets (green in the figure) provide a
different view of rule of law in China. They often point out the problems in the legal system
and the need for political reform in order to achieve rule of law. These scholars include
professors He Weifang, Jiang Ping, and He Bing, all of whom were outspoken intellectuals
mentioned in the previous chapter. Frequent commentators in this cluster also include
Zhang Qianfan (张千帆), a law professor at Peking University, who is also an activist
promoting general political and judicial reforms in China; Liu Renwen (刘仁文), a
researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, who is vocal about demolishing the
death penalty in China; and Cai Dingjian (蔡定剑), a professor at China University of
Political Science, who passed away in late 2010 but still has an important part in the dataset
for his influential arguments on constitutionalism and democratic reforms. My
interviewees suggest that this group of legal scholars become increasingly marginalized in
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media after 2012 due to stricter ideological control, though they are not totally blacklisted.
Data show that the critical outlets on average contain 40.4 quotations on this issue in the
years 2010 and 2012, but the amount has significantly reduced to 14.2 in the years 2014
and 2016. The other clusters do not see significant longitudinal changes.
In sharp contrast to the this group of legal scholars who are generally in favor of
liberal notions of legality, experts unique to the nationalistic cluster (pink in the figure)
reject Western ideas and argue for Chinese style rule of law, which is characterized by the
absolute leadership of the Communist Party. These scholars include: Yang Xuedong (杨雪
冬), Vice Director of the China Center of Comparative Politics and Economics, who

maintains that the implementation of rule of law should be based on each country’s unique
political systems, thus rule of law in China should never be the same as that in the West;
Zhi Zhenfeng (支振锋), a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, who also
asserts that the Communist Party should define the rule of law in the Chinese context and
not be influenced by Western concepts; and Jiang Shigong (强世功), a professor at Peking
University, who argues for the Chinese way of constitutionalism and is also a key figure in
rejecting the pro-democratic movements in Hong Kong by citing legal documents. The key
difference between this cluster and the orthodox party outlets is that these two nationalistic
outlets cite few official scholars that are tasked with interpreting the legal developments.
Instead, they are more likely to cite scholars who heavily criticize and reject the so-called
“Western” liberal notions of rule of law.
Lastly, the largest cluster consists of provincial party and commercial dailies
(yellow in the figure). These outlets tend to cite experts of all stances—official, liberal, or
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nationalistic, suggesting no clear and coherent ideological position on this issue. To put it
in another way, the “internal diversity” of opinions of this cluster is high in terms of
accommodating expert sources with conflicting viewpoints.

Social Conflicts
Although China is an authoritarian regime that is generally intolerant towards collective
actions, it is not rare to see protests or the so-called “mass incidents” (qunti xing shijian).
Since the economic reform in the late 1970s, especially during the recent two decades,
social conflicts fueled by economic or social grievances have been rising (Cai, 2008; Tong
& Lei, 2010). It has been estimated that “[a]s many as 180,000 social protests may take
place in China every year” (Lagerkvist, 2015, p. 137). Interviews with journalists and
media executives suggest that coverage on this issue is largely in the “grey” area—it may
or may not get censored, depending on the nature of the topic, the sensitivity of opinions
expressed in the stories, and the general political climate at the time of publication.
Network analysis shows that the ideological landscape on this issue is very much similar to
that on rule of law, as illustrated in Figure 11. To avoid repetition, the network graph of this
issue is shown in Appendix III rather than in the main body of the manuscript.
The orthodox party outlets do not shy away from talking about the conflicts in the
society, though they have their own framings of the problem—social conflicts, according
to the prevalent opinions featured in these central-level party outlets, are problems of
local-level governance. The most frequently cited scholars in this cluster include: Wang
Yukai (汪玉凯), a professor at China National Academy of Administration; Hu Jianmiao
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(胡建淼), the Dean of the Law School at China National Academy of Administration; and
Wang Xixin (王锡锌), a professor of administrative law at Peking University. As reflected
in the scholars’ expertise in public administration and administrative law, their approach in
discussing the issue of social conflicts is depoliticized and reducing them to administrative
issues. In this way, the problem is kept far away from hurting the legitimacy of the party’s
rule and the political system.
The experts unique to the more critical outlets express different opinions. They
include: Yu Jianrong (于建嵘), a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and
a prominent critic of the government’s practices to ensure social stability; Sun Liping (孙
立平), a professor of sociology at Tsinghua University and the scholar who estimated the

amount of mass incidents in China; and Guo Yuhua (郭于华), a professor and Sun Liping’s
colleague at Tsinghua University’ sociology department, who is also an outspoken
intellectual on social problems in China. Their general claim is that social conflicts in
China are a symptom of larger and deeper problems that are rooted in the system. Yu
Jianrong even proposed a “10-Year Outline of China’s Social and Political Development”
to solve the problems (Tatlow, 2012). Not surprisingly, Yu’s proposal did not get a
response from the party-state, and their voices are increasingly less heard from on these
media outlets after the year 2012—quotations in this cluster reduce from 12.4 on average in
the pre-Xi era to 7.3 in the Xi era.
For the nationalistic publications, the focus of their featured opinions is on two
aspects. First, they tend to downplay the conflicts between citizens and the government,
and highlight the ethnic conflicts involving Tibetans and Uyghurs. Although ethnic
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conflict is even more sensitive than other types of conflicts, they are in the safe zone
because they feature opinions calling for heavier crackdowns on potential terrorists and
separatists, which arguably aligns with the nationalist sentiment among Han ethnic
Chinese. For example, an often cited expert is Turgunjan Tursun (吐尔文江·吐尔逊), a
researcher at the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, who defends the sharply increasing
expenses for maintaining social stability in Xinjiang and Tibet. The second aspect is that,
when discussing the conflicts between citizens and the government, these media outlets
tend to criticize the wrongdoings of citizens. For example, Chen Baifeng (陈柏峰), a
professor at Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, argues that many petitioners in
China suffer from paranoid personality disorder and the government should not be
responsible for this group of people.47 It is clear that the nationalistic leaning of these
publications are accompanied by a call for a strong and authoritative government that could
crack down on both hostile forces in other ethnic groups and trouble makers among the
public.
These tough voices are not seen in provincial party and commercial dailies. Instead,
they feature a combination of expert sources found in orthodox party outlets and those in
the more critical outlets.

Civil Society
The same four-cluster pattern is also seen in the ideological landscape of the last political
issue I examine: civil society (see Appendix III). Interviews with multiple journalists
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suggest that the phrase “civil society” (gongmin shehui) became blacklisted since 2012,
due to its alleged connection with the global “color revolution,” which involves foreign
forces sponsoring civil society for regime change.48 The data I collected confirm this
claim—the phrase “civil society” appeared in 2010, but has become absent since 2012. In
the later years, this issue is largely discussed under the phrases of “social organization”
(shehui zuzhi) and “public welfare” (gongyi).
“Social organization” is the official language to refer to non-governmental
organizations (NGOs). The party-state has issued multiple guidelines on the development
of social organizations (Hildebrandt, 2013). Experts cited in the orthodox party outlets
overwhelmingly endorse and interpret these guidelines. For example, Chu Songyan (褚松
燕), a professor at China National Academy of Administration maintains that the

fundamental principle for social organizations to develop in China is to uphold the party’s
leadership and build party branches within these organizations. To put social organizations,
including foreign non-governmental organizations operating in China, under the party’s
absolute control is the recurring theme seen in this cluster of publications.
In contrast, expert sources in the more critical cluster try to argue for more equal
power dynamics among the party-state, the market, and the society. At least before 2012,
scholars, including Zhu Jian’gang (朱建刚), a professor at Sun Yat-sen University and the
Director of the University’s Institute for Civil Society; Jia Xijin (贾西津), a professor at
Tsinghua University and the Deputy Director of the University’s Institute of Philanthropy;
and Shao Jian (邵建), a professor at Nanjing Xiaozhuang College and a prolific columnist,
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mainly suggest that social organizations should be an independent force in China, which
works with the government and the market for a better society. Their voices have been
diminishing since 2012. Data show that there are on average 13.6 quotations on this issue
in each critical outlet in 2010 and 2012, but the number has reduced to 5.6 in the years 2014
and 2016.
The nationalistic outlets’ standpoint on this issue is close to but still different from
the orthodox party outlets. Their focus is on the threats posed by foreign NGOs. For
example, Ni Feng (倪峰), a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Institute
of American Studies, claims that American NGOs are in fact in close connection with the
American government—they either receive funding from the U.S. government, or hire
retired government officials. Such claims are used to support the broad claim that civil
society organizations are used as a tool to subvert the Chinese regime, and therefore should
be seen as a potential threat to China.
Again, the provincial party dailies take a more “middle-of-the-road” position and
accommodate more internal diversity on this issue. While they rarely feature the
nationalistic voices, these dailies carry opinions from both state-endorsing experts and
those who tend to promote more liberal ideas. In general, the ideological landscapes of the
issues of rule of law, social conflicts, and civil society are very similar, with central-level
party media closely aligning with the party line, critical publications pushing for more
liberal notions (and such voices become less frequently heard after 2012), nationalistic
outlets highlighting the threats from foreign forces, and provincial dailies showcasing
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more diversified opinions. This pattern is also seen in the ideological landscapes of
multiple economic issues, which I discuss in the next section.

Economic Issues
The Role of the Government in Economy
My examination of the ideological landscape of Chinese media on economic issues starts
with an issue that is directly related to political power—the extent to which the government
should intervene in the market. As mentioned above, China started its economic reform in
the late 1970s and built the “socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics.” There
are different opinions regarding the actual nature of China’s economy under this official
title. Some argue that it is already a capitalist economy, some argue that the market is still
tightly controlled by the government and therefore it does not qualify as a market economy,
and some name it “state capitalism” (Long, Herrera, & Andréani, 2018; Naughton & Tsai,
2015). The attitudes towards this issue also vary across media outlets, and the general
landscape follows the four-cluster pattern discussed above. The network graph is included
in Appendix III.
The orthodox party outlets generally laud the achievements of the socialist market
economy. For example, Qiushi Magazine quoted the President of the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences Wang Weiguang (王伟光)’s arguments that “the socialist market economy
is the key to the success of China” and that “the socialist market economy is not simply a
combination of socialism and market economy, rather, it requires innovative practices to

115

solve the specific questions that were not solved by other socialist countries.”49 Wang
suggests that the market should play “the determining role” in allocation of economic
resources, while the government should play “a better role.” Similarly, an interview with
Xu Zhengzhong (许正中), a professor at China National Academy of Administration,
published in The People’s Daily also claims that the government should play “a better role”
and should not “act arbitrarily,” but no concrete policies are discussed to specify the
general principles. This kind of empty language is repeatedly seen in official party media,
suggesting a highly pragmatic approach in the official economic policy: there is no claim
for an exact role of the government; it will be determined in a case-by-case manner.
Both the critical and nationalistic media outlets take a clearer stance on this issue
than the orthodox party outlets, and their views are in sharp contrast to each other. The
critical publications frequently cite the proponents of free market and deregulation,
including two of China’s most influential economists Wu Jinglian (吴敬琏) and Mao Yushi
(茅于轼), Peking University professor Zhang Weiying (张维迎), China Europe International
Business School professor Xu Xiaonina (许小年), and Yale University professor Chen
Zhiwu (陈志武). They usually attribute problems in China’s economy to overregulation and
the government’s intervention for its own interests. It is also notable that the
Anglo-Austrian economist Friedrich A. Hayek, a prominent critic of socialism and
government intervention and author of The Road to Serfdom, makes frequent appearances
in this cluster. From the opposite standpoint, the two nationalistic outlets cite experts to
question the free market and call for more government regulations. Notably, their major
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strategies are to highlight the cases of market failure in the U.S. and Europe, and to directly
cite (and distort to some extent) the market critics in the West. For example, in an article on
Guancha.cn, Tsinghua University professor Cui Zhiyuan (崔之元) claims that the U.S. has
suffered severely from the 2008 financial crisis and wants to learn from China’s socialist
market economy, which is characterized by the nationalization of key assets.50 Another
example is that Global Times cites American economist and The New York Times
columnist Paul Krugman’s critique of Reaganonomics as a supporting argument for “big
government and small society.”51 Here we see an interesting dynamic: The New York Times
is generally considered as a progressive and anti-nationalism publication in the U.S., but
some of its arguments on the necessity of government intervention and regulation get
picked up by more conservative and nationalistic outlets in China calling for a stronger
government. This reversed alignment of issue attitudes is due to the different nature and
history of the regimes.
For the provincial party and commercial dailies, they cite both the pro-free market
economists and the scholars endorsing the official line. The expert sources cited in
nationalist outlets are rarely absent in those dailies, suggesting a generally pro-market
environment in Chinese media, which will be confirmed in the analysis of the following
issues.
Longitudinal analysis indicates that there is no significant changes between the
pre-Xi and Xi eras.
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State-owned and private enterprises
An issue closely related to the role of the government in the market economy are the
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), especially the controversies over the alleged unfair
advantage and lower efficiency of SOEs as compared with private enterprises. The share of
the private sector in the economy significantly increased during the 1980s and 1990s, but
since the 2000s there has been a trend known as guojin mintui (“the state advances as the
private sector retreats”), which refers to the resurgence of SOEs and the decline of private
enterprises especially in the more lucrative industries (Huang, 2011). There has been
constant worries among business owners about state economic policy. The most recent
example was in October 2018, when concerns were so great that President Xi Jinping had
to write an open letter to private business owners to sooth their fears amid wavering
economic growth. The letter, published in State News Agency Xinhua, confirmed the
“indelible” contribution of the private sector to China’s economy and promised to continue
supporting the development of private business (Zhou, 2018).
The network graph, which includes four clusters, is included in Appendix III.
Similar to the previous issue, central-level party media mainly cite scholars close to the
government to laud and interpret the policies on SOEs and private enterprises. The most
frequently seen experts include: Li Jin (李锦), the principal researcher at the Institute of
Chinese Enterprises affiliated with the official organization China Enterprises
Confederation; Wen Zongyu (文宗瑜), the Director at the Institute of Fiscal Science under
the Ministry of Finance; and Xu Baoli (许保利), a researcher at the Research Center under
the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council.
118

Their general argument is that both SOEs and private enterprises are important and should
be upgraded to better serve the development of the economy. In the year 2016, the
government pushed several major mergers among SOEs. And scholars cited in this cluster
of publications argue that efficiency has been boosted thanks to the mergers, and that this is
great for Chinese enterprises ability to compete in the global market.
The two clusters of more unorthodox outlets are once again opposing each other on
this issue. The more critical publications frequently quote experts who are skeptical about
SOEs’ contribution to the economy and passionate in promoting further privatization.
These experts include the aforementioned economists Zhang Weiying, Chen Zhiwu, and
Xu Xiaonian, as well as Sheng Hong (盛洪), Executive Director of the non-governmental
think tank Unirule Institute of Economics, who was cited in Southern Weekly that SOEs
enjoy unfair advantages such as tax breaks and free lands offered by the government.52
They also frequently criticize the monopoly of SOEs in lucrative industries such as energy
and telecom. In contrast, the nationalistic publications overwhelmingly quote intellectuals
who are defenders of the SOEs, including Chen Ping (陈平), a researcher at Fudan
University’s China Institute, who maintains that SOEs are key to social stability in China
and act as an important player to reduce the harm brought by multinational corporations to
China; Guo Songmin (郭松民), a prominent Maoist academic and commentator, who
claims that SOEs have been demonized by news media and the narrative is conspired by
multinational corporations who want to eliminate China’s SOEs;53 and Zhou Zhanqiang
(周战强), a professor at Central University of Finance and Economics, who argues that
52
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SOEs play an important role in providing public goods, which makes it irreplaceable by
private business. Interestingly, foreign experts are again quoted in this cluster of media
outlets. For example, Global Times quotes Nicholas R. Lardy, an economist at the Peterson
Institute for International Economics in the U.S., who suggests that the role of SOEs in
China has been exaggerated and that China’s economy should not be seen as state
capitalism.54
The standpoint of provincial dailies on this issue is a mixture of orthodox party
outlets’ and critical outlets’ views. They give significant spaces to both interpreters of the
state policies and the pro-privatization economists. Longitudinal analysis does not reveal
any significant difference before and after 2012.

Tax and Financial Revenue (state vs. citizens)
We now turn to the discussions on economic equality. Two issues are at the center: the
divide between the state’s and citizens’ fortune, and the disparity between rich and poor.
China has seen a steady, fast growth for the past four decades, becoming the world’s
second largest economy in 2010. However, there are controversies over whether ordinary
people in China have gotten their fair share of the growing cake, and whether the state
becomes wealthy whereas the people remain relatively poor.
We see the four-cluster network structure again on this issue—the same outlets
cluster together in a similar way, though they are citing different groups of experts
depending on the issue (see Appendix III for the graph). There is plenty of coverage of this
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issue in the orthodox party outlets. The People’s Daily and The Economic Daily discuss the
increased rate of household income every quarter since 2014, when the National Bureau of
Statistics started to publish the numbers. Experts affiliated with the central government are
frequently quoted to provide their analysis and offer an optimistic prediction. They include:
Liu Shangxi (刘尚希), President of The Research Institute for Fiscal Science affiliated with
the Ministry of Finance; Bai Jingming (白景明), Vice President of the same institute; and
Yao Jingyuan (姚景源), a researcher at the Counselor’s Office of the State Council. A vivid
example was that in the first half of 2016, when the increase in the rate of household
income was lower than the GDP growth rate, the party newspapers published lengthy
articles and quoted extensively from those official scholars to argue that the increase rate of
household income in China was still higher than any other country in the world, and that
continued high increase rates in future would be guaranteed because the government had
been working very hard on ensuring higher income for all.
Instead of lauding the current policies and projecting a rosy future, the critical
outlets focus on the more disturbing aspects of the situation and call for tax cuts and other
reforms. The aforementioned Yale economist Chen Zhiwu frequently appears in this
cluster of publications for his estimations on the growth rate of the government’s financial
revenue. For example, he estimated that in 2011, the government’s financial revenue was
26.8% higher than in 2010—that is triple the growth rate of GDP of that year. These
numbers are often cited as evidence that the government has accumulated too much fortune
and left too little for the people. Economists Cao Yuanzheng (曹远征), Li Weiguang (李炜
光), and Xu Xiaonian are also heavily cited by these publications for their call on structural
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tax reduction and “giving back the wealth to the people” (huan fu yu min). For them,
ensuring the people a larger share of the wealth not only contributes to the economic
development by boosting consumption, but also matters for equality and justice in the
market economy.
For the nationalistic publications, they again take a more statist approach by citing
experts who affirm the importance of state financial revenue. For example. Tsinghua
University professor Hu Angang (胡鞍钢) argues that the growth in financial revenue
ensures the ability of the central government to macro-control the economy and to maintain
equality among different provinces by transferring payments; i.e., getting more revenue
from the richer provinces and transferring part of their revenue to the poorer ones. The
overall amount of coverage on this issue by these two publications is relatively small (9.4
quotations on average as compared with 20.1 quotations on average for other outlets).
In a now familiar pattern, the provincial party and commercial dailies feature both
the more critical voices calling for tax cuts and a larger share of wealth for the people, and
the champions for official policies as in central-level party outlets. No significant
longitudinal changes are identified on this issue.

Inequality (rich vs. poor)
Concerns about economic inequality in China are not only about how the government may
have taken an oversized share of the economy, but also about how the income gap between
rich and poor, as well as between urban and rural residents, may have significantly
widened. It has been estimated that China’s income inequality, driven by the rural-urban

122

gap and regional disparities, ranks among the highest in the world, with the Gini coefficient
in the range of 0.53–0.5555 (Xie & Zhou, 2014).
There are four clusters of media outlets in the landscape of this issue (see Appendix
III for the graph). The Chinese government seldom publishes the official numbers of the
Gini coefficient. As reflected in the quotations in central-level party outlets, the only
official statistic that could regularly infer income inequality is the average income for
urban and rural residents. Zhang Yansheng (张燕生), a researcher and Secretary-general at
the Academic Committee of the National Development and Reform Commission, suggests
in an interview with The People’s Daily that the urban-rural income gap has decreased
from 2009 to 2015. Similarly, other expert sources cited in the party outlets, including
Renmin University professor and member of the 10th and 11th National People’s Congress
Standing Committee Zheng Gongcheng (郑功成) and the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences rural economics researcher Li Guoxiang (李国祥), mainly talk about
achievements in reducing inequality, and the key role of the government in continuing to
alleviate the problem.
More discussions about the darker side of the Chinese economy, and calls for
systematic reforms, are seen in the cluster of critical news outlets. The most frequently and
uniquely cited experts in this cluster include: Wang Xiaolu (王小鲁), a professor at the
Economic Research Institute of China Reform Foundation, who suggests that the income
gap could only be solved by political reforms and public supervision of the government; Li
Shi (李实), a professor at Beijing Normal University and the Executive Director of
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University’s Institute for Income Distribution and Poverty Studies, who has been studying
income inequality in China for decades and published his own calculations of the Gini
coefficient; and Xu Xiaonian, the aforementioned pro-market economist, who challenges
the official statistics and once argued that “even fairy tales wouldn’t dare to write in this
way [to understate the inequality in China].”56
Opposite to these harsh critiques, the nationalistic outlets provide opinions from
another group of experts who defend China’s situation in two ways. First, income equality
is a worldwide problem, and some Western countries have even wider gaps between rich
and poor. For example, Ding Yifan (丁一凡), a researcher at the Development Research
Center of the State Council, argues that globalization has widened the global income gap.
French economist Thomas Piketty, author of Capital in the Twenty-First Century, has also
been frequently quoted to demonstrate the problem on a global scale. Second, state
capacity and strong government is once again emphasized as a solution to the problem of
inequality. In an interview conducted by Global Times with Thomas Piketty, his alleged
argument that economic equality should be ensured by state power is emphasized by the
paper.57 Similarly, He Xuefeng (贺雪峰), a professor of rural governance at Wuhan
University, appears frequently in these two publications with his statement that the
problem of urban-rural divide should not be solved by the privatization of rural lands,
which is a proposal supported by many pro-market economists.
As for the provincial dailies, they again feature a relatively diverse group of expert
interviewees, the majority of whom appear either in the cluster of orthodox party outlets, or
56
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the cluster of critical outlets. In other words, they feature both opinions that lauding the
achievements in reducing the inequality and experts that point to the problems in the
income inequality in China.
No significant longitudinal difference is identified in the analysis.

Housing Price Regulation
Housing price is a widely discussed issue in China, not only because it is deeply important
to everyone’s life, but also because of the exceptionally rapid growth rate—by the end of
2017, the 100 City Price Index in China rose from USD$134 per square foot in 2010 to
USD$202, which was 38% percent higher than the medium price in the U.S. (Balding,
2018). Different media outlets, however, attribute the phenomenon to different factors and
provide different solutions. The graph of the landscape is included in Appendix III.
The orthodox party outlets continue to stick to the official line, which is quite
inconsistent and torn. On the one hand, high housing prices could potentially lead to social
unrest and create an unfavorable views of the ruling party among the public, especially
among the grassroots. On the other hand, real estate is a major driver of China’s economy,
and the government does not want to risk slowing down the economy, which would also
lead to serious social problems. One journalist at a central-level party newspaper
commented in my interview that the government has been paying lip service to housing
price regulations. “We constantly cover the new regulations and interview experts who say
that the price will be stabilized, but the actual price has been surging with only a few
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occasional bumps.”58 For them, the key is to show that the authority is concerned about this
situation, and government does issue new regulations from time to time. However, as a key
driver of the economy, the real estate sector has never been in actual decline during past
two decades. The experts arguing that the government has met its responsibility in
regulating housing prices and providing their optimistic predictions include: Ren Xingzhou
(任兴洲), a researcher and the former Director-general at the Institute for Market Economy
under the Development Research Center of the State Council; Liu Hongyu (刘洪玉), a
professor at Tsinghua University and the Director of the University’s Institute of Real
Estate Studies; and Yi Xianrong (易宪容), a researcher at the Financial Institute of the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
While also covering those regulations, the critical outlets frequently cite a group of
experts who point out that regulations would not solve the problem unless they touch on
two issues. First, the “land finance” (tudi caizheng) model, which refers to “the generation
of revenues for local governments through land sales or transfers, land taxes, and leases”
(Zheng, Wang, & Cao, 2014, p. 130). For example, pro-market economist Li Yining (厉以
宁) argues in multiple publications that housing prices will continue to rise as long as local

governments rely on selling the lands for higher and higher prices to generate financial
revenues. The second issue is the over-issuing of currency, which causes inflation and
reduces the purchasing power of money. The aforementioned economist Wu Jinglian holds
this view and his opinion is also featured in multiple news outlets in this cluster.
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Neither ending the land finance model nor fixing the currency over-issuing
problem is the suggested solution by expert sources in the nationalistic outlets. For them,
public housing is the ultimate solution. For example, Su Wei (苏伟), a professor at
Chongqing Party School, has been cited for his promotion of the “Chongqing Model,”
which includes building a large amount of public rental houses.
The provincial dailies again feature a more diverse group of expert interviewees.
They include the interpreters of the official policies, the more critical voices of the deeper
problems, as well as a unique group of economists who predict the real estate market
without giving any normative judgement. This group of economists include director of the
E-house China Research and Development Institution Yan Yuejin (严跃进), China
International Capital Corp's (CICC) chief economist Ha Jiming (哈继铭), and Hong Kong
Exchanges and Clearing Limited chief China economist Ba Shusong (巴曙松). This group
is the largest in provincial dailies (around 75% of quotations are from them), suggesting a
relatively non-opinionated approach towards the housing price issue by these papers.
For the longitudinal analysis, no significant change in the network between the pre
and post Xi era emerged.

Interpretation of Key Economic Statistics
Housing prices could be seen as an important economic statistic, and there are several other
key statistics that are frequently covered in Chinese media: GDP (Gross Domestic Product),
CPI (Consumer Price Index), PMI (Purchasing Managers Index), and two major stock
market indexes—SSE Composite Index and SZSE Component Index. One might suspect
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that different media outlets would provide distinct interpretations of these statistics.
However, network analysis shows that all media outlets in my sample share very similar
interviewees on this set of issues. The graph is very similar to Figure 9, and is included in
Appendix III. And there is no significant difference between the pre-Xi and Xi eras.
The most cited experts commenting on key economic statistics are chief
economists at various banks and other financial institutions. They largely give technical
analysis on the latest figures. For example, how the global economic recovery, the
anti-corruption campaign in China that reduced luxury consumption, and the severe winter
weather conditions have worked together to influence the performance of CPI. Unlike
previously discussed issues, deeper analysis related to the structural factors is rarely
provided in any of the outlets. My interviews with journalists suggest that a working
routine has been formulated in covering these numbers, which are reported on a regular
basis. The routine includes interviewing the regularly quoted economists, who are used to
providing technical analysis. One journalist at a provincial commercial daily shared that
“when major quarterly and yearly economic statistics are announced, I always call the
same two economists, and they always provide quotable analysis. Sometimes they send in
their analysis even before I contact them.”59 This phenomenon suggests the influence of
journalistic routines on interviewee selection.

Currency
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The alleged manipulation by the Chinese government of its currency (Renminbi) is an
issue that has drawn global attention and became a talking point in Donald Trump’s 2016
presidential campaign. How do Chinese domestic media cover this issue? Analysis shows
that the expert sources appearing in the media outlets are quite similar, resulting in a
one-cluster network (see Appendix III). The most cited experts are economists based in
banks and other financial institutions, as in the previous issue. They provide technical
analysis of the ups and downs in the currency exchange rates on a regular basis, without
touching the more sensitive issue of currency manipulation.
There is also another significant group of expert interviewees across all media
outlets whose major argument is to defend China against the criticisms from the U.S.
Interestingly, this group mainly consists of high-profile non-Chinese economists,
including Joseph E. Stiglitz, a professor at Columbia University and a recipient of the
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences; Pieter Bottelier, a senior adjunct professor at
the Johns Hopkins University and former Chief of the World Bank’s resident mission in
China; and Fred Bergsten, a researcher and Director emeritus at the Peterson Institute for
International Economics. They are frequently quoted in Chinese media for their arguments
that China is not a currency manipulator and that changes in currency exchange rates won’t
help solve the problem of U.S. trade deficit. Interviews with multiple journalists suggest
that the controversies over currency manipulation is considered highly sensitive and
subject to heavy censorship. For example, a media executive at a party newspaper
suggested that they received a large amount of orders from the propaganda department
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regarding this issue, and were granted little freedom in coverage.60 The nature of this issue
is similar to that of sovereignty and national interests as discussed in the previous section.61
Therefore, there are two major reasons contributing to the homogeneity in expert sourcing
patterns on the issue of currency: working routines that lead journalists to seek out
economists who in turn regularly give technical analysis of the currency exchange rates,
and political sensitivity of this issue that sharply narrows the pool of potential
interviewees.
There is no significant longitudinal change identified in the analysis.

Social & Cultural Issues
Gender equality
I now turn to the realm of social and cultural issues. Gender equality, women’s rights, and
LGBTQ rights are globally significant issues. In Chairman Mao’s China (1949-1977), the
party-state, following the Marxist ideology, promoted the idea that “women can hold up
half the sky.” Although there were significant limitations in this “state feminism” approach,
China did well in terms of women employment rates (Wang, 2005). The market reform
after Mao has changed the situation by bringing more freedom to women but at the same
time creating more inequality in the job market and introducing consumerism to women in
China (Cao & Hu, 2007).
Figure 12 shows the ideological landscape of Chinese media on the issue of gender
equality. The most significant difference between this graph and previous graphs is that the
60
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two nationalistic outlets are absent, and half of the orthodox party outlets are also missing
(News Simulcast, Focus, and Qiushi), suggesting that these outlets are not interested in
discussing gender issues.

Figure 12 The ideological landscape of the issue: Gender equality
Note: Circle = party media; square = commercial media. The size of the nodes are proportional to the
log-transformed amount of expert citations in each outlet.

The remaining three central-level party newspapers tend to frame the issue as a
public policy problem, as indicated by expert interviewees who mainly come from the law
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and policy sector. A frequently quoted expert is Sun Xiaomei (孙晓梅), a professor at China
Women’s University and a deputy to the National People’s Congress. She has been vocal
in fighting against gender-discrimination in employment and against domestic violence.
As a lawmaker in the national legislature, her main approach is to call for laws and
regulations that could protect women’s rights. Liu Xiaonan (刘小楠), a professor at the
China University of Political Science Law, also appears in this cluster of media outlets to
provide the comparison between anti-discrimination laws in China and in the West, as well
as to suggest possible legislation.
Rather than focusing on law and policy, the critical media outlets emphasize the
social construction of gender norms. Sociologists and sexologists Li Yinhe (李银河) and
Fang Gang (方刚) are frequently cited in these publications for their arguments that China
should pay more attention to how social norms suppress women’s rights. Li Yinhe is also a
prominent advocate for LGBTQ rights in China, and she often talks about this topic in the
critical media outlets. In contrast, the orthodox party outlets do not talk about LGBTQ at all,
mainly due to the sensitivity of this issue, as suggested by an interviewee at a party
newspaper. He shared that “our newspaper keeps silent on this issue because the
government holds rather ambiguous attitudes towards sexual minority groups: it neither
explicitly recognizes their rights, nor openly criticizes them.”62
As with previously discussed economic issues, provincial party and commercial
media also feature a diverse group of expert interviewees on gender equality. They include
law and policy experts like Liu Xiaonan, women’s rights advocates like Li Yinhe, and also
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a group of “men’s rights advocates.” The most prominent figure in the last group is Sun
Yunxiao (孙云晓), a researcher at the China Youth Research Center, who argues that China
is experiencing a “masculinity crisis” and calls people to “save the boys.” The crisis,
according to Sun, is evident because boys are now less assertive and perform worse than
their girl classmates. Another example is Peking University sociology professor Zheng
Yefu (郑也夫), who argues that men are born to be strong whereas women are born to be
weak. Zheng’s stereotypical opinion is cited in multiple provincial dailies. In sum, these
balanced outlets feature a diverse range of opinions regarding gender equality.
No significant longitudinal changes were found in my analysis.

One-child Policy
China started its one-child policy in the 1980s and allegedly prevented 400 million births
(Parkinson, 2015). The policy was abolished in late 2015, after years of criticism both from
abroad and home. In China, the major concern is that the policy has been changed too
late—China is aging rapidly and there might be a workforce shortage soon. Some even
argue that in order to boost the fertility rate, which is already too low, the government has
to encourage couples to give birth to more than two babies.
One of the most prominent critics of the one-child policy is Yi Fuxian (易富贤), a
scientist at the University of Wisconsin-Madison’s Department of Obstetrics and
Gynecology, who wrote the book Big Country with an Empty Nest to highlight the problem.
Yi claims that China’s future situation will be worse than Japan today, and that China will
never overtake the U.S. economically because of the declining economic vitality doomed
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by low fertility rates (Yi, 2019). Yi is one of the most frequently cited experts on this issue
in most of the media outlets in my sample—except the orthodox party outlets. As shown in
Figure 13, there is a clear divide between central-level orthodox party media and other
publications. Yi’s name is never mentioned in the central-level party media. Similarly,
experts who make frequent appearances in publications other than central-level party
media also include Tsinghua University professor Wang Ming (王名), Renmin University
professor Liu Shuang (刘爽), and Stanford University PhD and Ctrip former CEO Liang
Jianzhang (梁建章), all of whom are critics of the one-child policy and have been calling for
abolishing the policy for years before 2015. It is notable that the critical outlets and the
nationalistic outlets have reached rare “agreement” on this issue by citing a similar group
of expert interviewees.

134

Figure 13 The ideological landscape of the issue: One-child policy
Note: Circle = party media; square = commercial media. The size of the nodes are proportional to the
log-transformed amount of expert citations in each outlet.

In contrast, the orthodox party outlets tend to cite experts who endorse the timing of
the state policy, including Zhai Zhenwu (翟振武), Dean of the School of Sociology and
Population Studies at Renmin University of China, who argues that we don’t need to worry
about the fertility rate, which is underestimated and does not represent the actual situation;
and Zhang Xuying (张许颖), a researcher at China Population and Development Research
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Center, who also suggests that the abolishment of the one-child policy is not late and gives
optimistic estimations about the future fertility rate.
Although China changed the policy in 2015, there is no significant longitudinal
changes in terms of expert opinions featured in media outlets—they hold on to their stances
regardless of the changes in official policy.

Environmental Protection
China’s rapid economic growth is accompanied by severe environmental pollution and
degradation, which causes social and health problems (Xie, 2012; Xu, Chen, & Ye, 2013).
In response to the problems, the party-state has made promises to create an “ecological
civilization.” President Xi Jinping maintains that “green mountains and clear water are
equal to mountains of gold and silver,” and has doubled down on his support for the
low-carbon energy transition of China and the UN climate accord (Geall, 2017). The
orthodox party outlets, as in a number of issues discussed above, mainly cite expert sources
singing the praises of the government’s policies. The most frequently cited experts include:
He Jiankun (何建坤), a professor and the Director of Low Carbon Economy Lab of
Tsinghua Universtiy and the Deputy Director of National Expert Committee on Climate
Change, who suggests that China’s natural environment will be improved as long as the
policies are implemented and that the transition to low-carbon economy could be an
opportunity for China; Gao Shiji (高世楫), a researcher and the Director-General of
Institute for Resources and Environment Policies at the Development Research Center of
the State Council, who argues that the Communist Party has incorporated environmental
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protection into China’s modernization project, which will benefit the people and the whole
world; and Su Yang (苏杨), a researcher at the Development Research Center of the State
Council, who claims that there is misinformation involved in people’s concerns about
pollution and that more education on the public’s scientific literacy in needed.
In the four-cluster ideological landscape on this issue (shown in Appendix III), the
critical outlets tend to cite voices that point to the problems and call for actions. These
expert sources include: Wang Canfa (王灿发), a professor at the China University of
Political Science and Law and the founder and Director of the Center for Legal Assistance
to Pollution Victims, who often criticize the lack of legal protection on pollution victims as
well as the lack of transparency in government information about pollution; Shan
Guangnai (单光鼐), a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, who argues
that massive incidents caused by environmental pollution combined with the government’s
ineffective responses is a serious social problem in China; and the aforementioned
economist Wu Jinglian, who posits that the degradation of China’s natural environment has
not stopped and that the only solution is the total transformation of China’s growth model,
which is now largely based on the unsustainable exploitation of the natural world.
In contrast, the solution provided by scholars cited in the nationalistic publications
follows a distinct approach: the problem will gradually be solved as China’s economy
continues to develop. For them, pollution is an inevitable problem on the road to a
developed economy, and things will get better once China’s development reaches a certain
stage. Therefore, it is not a good strategy to ask the government to slow down the economy
for environmental considerations. The scholars include: Tsinghua University professor
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Wang Shuxiao (王书肖), Deputy Director of the Beijing Academy of Ecocivilization Jia
Weilie (贾卫列), and the aforementioned pro-government economist Justin Yifu Lin.
The provincial party and commercial dailies again feature a combination of the
three groups of expert interviewees discussed above, making up the fourth cluster in the
ideological landscape. No longitudinal changes is identified in the four clusters.

Traditional Culture
Lastly, we examine the positions of Chinese media on the issue of traditional culture.
China observers have noticed the recent revival of traditional culture and argue that
Confucianism, classical literature, traditional Chinese clothing, traditional Chinese
medicine, and other traditional cultural elements have been promoted by the party-state as
a tool to boost national pride and resist Western culture and political ideas (Page, 2015).
Network analysis shows that most media outlets—except for a few critical
publications—share similar expert sources on this issue. A closer look at the sources
reveals that they are mostly proponents of traditional culture. The most frequently cited
scholars include: Tu Weiming (杜维明), a Harvard professor emeritus and Chair Professor
of Humanities and Founding Director of the Institute for Advanced Humanistic Studies at
Peking University, who is one of the most prominent Confucian of the 20th and 21st
centuries; Zhang Liwen (张立文), Dean of the Institute of Confucian Study at Renmin
University, who uses Confucianism to interpret Xi Jinping’s thoughts on governance; and
Chen Lai (陈来), Dean of Tsinghua University’s Academy of Chinese Learning, who is
also active in connecting Confucianism with the current regime and has been invited to
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give lectures on Chinese traditional culture and patriotism to top leaders including Xi
Jinping.
While Tu Weiming and some other figures of “neo-Confucianism” also make
appearances in the more critical outlets, their opinions also get challenged to some extent in
these publications. Scholars, including Sun Yat-sen University professor Yuan Weishi (袁
伟时) and Beihang University professor Gao Quanxi (高全喜), argue that traditional culture

should be examined within the framework of universal values written in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and other international documents. They are generally in
doubt about the current revival of traditional culture in China. However, it should be
mentioned that there are only three outlets in this critical cluster—Southern Weekly,
Sanlian Life Weekly, and Nanfeng Chuang. Jiemian and Caixin Weekly have no coverage
on this issue, and China Youth Daily does not feature the more critical voices on this issue,
suggesting a tighter control on this issue for party newspapers. In terms of longitudinal
analysis, no significant difference between the pre-Xi and Xi eras is found.
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Figure 14 The ideological landscape of the issue: Traditional culture
Note: Circle = party media; square = commercial media. The size of the nodes are proportional to the
log-transformed amount of expert citations in each outlet.

Summary
The ideological clusters of the media outlets on the twenty issues are summarized in Table
6. There are nine issues that follow the four-cluster pattern as in the overall structure of
ideological landscape in 2010 and 2012. In addition, there is only a single cluster on five
issues, reflecting either tight censorship or the influence of journalistic working routines as
discussed in this chapter. The structure of network varies on the other six issues.
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Table 6 Ideological clusters on major issues
Issues
Overall
Overall (2010 & 2012)
Overall (2014 & 2016)
Political
Adherence to party ideology
The “China Model”
Sovereignty and territorial integrity
China’s international presence
Corruption
Government accountability
Rule of law
Social conflicts
Civil society
Economic
The role of the government in economy
State-owned and private enterprises
Tax and income distribution (state vs.
citizens)
Inequality (rich vs. poor)
Housing price regulation
Interpretation of key economic statistics
Currency
Social & Cultural
Gender equality
One-child policy
Environmental protection
Traditional culture

OPO

PPD

PCD

Cri

Nat

N/A

Note: 1. Each color indicates one cluster. For example, on the issue of “adherence to party ideology,”
there is only one cluster; on the issue of “rule of law,” there are four clusters.
2. OPO: Orthodox party outlets; PCD: Provincial Party Dailies; PCD: Provincial Commercial Dailies;
Cri: unorthodox outlets with more critical stances; Nat: unorthodox outlets with more nationalistic
stances.
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In Appendix IV, I give details of these issue networks by providing statistics
including the size, density, distribution of edge weights, and the modularity score of each
network.
Table 7 summarizes the changes in media’s issue attitudes after Xi Jinping took
power. There is no discernable overtime changes in network structures in the 20 issues.
However, 7 of these issues show changes in node size. And all of these 7 issues are in the
political arena. The general direction is moving towards increasing the party line and
reducing critical voices. All of the media outlets devote more attention to China’s
international presence (with the Belt and Road Initiative at the center) and Xi’s
anti-corruption campaign. The critical publications have increased their citing of
nationalistic opinions, and reduced voices that highlight the problem of social conflicts and
call for rule of law and civil society development. In addition, all commercial outlets have
increased opinions that adhere to party’s official ideology.

Table 7 Longitudinal changes (pre-Xi era vs Xi era) on certain issues
Change
All media increased coverage

Issue
China’s international presence
Corruption
Sovereignty and territorial integrity
Rule of law
Social conflicts
Civil society
Adherence to party ideology

Critical media increased coverage
Critical media reduced coverage

All commercial media increased coverage
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In the concluding chapter, I will integrate the findings presented in this and the
previous chapters to provide a more comprehensive picture of media bias in China, and
discuss implications for our understanding of Chinese media and for future research.
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CHAPTER 5. Summary, Discussion, and Conclusions

The empirical study of media diversity and bias in non-Western and/or non-democratic
regimes has lagged behind that of their counterparts for conceptual, substantive and
methodological reasons. In this dissertation, I have attempted to address these
shortcomings by developing a source-driven, multi-method approach to mapping media
landscapes and measuring media bias, and applying this approach to the contemporary
Chinese media landscape. In this concluding chapter, I summarize my approach and
findings, followed by a discussion of their implications for both Chinese media studies and
research on media bias more broadly. Lastly, I discuss the limitations of the current project,
and suggest some possible directions for future research.

Summary of Findings: Mapping Media Bias in China
My argument in this dissertation is built upon three interrelated observations. First, that
little is known about the ideological and structural biases that exist in the contemporary
Chinese media landscape. Second, that existing conceptualizations and measures of media
bias are inappropriate for understanding the media systems of non-Western regimes such
as China. And third, that the use of quoted expert sources and mentioned top political
leaders as indicators of media bias provides a valid, ground-up, and context-independent
means of mapping media landscapes.
Drawing on four years of data comprised of 31 media outlets, over 8,700 expert
sources, and 192 Communist Party leaders, I used computational social science techniques,
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supplemented with interviews with Chinese journalists and media executives in China, to
provide answers to five research questions and two specific hypotheses.

Research Question 1: What does the media landscape of contemporary China look like,
and how do the biases found in this landscape comport with the distribution of ideological
perspectives and structural control found in China?
The general landscape of contemporary Chinese media is visualized in Figure 4,
which includes two major dimensions. On the ideological dimension, three clusters (or
four, depending on which years we are looking at, see the following discussions on RQ4)
are identified. It is not a binary, let alone homogenous, landscape, as many observers and
previous scholarship presume. It also indicates that the party/commercial divide has
limited use in determining the ideological bias of media outlets.
In contrast, the party/commercial divide is apparent on the structural
dimension—party media outlets mention top political leaders significantly more than
commercial media, suggesting that the stricter control on party media is mostly evident in
exerting structural power, rather than in shaping ideological orientations.

Research Question 2: What are the major clusters of media bias in China and which media
outlets are there in each cluster?
I have identified four clusters of media outlets in terms of ideological orientations.
Note that two of the clusters have “merged” in the Xi era, which is to be discussed later.
The first cluster, which I name the “orthodox party outlets,” consists of party media on the
central level. They are important organs within the party-state system, and generally
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operate as the propaganda arm of the Communist Party. The opinions featured in this
cluster are heavily controlled by the party and usually seen as the official positions.
Analyses on the orthodox party outlets’ standpoints on various issues reveal that they
closely follow the party line, and mainly cite scholars within or close to the party-state
system to laud and interpret government policies. Although there are occasionally more
critical stances towards local governments and officials, it is very unlikely for this cluster
of media outlets to question and challenge official policies issued by the central party
leadership.
The second cluster, named as the “balanced outlets,” are provincial and municipal
level party dailies and commercial dailies. Against the conventionally known
party/commercial divide, these two kinds of newspapers are actually very similar in terms
of choosing expert interviewees, thus demonstrating similar ideological orientations. On
the politically sensitive issues such as the party ideology and sovereignty, this cluster of
media outlets follows the party line. On other issues, they generally accommodate a
combination of experts who approve and interpret the official policies, and experts who are
in favor of free market, deregulation, and liberal notions of law and civil society. It should
be noted that I only included the most circulated provincial dailies in my sample, which
concentrate on the more affluent coastal provinces. Results should not be directly
generalized to the less developed and more politically sensitive provinces such as Tibet and
Xinjiang.
The third cluster consists of media outlets that are more critical towards the
party-state and official policies. They are mostly commercial publications that are known
for in-depth reporting and critical analysis, but also include a unique central-level party
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newspaper—China Youth Daily. Media outlets in this cluster tend to cite experts that
support liberal notions of law and civil society, argue against government intervention in
economy, and favor progressive ideas on gender and environmental issues. I choose not to
label this cluster as “liberal” or “progressive,” mainly because their positions on economic
issues do not fit into the “liberal” or “progressive” camp in the Western context. It should
also be noted that their positions on politically sensitive issues do not differ from those of
orthodox party media, suggesting the limitations of opinion plurality in Chinese media.
The fourth cluster includes two nationalistic publications: the commercial
newspaper Global Times and the commercial website Guancha.cn. They tend to cite
experts who heavily criticize the U.S. and other Western countries, warn against the danger
that the Western world might bring to China, and emphasize the importance of a strong
government under such hostile international environment. Although this kind of narrative
could potentially boost public support for the Communist Party, it does not always align
with the official positions, which are generally more dovish. Therefore, one should not
simply consider this cluster as a more extreme version of the orthodox party outlets.
As discussed in the first chapter, each of the clusters presents biased content that
could potentially influence public opinion on various issues. For instance, the “orthodox
party outlets” have the potential to boost public support in official policies and the
Communist Party’s rule in general. If we take the readership, perceived importance, and
other factors into consideration, the actual influences are expected to vary. But in this study,
I only focus on the relative position of the outlets, rather than calculating their actual
influence.
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Research Question 3: What are the major dividing issues among these clusters of media
outlets?
In general, the ideological alignment of issues in Chinese media is much messier
than that in liberal democracies. There are multiple, divergent opinions on certain issues,
but more homogenous opinions on others. It suggests that the “cluster view” as adopted in
this study is indeed a more appropriate approach to understand the ideological positions of
Chinese media.
The major dividing issues among the four clusters include the less sensitive
political issues, most of the economic issues, and some of the social and cultural issues. For
political issues, media outlets take distant positions on government accountability, rule of
law, social conflicts, and civil society. Generally speaking, the orthodox party outlets
closely follow the party line; the critical outlets emphasize liberal notions that resemble
Western liberal democratic ideas; the nationalistic outlets actively defend China’s system
and warn against the danger that Western liberal ideas might bring to China; and the
provincial dailies feature a diverse combination of those opinions.
In the economic arena, the dividing issues include the role of the government in
economy, state-owned and private enterprises, tax and income distribution, inequality, and
housing price regulation. The orthodox party outlets mainly laud China’s economic
achievements. The critical outlets point to the problems in China’s economy and call for
further deregulation and the retreat of the government from economy. The nationalistic
outlets take a more statist approach on emphasize the importance of a strong government in
assuring continuous economic growth. The provincial dailies contain a mixed group of the
opinions from the other three clusters.
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For social and cultural issues, the major dividing issues are gender and
environmental protection. The orthodox party outlets frame the gender issue as a public
policy problem, whereas the critical outlets point out the structural sexism in the Chinese
society. The nationalistic outlets do not talk about gender issues. And the provincial dailies
feature a diverse group of experts, including law and policy experts, women’s rights
advocates, and also “men’s rights advocates.” In terms of environmental protection, the
orthodox party outlets generally praise the official policies. The critical outlets tend to
highlight the environmental problems in China and call for actions. The nationalistic
outlets promote the idea that economic growth will solve the problems. The provincial
dailies again feature a combination of these three groups of expert interviewees.
It should be noted that five of the twenty issues examined, most of which are
political issues, tend to form a single cluster due to strict censorship.

Research Question 4: How has Chinese media’s ideological landscape changed after
2012?
The diversity of the ideological landscape shrank and there are only three clusters
present in the years 2014 and 2016. The major reason is that media outlets in the critical
cluster have reduced their critical edge by quoting fewer scholars with critical opinions on
political issues, and have featured more nationalistic voices since Xi Jinping took power.
The increase or decrease in the amount of coverage on specific issues result in a structural
change of the overall landscape, i.e., the merge of the critical cluster and the nationalistic
cluster.
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Research Question 5: How has Chinese media’s structural bias changed after 2012?
Comparing the years before and after Xi took power, I find that all the media outlets,
no matter party or commercial, have significantly increased their coverage and use of top
leaders after 2012. The significant difference between party and commercial media
remains under Xi’s rule. Findings for the last two research questions confirm that media
has been under stricter control under Xi’s leadership.

Implications for Research on Chinese Media
The findings of this project add to our understanding of Chinese media, demonstrating both
the extent of and limitations to media diversity across outlets, issues, and time. The
findings also offer a new and more nuanced conceptualization of the Chinese media
landscape. Previously, studies on the landscape of Chinese media were from several
separate approaches. The political economy approach highlights the importance of
ownership and especially the party/commercial divide, or the party line/mass line/bottom
line categorization proposed by Zhao (1998). The study by Stockmann (2013) examines
the seemingly contradictory but actually convergent goals of commercialization and
authoritarian rule. Her approach provides an analysis of the similarities among the
provincial dailies. Another approach emphasizes the agency of journalists (Repnikova,
2017a; Svensson et al., 2013) and shows that critical content is possible to a certain extent.
Lee et al.’s (2007) and Lei’s (2016) studies demonstrate the impact of locality on media
performance. Results of the current project could synthesize and extend these previous
approaches and findings. The political economy argument is still useful since we do see
clear difference between a group of central-level publications and other commercial outlets,
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but it has its limitation in explaining the case of China Youth Daily. The convergence of
commercialization and authoritarian rule argument is also largely confirmed in this project,
and the scale of research has been significantly widened. The journalists’ agency could
explain the diversity found in the landscape, especially for those critical outlets. The
locality argument also largely holds true because daily newspapers in the same province
tend to be quite similar to each other in terms of expert sourcing. While these previous
approaches are useful, none of them are built on systematic empirical analysis of media
outlets, and none provide a detailed analyses of how ideological and structural bias and
constraints differ across issue areas. Therefore, the current project makes important
contribution to our understanding of media bias and landscape in China.
In addition, this study differentiates between bias that structurally favors certain
actors (top political leaders in the context of the current study) and the bias that reflects
divergent attitudes towards certain issues. It shows that these two types of media bias are
not necessarily correlated with each other, and so should be treated as different types of
constraint. This phenomenon is most evident in the case of China Youth Daily, which
previous studies have found to be intriguingly unique (Wang et al., 2018). The current
project provides an explanation on why China Youth Daily could sometimes behave as
other party outlets, while at other times like a critical commercial newspaper—it is because
structural bias and ideological bias can operate independently from each other.
Methodologically, the findings provide important lessons for selecting Chinese
media outlets for use in content analyses and experiments. Given the complexity of the
Chinese media landscape, choosing representative media outlets is a vital step in ensuring
the validity of such studies. In a previous project, I have reviewed 51 academic papers on
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Chinese media that use content analysis and are published in 16 major journalism and mass
communications journals during recent two decades (Fang, 2015). I find several problems
in the sampling methods. First, there were not enough publications selected for analysis.
More than half (52.9%) of the studies only sample one media outlet. On average, one
article selected 2.43 media outlets for analysis. After excluding the two outliers (9 and 19),
the average is only 2.03. Second, there is an apparent lack of diversity in sampled media
outlets. The People’s Daily has been studied by 23 papers (45.1%), followed by China
Central Television and Xinhua News Agency (10 papers for each). Commercial media
outlets altogether have been included in only 12 studies (23.5%), and important
commercial publications such as Caixin Weekly and Sanlian Life Weekly have not been
studied at all. Third, there is a lack of justification for the choice of media outlets. Even
though many studies mention influence/circulation and the authority of party media as
reasons for sampling specific media outlets, only a few of them have paid attention to
ideological diversity. An exception is that He and colleagues (2012) consciously picked
newspapers according to the political spectrum, including Southern Weekly and the China
Youth Daily on the liberal side, The People’s Daily on the conservative side, and
Guangzhou Daily “in the middle of the political road.” However, their choices were based
on speculations of the media landscape rather than systematic empirical analysis.
Nevertheless, their selections fit into the findings of this study quite well—with the caveat
that a nationalistic outlet should have been included, especially considering the fact that
their study is on the image of the U.S. in the Chinese media.
Based on findings presented in this project, I suggest the following approach for the
purposive sampling of Chinese media for content analysis. First, if a study aims to capture
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the full landscape of Chinese media, it should include at least one media outlet from each
cluster as identified above. If possible, I recommend also including one provincial party
daily and one provincial commercial daily to capture the possible differences in covering
the top officials among provincial dailies. I also recommend including China Youth Daily
as a unique case that generally falls in the critical cluster but is more conformist on certain
issues. Second, the choice of media outlets to include should be matched to the specific
purpose of the study. For example, orthodox party outlets should be sampled if one wants
to know the party line and official discourse on an issue, while critical outlets should be
sampled if one wants to make sense of the boundary for Chinese media on certain issues.
Third, as indicated in the findings, locality matters in determining the orientations of media
content. Therefore, researchers are encouraged to include media outlets from different
regions (developed vs. developing; coastal vs. inland; politically sensitive vs. normal; etc.)
in their national-scale studies, so as to capture important differences.
Similarly, experimental research could also draw insights from this project. In her
seminal work on Chinese media, Stockmann (2013) uses Beijing Daily and Beijing
Evening News as experimental treatment to test if media labels influence the perceived
credibility of a story published in that media. She finds that readers trust the commercial
Beijing Evening News significantly more than the party media Beijing Daily, though
content analysis shows that the ideological orientations of these two newspapers do not
differ much. Future research could test the perceived credibility associated with media
labels of the other three clusters: the orthodox party outlets, the critical publications, and
the nationalistic outlets. Furthermore, experiments investigating selective exposure,
political polarization, and other topics that involve the understanding of the ideological
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landscape could build on findings of this project. It is recommended that when preparing
the treatment materials, researchers select issues with divergent opinions (rather than those
with homogenous standpoints such as sovereignty and territorial integrity) and media
outlets from each cluster with different opinion orientations. By following this approach,
the experiments are likely to achieve a higher level of validity.

Implications for Research on Media Bias
This project also has implications for research on media bias in contexts other than China.
First, it shows that the journalistic sourcing patterns of expert interviewees is a
“context-free” method to measure media bias. The only circumstances in which such an
approach would be inappropriate are the rare cases in which a media outlet does not follow
the journalistic norm of citing experts in their coverage of issues and events. To validate
this methodological approach in a specific context, researchers should conduct interviews
with journalists to examine their sourcing practices.
Second, it provides a new perspective to understand and study the ideological
landscape in regimes where a clear ideological alignment has not formed, is in flux, is
unknown, or is complex and malleable. This is often the case in non-democratic, mixed, or
transitioning regimes, where little or no formal competition between parties is allowed. As
a result, there is no clear indication of the ideological alignments in society (even if such
alignments exist or are forming), leading to a less clear understanding of it among the
public, as well as also among the elites, the media, and researchers. To investigate this kind
of “formative” ideological landscape, one could not rely on frameworks (such as the
bipolar structure) developed in liberal democracies, where clearer ideological dimensions
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are arguably—though not necessarily—already defined. Instead, researchers could adopt
the data-driven approach as in this study and let clusters emerge in a network. Researchers
could also select multiple issues as in this study and identify issues that are actually
dividing the media outlets.
Finally, the two dimensions (ideological and structural) of media bias identified in
this study also provides a general theoretical framework for future studies on this topic, and
helps develop a more wholistic understanding of media bias rather than focusing on a few
specific types of bias.

Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
As indicated earlier, this project is necessarily exploratory in nature. It provides important
findings and implications, but also has some notable limitations. First, although I managed
to include more than 30 media outlets in the analysis, some important ones are still missing
due to the unavailability of full-text data, including Reference News 参考消息, one of the
most widely read newspapers in China; China Comment 半月谈, another important party
magazine; and China News Week 中国新闻周刊, a popular weekly news magazine. In
addition, no radio programs are included in the sample.
More importantly, the online media landscape has grown rapidly during recent
years, and many legacy media organizations have started to produce online-only content.
For example, The People’s Daily launched a well-received WeChat public account (similar
to a Facebook Page) Xiake Dao 侠客岛, which provides analyses on politics and current
affairs that are written in a more entertaining way. Southern Weekly also launched a
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popular WeChat public account Zhidao 知道 to provide content that is not published in the
paper. It is possible that with these emerging online channels, there are more internal
heterogeneity within each media outlet. Future studies could explore whether Xiake Dao is
closer to The People’s Daily or to other clusters of outlets in terms of ideological
orientation. Research on public opinion on social media could also draw insights from the
methodological approach and findings of this study.
Another limitation of this study is about the measurement of structural bias.
Although the bias in favor of top political leaders is arguably the most prominent structural
bias in Chinese media, there are possibly other forms of structural bias. For example, there
might be pro-business bias in commercial outlets, and a pro-Han ethnic group bias in most
areas except those minority autonomous regions. This study has not tested these alternative
forms of structural bias. It is encouraged that future studies could look into this issue.
Future studies could also build on this project and study the effects of media bias,
which is a crucial area of study in media bias research. Surveys and experiments could be
conducted to examine whether there is a causal relationship between the consumption of
biased media content and specific issue attitudes of the consumers. Issues analyzed in this
project could be used in those studies, as indicated above.
This project takes a media-centric view, which leaves room for future studies that
could focus on the cited experts. One could follow a similar methodological approach and
examine the cluster of scholars, or rank the visibility of scholars in media. These studies
could provide important implications for our understandings of elite ideology in China.
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An additional direction for future research is to develop a quantitative measurement
of media bias in China; one that could be applied to media outlets not analyzed in this
project. For the structural bias, it is relatively easy to operationalize it by comparing the
frequency with which top political leaders are mentioned to those already analyzed here.
For the ideological bias, the task is more difficult. One possible approach is to assign a set
of values to the most unique sources in each cluster (in a ranked order) and calculate the
total value of each media outlet for each cluster. For example, we assign 10 points to the
most unique source in each cluster, 9 for the second most unique one, and 1 for the 10th
most unique source. One media outlet that has not been studied before might end up getting
more than 200 points for the “critical outlets” cluster because it cited the most unique
source 10 times, the second most unique source 11 times, and several other unique sources
in that cluster. It only gets less than 10 points for the other three clusters. We can then
determine that this outlet belongs to the critical cluster, and we can compare it with other
outlets in the same cluster by points. Following this approach, one could assign a media
outlet to the landscape in a relatively easy and consistent manner. And our understanding
of the landscape of media bias in China could be continuously expanded.
Finally, future research should apply the approach used here to the media systems
in other nations, ideally in a way that allows for comparative research. This would be
especially valuable for non-Western polities, which as mentioned are understudied and less
amenable to the approaches developed for Western democracies. But it would also be
valuable to apply in Western democracies, including the United States, both as points of
comparison and for the real possibility that my approach might uncover general and
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issue-specific clusters of media outlets that to date have been missed by assuming a simple,
left/right or Democratic/Republican dimension.
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Appendix I. The Sampling Rationale
A. Newspapers
The following 22 newspapers are included for one or two reasons:
Title (Chinese)
人民日报
广州日报
南方都市报
钱江晚报
环球时报
楚天都市报
南方日报
华西都市报
南方周末
经济日报
光明日报
新民晚报
今晚报
湖北日报
羊城晚报
浙江日报
江南都市报
北京晚报
中国青年报
新京报
北京青年报
京华时报

Title (English)
The People’s Daily
Guangzhou Daily
Southern Metropolis Daily
Qianjiang Evening News
Global Times
Chutian Metropolis Daily
Nanfang Daily
Western China Metropolis
Daily
Southern Weekly
Economic Daily
Guangming Daily
Xinmin Evening News
Today Evening Post
Hubei Daily
Yangcheng Evening News
Zhejiang Daily
Jiangnan Metropolis Daily
Beijing Evening News
China Youth Daily
The Beijing News
Beijing Youth Daily
Beijing Times

Top 30
circulation?
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Previously
studied?
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N

Y
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y

The following newspapers were also among the top 30 most circulated in 2016, but were
excluded from the sample because no full-text data were available:

Title (Chinese)
参考消息
新华每日电讯

Title (English)
Reference News
Xinhua Daily Telegraph
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辽沈晚报
大河报
河南日报
新华日报
潇湘晨报
华商报
现代快报
齐鲁晚报
扬子晚报
半岛都市报

Liaoshen Evening News
Dahe Daily
Henan Daily
Xinhua Daily
Xiaoxiang Morning Post
Chinese Business
Modern Express
Qilu Evening News
Yangtse Evening News
Bandao Metropolis Daily

B. Magazines
There is no reliable data on the circulation of magazines in China. And there are very few
previous studies that have examined magazines in China. Therefore, I initially selected two
party magazines and five commercial magazines that are influential and representative to
my knowledge of China’s media landscape. The two party magazines were: Qiushi (求是)
and China Comment (半月谈). The five commercial magazines were: Caijing (财经),
Caixin Weekly (财新周刊), China News Week (中国新闻周刊), Sanlian Life Weekly (三联
生活周刊), and Nanfeng Chuang (南风窗).
Three of the seven magazines did not have full-text data available. The final sample
included the remaining four: Qiushi, Caixin Weekly, Sanlian Life Weekly, and Nanfeng
Chuang.

C. Broadcasting
The two most watched primetime news programs of China Central Television
(CCTV)—News Simulcast (新闻联播) and Focus (焦点访谈) were selected.
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The primetime radio news program by China National Radio—National News (央
广全国新闻联播) was initially included but later dropped due to the lack of full-text data.

D. Websites
News portals (e.g., Tencent, Sina, and Sohu) and aggregators (e.g., Today’s Headline) that
only repost stories from other media outlets were excluded. I also excluded websites of
traditional media because the content is repetitive of the first three categories.
Pengpai (澎湃) and Jiemian (界面) are two most prominent online-only news
outlets in China (See Repnikova & Fang, 2019). Both of them were included in the sample.
Another online publication in the sample is Guancha.cn (观察者网), which is a
popular news website (in terms of Alexa ranking) and a site that is known for opinionated
content (See Fang & Zhao, 2014).
Fang and Zhao’s (2014) study also included another influential and opinionated
website—Gongshi Wang (共识网). Unfortunately, it was shut down by the Chinese
government in 2016, and its previous articles were not accessible.
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Appendix II. Data Cleaning Process

The following types of data entries were picked up by algorithm but then removed by hand
because the intellectuals were not cited for their opinions.
A. science and engineering scholars cited
E.g., “Wuhan University Liu Jingnan, who is a member of Chinese Academy of
Engineering, says that the double satellite system of GPS and BeiDou can increase the
applicability and the accuracy of navigation (中国工程院院士、武汉大学教授刘经南说，
GPS 加北斗的双卫星导航系统可以提高系统的可用性和导航精度).” Economic Daily,
June 4, 2012.
B. political leaders visiting university campuses and meeting with professors
E.g., “Before the performance, Politburo Standing Committee member Li Changchun
visited exhibitions of Peking University’s developments and achievements. He also met
with Wu Shuqing, Yuan Xingpei, Sha Jiansun, Ye Lang, and other senior professors and
delegates of junior faculty and students (演出开始前，李长春参观了北京大学发展概况
展、人文社会科学成果展和“学雷锋树新风、加强校园文明建设”系列活动成果展，
与吴树青、袁行霈、沙健孙、叶朗等老教授和青年教师、学生代表亲切交流).” News
Simulcast, May 4, 2012.
C. scholars winning awards
E.g., “French economist Jean Tirole is the only laurate of the 2014 Nobel Memorial Prize
in Economic Sciences, breaking the U.S. monopoly of this prize (法国经济学家梯若尔独
中诺贝尔经济学奖，打破美国垄断).” Pengpai, October 14, 2014.
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D. scholars being appointed to political positions
E.g., “Professor of Economics Georgios Zanias is appointed to the Minister of Finance,
which is an vital position in Greece (对希腊来说至关重要的财政部长一职由经济学教
授约戈斯·扎尼亚斯担任).” Nanfang Daily, May 18, 2012.
E. intellectuals being the protagonists or the witnesses in a news story, rather than
the ones providing analysis and opinions
E.g. “Tsinghua University professor Wang Hui is accused of plagiarism, and dozens of
scholars publish open letter to demand investigation (清华教授汪晖涉嫌剽窃，数十名学
者发表公开信要求调查).” Western China Metropolis Daily, July 8, 2010.
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Appendix III. The Ideological Landscape of Certain Issues

Some of the figures of issue landscape are not included in Chapter 4 due to a high degree of
similarity. The figures are include here.
Circle = party media; square = commercial media. The size of the nodes are proportional to
the log-transformed amount of expert citations in each outlet.

a. The ideological landscape of the issue: social conflicts
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b. The ideological landscape of the issue: civil society
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c. The ideological landscape of the issue: the role of the government in economy
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d. The ideological landscape of the issue: state-owned and private enterprises
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e. The ideological landscape of the issue: tax and income distribution (state vs.
citizens)

168

f. The ideological landscape of the issue: inequality (rich vs. poor)
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g. The ideological landscape of the issue: housing price regulation
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h. The ideological landscape of the issue: interpretation of key economic statistics
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i. The ideological landscape of the issue: currency
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i. The ideological landscape of the issue: environmental protection
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Appendix IV. Statistics of the Issue Networks

Edge Weight

Number of
Communities

Modularity
Score

1

N/A

.271

3

.147

.497

.122

1

N/A

.658

.328

.114

2

.113

.127
.008

.790
.653

.526
.370

.164
.249

1
2

N/A
.219

.987
.994

.001
.001

.802
.756

.243
.225

.194
.216

4
4

.202
.157

31
31

.987
.985

.003
.001

.773
.791

.208
.196

.186
.193

4
4

.186
.142

31

.989

.002

.714

.189

.247

4

.121

31

.994

.005

.641

.214

.199

4

.145

31

.987

.009

.733

.198

.212

4

.110

31

1

.006

.692

.255

.236

4

.129

31

1

.192

.788

.487

.141

1

N/A

31

1

.223

.808

.542

.129

1

N/A

Issue

Size

Density

Min

Max

Adherence to
party ideology
The “China
Model”
Sovereignty
and territorial
integrity
China’s
international
presence
Corruption
Government
accountability
Rule of law
Social
conflicts
Civil society
The role of the
government in
economy
State-owned
and private
enterprises
Tax and
income
distribution
(state vs.
citizens)
Inequality
(rich vs. poor)
Housing price
regulation
Interpretation
of key
economic
statistics
Currency

27

1

.288

.691

.506

29

.983

.010

.786

.426

29

1

.295

.722

30

.998

.009

31
31

1
1

31
31

Mean

174

Standard
Deviation
.119

Gender
equality
One-child
policy
Environmental
protection
Traditional
culture

26

1

.030

.781

.312

.195

3

.174

30

1

.010

.759

.372

.245

2

.156

31

.991

.001

.780

.226

.187

4

.128

29

1

.103

.749

.484

.204

2

.091
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